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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Trading in financial markets is easy. Today, any person with an internet connection and
a proper brokerage account can trade almost any financial security on all important
exchanges around the world. However, making the right trades is extremely complicated
and many empirical studies1 suggest that both private and institutional investors often
fail to do so.
Especially stocks seem to be promising investment instruments in order to obtain
acceptable long-term returns. The negative trend in key interest rates during the last
decade has hit the zero line implying a virtual absence of effective low-risk saving
instruments. This is particularly worrisome with respect to the politically intended
proliferation of private retirement provisions in Germany and other countries alike.
In the view of the German government "private retirement provision is indispensable
to maintain future living standards" (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2011, p. 143).
Considering the media coverage, we find an insistent narrative, which appears to be
common knowledge, saying that "stocks are without alternative"2 for wealth creation.
Given that private persons have a necessity to invest in risky assets, e. g., stocks, the
question of how to invest correctly imposes a great challenge to investors.
1
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There has always been an intense discourse on how to increase wealth by investing
in stock markets. What should we buy or sell and when should we do it? What risk
should we take? How to diversify between stocks and other assets? Should we invest in
single stocks or use baskets such as funds? Should we trade actively or be just long-term
buy-and-hold investors? Undoubtedly, the list of questions is long and for each question,
there are different answers depending on whom we ask and who is asking.
Investment 
Problem  
Information 
Gathering  
Decision 
Making 
Monitoring 
Exchange 
Transaction 
Trade Imple-
mentation 
Price 
FIGURE 1.1: Stylized Investment Process.
Figure 1 illustrates a stylized investment process in order to discuss typical actions an
investor would take. For simplicity, assume the investment problem3 is to solely invest
in stocks, which could be a sub-task of the overall investment problem. The investor
needs to gather information on the instruments and on the methods to evaluate these
instruments, in order to solve her investment problem. Based on this information, the
investor needs to make decisions of what, when, and where to buy. Ultimately, she
1For example, Odean (1998b) and Barber and Odean (2000) analyze performance of private investor
and find considerable underperformance. Busse et al. (2012) analyze a broad set of institutional investors;
Wermers (2000) shows a (net) underperformance of fund managers which to a large extent is due to
transaction costs and other expenses. Naturally, average results imply that a large group of the sample
population performs much worse than the average value.
2This statement has been made by many industry experts, e. g., Andreas Utemann, Chief Investment
Officer Allianz Global Investors (Die Welt, 2015) and Christoph Bruns, Managing Partner of the fund
management firm LOYS AG (Handelsblatt, 2012)
3The investment problems of private persons (households) are considered in the household finance
literature. Campbell (2006) provides an overview on this research area and discusses challenges of
normative and positive household finance. Naturally, the "investment problem" of an investor has
more dimensions than just investing free capital, such as expected income and consumption as well as
associated risks, risk-free rate, utility preferences. Note that the discussion of these key points as well as
an extended view on household finance is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2
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implements her decision, for instance, by submitting an order to buy (or sell) some stock
on the selected exchange. However, the investment process is not a static single-period
problem but a continuous one, where inputs are constantly changing and decisions must
constantly be monitored. It is evident that each step of this process cannot be solved
optimally but is constrained by resources (e. g., information) and cognitive abilities
(e. g., knowledge or information processing capabilities). Thus, investors will always
try to use some simplification, that is, they use heuristics to solve their investment
problem.
In this thesis, I use the term investment heuristic for any approach which addresses
some problem the investor might be confronted with when managing the investment
process. In this sense, classical academic models, such as Markowitz’ Portfolio Theory
(Markowitz, 1952) or dividend discount models (e. g., Gordon, 1959), can be considered
as a type of investment heuristic when used to make investment decisions, since the
models are based on a set of assumptions which simplify the complexity of financial
markets. While academics typically propagate fundamental and statistical analysis -– at
its core modern portfolio theory, the efficient market hypothesis, and the capital asset
pricing model -– practitioners often rely on methodologies, which are less backed by
academic theory and quantitative validation but by personal experience of experts and
media narratives (Flanegin and Rudd, 2005). There exists a wide range of investment
methods and heuristics which are summarized under the term Technical Analysis.
Technical Analysis typically involves the recognition of price trends and trend reversals
by means of visual recognition or pseudo-statistical calculations. Its origins date back
to the Dow Theory propagated by Charles Dow in the 1920s. Hence, Technical Analysis
is substantially older than modern finance theories but it seems to have survived until
today.
However, the outcome of the investment process is not only affected by the choice
of the used investment heuristics. Behavioral finance literature has shown that the
investment outcome of human investors is affected by their cognitive limitations
and biases caused by judgmental heuristics (mental shortcuts for making decisions).
These cognitive heuristics and the resulting biases can influence the choice and the
implementation of investment heuristics. First, behavioral biases can influence the
choice of investment heuristic. For instance, in the context of judging probability,
3
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the availability heuristic means the overestimation of probabilities of events based on
observed frequencies. This cognitive heuristic could bias the investor’s choice to use
some investment heuristics because it occasionally worked in the past, but the investor
overestimates the probabilities that it works in general. Second, the implementation
of the applied investment heuristics could be biased or superimposed by behavioral
characteristics of the investor. For example, investors who have a home bias, i. e., the
tendency to focus on stocks of companies located in geographical proximity, limit their
trading heuristic to a subsample of local stocks they are familiar with.
Furthermore, cognitive limitations of human investors can lead to imprecise (quanti-
tative) processing of information. An example often observed in practice is the reliance
on specific key figures, such as round numbers or all-time highs and lows in the price
history which receive a lot of media attention. Such reference points often influence
the decision of investors, for instance, when they submit a limit order with a specific
limit price biased towards some level.
On the other hand, cognitive limitations could to some extent be diminished by the
investment heuristic. Given the investor sticks to a certain systematic strategy, she might
be able to overcome her loss aversion as a result of the systematic investment approach.
Interestingly, proponents of fundamental and technical investment heuristics often
interpret results of behavioral finance differently. From the fundamental analysis point
of view, behavioral effects mean a deviation from the norm (e. g., full rationality), while
technical analysts see behavioral concepts as a basic principle of markets which justifies
its use as a method to identify the induced deviation (Kirkpatrick II and Dahlquist, 2012,
ch.4).
Whether biased or rational market participants, Technicians or Fundamentalists, the
basic principle of markets is to reveal the market price of the traded asset by means
of the interaction of all market participants and the information they trade on. In this
sense, the market also reveals whether an investment heuristic used to trade contains
information that contributes to the informativeness of the current price. Nevertheless,
any trade – whether informative or not – will ultimately affect supply and demand for
the stock that can be observed in the market. Fisher Black motivated the term noise
trading for such trades, i. e., trading "on noise as if it were information" (Black, 1986,
p.529). If we assume that behavioral biases and (ineffective) investment heuristics
4
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contain no information, they trade on noise and add noise to the market at the same
time.
In this way, the market is affected by behavioral biases as well as investment heuristics.
The more dominant a bias or heuristic is, the larger the potential effects should become.
This means, there could be an observable link between trading that happens on the
exchange and investment heuristics that are applied by some market participants.
Empirically, we usually do not know what the intention behind a trade or an order
was, but we can observe the outcome, i. e., price and volume. Hence, price and volume
could provide insights on whether heuristics are used and how they, in turn, affect the
outcome of the market. If so, the question arises whether the outcome and, in general,
the functionality of the market is influenced negatively or positively. If we assume that
informed traders (e. g., arbitrageurs) will profit from deviations from efficient price
levels, the effect from noise trading should vanish quickly. Thus, only a very precise view
on trading will reveal such effects, i. e., from a (market) microstructure perspective.
In his review of behavioral finance, Subrahmanyam (2007, p.24) states that "there
[...] is room to analyse the fast-growing field of market microstructure and behavioural
finance" and asks "whose biases affect prices". This thesis tackles these issues and
provides insights into the link between investment heuristics and dimensions of market
quality (e. g., trading activity, liquidity, and price discovery) by the example of Technical
Analysis trading strategies and round number biases. Thereby I empirically show how
imperfect4 trading intentions influence the microstructure of trading.
4At this point, the term rational can be used as well, since the considered behavioral biases and
investment heuristics are limitations to the ability to find optimal solutions. However, to be rational needs
some definition of rationality, e. g., by some model or theory, while imperfect shall denote that an optimal
solution of the investment problem is very hard or even impossible to find and, hence, some heuristics
are applied. On the other hand, using heuristics can be rational in certain circumstances, for instance,
when information processing costs are high. Both cognitive and investment heuristics basically fit in
the concept of bounded rationality, which establishes an overarching theory. Simon (1955) postulates
simplifications that people use to make rational choices, e. g., by simplifying the pay-off function of the
outcome of some choice. An overview of related concepts and definitions is provided by Camerer (1998),
among others.
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1.2 Research Outline
This thesis aims to analyze the link between dimensions of market quality and investment
heuristics as well as round number biases. These links are considered on the basis of
empirical analyses of Technical Analysis and limit order clustering as well as buy-sell
imbalances around round numbers. I consider these research objects because both
are long known to matter for stock trading but still persist today. This motivates the
debate on why such investment heuristics and biases persist and what consequence the
high popularity in financial media (among other things) has. In both cases, it seems
that market participants did not adjust their behavior over several decades5. To study
potential effects, I pursue an empirical approach which is based on the processing of
large and precise data sets, i. e., data spanning over multiple instruments and over a
long sample period, yet, having a high observation granularity (e. g., tick data and order
flow data).
In particular, Technical Analysis, which summarizes a large variety of price and vol-
ume based methods and indicators, is heavily promoted in recent years by the financial
service industry and financial media. Both use it to provide ’profound investment tools’
for their clients and users. Whether they believe such features are actually helpful for
the investors’ trading efforts or whether marketing plays a dominant role is hard to verify,
but the latter seems likely considering the advertisements of software providers for
Technical Analysis tools. These catchy tools and visualizations could result in increasing
click rates and time spent on a financial website or increase the number of client trades
for a broker, in particular, because Technical Analysis methods provide explicit trading
recommendations in most cases. Thus, it seems possible that Technical Analysis plays a
role for retail investors when making investment decisions, which is addressed by the
first main research question.
Research Question 1. Do investment heuristics that are summarized as Technical
Analysis influence retail investor trading in speculative structured products?
5In the case of Technical Analysis, the survey evidence of Lease et al. (1974) and Hoffmann and
Shefrin (2014) on the usage of Technical Analysis by retail investors show similar results, although 40
years separate the studies
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To shed light on this question, I analyze order flow data in speculative structured
products traded on the Stuttgart Stock Exchange. These products are almost exclusively
traded by retail investors and provide a promising basis to explore the behavior of
retail investors (e. g., Meyer et al., 2014). In order to analyze Technical Analysis, i. e.,
trading signals to buy or sell, I implement recognition algorithms to determine trading
signals from popular chart patterns and Moving Average strategies. The algorithm is an
adopted version of the algorithm proposed by Lo et al. (2000). The Technical Analysis
signals are then related to various dimensions of retail investor trading such as trading
activity, returns, and holding duration.
In fact, retail investor trading increases around Technical Analysis trading signals.
Furthermore, several recent studies support the view that investment heuristics related
to Technical Analysis (still) play a role for institutional investors, too (e. g., Menkhoff,
2010). Hence, the question arises if trading on the larger and economically more
important German stock market is influenced by Technical Analysis in a comparable
manner as retail investor trading in structured products. Thus, I consider trading on
Germany’s largest stock market Xetra in order to assess the following question.
Research Question 2. What is the relation between Technical Analysis trading
signals and the market quality on Xetra?
O’Hara and Ye (2011, p.463) characterize market quality as "a market’s ability to
meet its dual goals of liquidity and price discovery." Both aspects are typically measured
along several dimensions by means of different proxies (Zhang et al., 2011). The
electronic evolution of both trading systems and IT infrastructure of market participants
have made stock trading much faster and increasingly automated (e. g., Jain, 2005;
Hendershott et al., 2011). This has substantially supported the increase in liquidity and
market efficiency over the past decades. The ability to process and react on information
very quickly makes it necessary to analyze potential market quality effects in relation
to Technical Analysis based trading in an immediate way. Thus, the measurement
must be based on short intervals instead of being calculated as long-term averages.
Existing studies consider Technical Analysis mostly on a daily basis or over short time
periods. I fill this gap by adapting the recognition procedure for intraday data and use
the procedure to analyze immediate effects on various dimensions of market quality. In
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particular, this includes an analysis of price discovery by means of a price decomposition
derived from a state space model representation.
The second part of this thesis examines round number effects, which can influence
the trading decisions and, especially, the trade implementation (see Section 1.1).
Psychologically, human round number biases stem from limited cognitive abilities to
handle large or precise numbers as well as a lot of numbers simultaneously (Schindler
and Kirby, 1997). Furthermore, people often rely on reference points (anchors), such
as round numbers like integers or multiples of ten, in order to make decisions (Rosch,
1975).
In the context of financial markets, where buyers and sellers meet to find a suiting
price, round numbers can simplify negotiations as they limit the set of possible outcomes
by serving as reference points (Harris, 1991; Kahneman, 1992). This was particularly
relevant in times when much trading happened bilateral and often non-verbal on
the trading floor. Today, stock exchanges are highly automated and fully electronic.
Therefore, it seems unlikely that the negotiation problem still applies. However, there
is international evidence that limit order clustering still is an empirical characteristic
of limit order book trading (e. g., Bhattacharya et al., 2012), but the origins of the
effect and its implications remain unclear in the context of fully electronic markets and
trading systems. Thus, the purpose of the following research question is to confirm the
evidence on round number effects for the German stock market and to obtain further
insights regarding potential determinants of these effects.
Research Question 3. How do round number biases influence trading on the
German stock market?
Since the analysis of stock trading on Xetra is based on public data and Xetra is used
by many different types of traders, stock trading data from Stuttgart Stock Exchanges
enables a deeper understanding of retail investor behavior with respect to round number
effects. The additional information contained in order flow data allows for a deeper
understanding on how round number effects convey into the market.
8
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides basic information
on the institutional setting of German security markets with a focus on retail investor
trading. The chapter also describes the data sets obtained from these institutions,
which will be used throughout the thesis. Furthermore, I give an overview of academic
literature on the behavior and biases of investors when making financial decisions
as well as on empirical findings on (retail) investor trading and performance. The
last section of the Chapter 2 provides basic knowledge regarding empirical market
microstructure with a focus on the measurement of market quality.
The two subsequent chapters present the main results of this thesis. Chapter 3
analyzes the role of Technical Analysis for retail investor trading in structured products
on Stuttgart Stock Exchange and for the trading of blue-chip stocks on Xetra6 Therefore,
an algorithmic recognition methodology is introduced to reconstruct Technical Analysis
trading signals. Chapter 4 examines round number effects in the German stock market7.
The chapter proceeds by analyzing the presence and determinants of round number
effects on Xetra. These results are complemented by a second analysis of stock trading
on Stuttgart Stock Exchange in order to obtain evidence on retail investor behavior,
which shall improve the understanding of the results from Xetra. Chapter 5 summarizes
the results and discusses their implications as well as potential future research topics.
6The results on Research Question 1 presented in Chapter 3 is based on the paper Fritz and Weinhardt
(2015), which has been presented at the 14th INFINITI Conference on International Finance (Dublin,
Irleand) and which was invited to for presentation at the 33rd International AFFI Conference 2016 (Liege,
Belgium). Research Question 2 is based on the work Fritz and Weinhardt (2016). The results have been
presented at the 2016 Portsmouth-Fordham Conference on Banking & Finance (Portsmouth, UK) and the
paper is invited for presentation at the 14th International Paris Finance Meeting 2016 and the 4th Paris
Financial Management Conference 2016.
7Chapter 4 is based on the paper Fritz (2014), which has been presented at the 5th Financial Markets
and Corporate Governance 2014 (Brisbane, Australia) and was invited for presentation at the 12th
INFINITI Conference on International Finance (Prato, Italy).
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Chapter 2
Foundations
This chapter provides basic information on the research objects of this thesis. I focus on
German security markets with a special dedication to retail investor trading and behavior.
First, the financial institutions and products considered in this thesis are introduced
as well as the employed data sets provided by these institutions. Second, I discuss
academic findings on investor behavior and biases in financial decision making as well
as empirical findings on retail investor trading in practice. Third, basic knowledge
on market microstructure theory with a focus on the measuring of market quality is
provided.
2.1 Institutions
The empirical analyses conducted to answer the research questions postulated in Section
1.2 focus on financial markets in Germany. This section describes the German exchange
landscape with a focus on stock trading and trading of structured products. The
universe of structure product types is immense, hence, I will consider two popular and
fairly standard types of speculative structured products namely plain vanilla warrants
(henceforth warrants) and knock-out warrants, which are described in detail within
Section 2.1.3.
With respect to the trading process discussed in Chapter 1, the investor’s brokerage
naturally plays an important role. Numerous brokers offer their services to retail
11
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investors. Most classical banking accounts come with the possibility to add a brokerage
account. Furthermore, there are many online (discount) brokers offering accounts
which are accessible exclusively online and come at relatively low cost. Typically these
brokers have mobile application such that trading is possible from anywhere at any
time provinding retail investors much more flexibility compared to the pre-internet era.
Since financial markets have become fully electronic, brokers can offer their (retail)
clients access to almost any exchange and any product. The high degree of automation
promoted the rise of the derivatives industry as it has become very simple to issue new
products and markets, e. g., contracts for difference (CFDs), binary options, and (other)
structured products.
Due to the lack of broker data, I omit to describe the brokerage industry in more
detail. The presented research on retail investors, in particular Section 3.5 and Section
4.6, takes a market-wide perspective, i. e., the retail investors participating in a market
are considered as a group and, thus, the results provide evidence on the population of
(retail) investors rather than on the individuals.
2.1.1 Deutsche Börse and Xetra
Deutsche Börse is the largest exchange operator in Germany and is the fourth largest
equity exchange world-wide (as of May 2016). Deutsche Börse operates several market
platforms and the largest German provider of post-trade services (Clearstream). Their
fully electronic trading platform Xetra (current release Xetra 16.0) is the primary market
for most major German stocks. With an overall order book turnover at the cash market
of about EUR 1.058 trillion1 in 2013 Xetra constitutes one of the largest stock exchanges
world-wide.
Stock trading on Xetra has a dynamic flexible market model which includes contin-
uous double auctions (limit order book trading) as well as call auctions. The normal
trading schedule stipulates auctions at the beginning and at the end of the trading
session as well as a midday auction. The full Xetra trading schedule is shown in Appendix
A.1. Trading hours at Xetra are from 09:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. (CET). After trading
1According to the GDP report of the Statistische Bundesamt, trading turnover on Xetra is equivalent
to about 38% the German gross domestic product in 2013 (EUR 2.821 trillion).
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interruptions (e. g., volatility breaks) trading is typically initiated by a call auction to
concentrate liquidity.
The Xetra system is designed to enable fast and large-scale trading. Deutsche Börse
offers different connection bandwidths and co-locations to meet the demand of market
participants for low-latency access. Over the last decade the share of high-frequency
trading has increased considerably which also bolstered trading activity and liquidity.
For example, in 2007 the reduction of latency with the Xetra 8.0 upgrade led to a
significant increase of liquidity and a reduction of spreads (Riordan and Storkenmaier,
2012). According to a press release in August 2008 (Deutsche Börse AG, 2008), the
share of algorithmic trading in overall order volume on the Xetra system is in the
magnitude of 40 percent. Although exact numbers are not publicly available, it is likely
that the amount is considerably larger in highly liquid stocks (cf. Gsell and Gomber,
2009) and has further risen in recent years.
Furthermore, Xetra allows for so-called designated sponsors who are required to
"offer binding bid- and ask prices" (Deutsche Börse AG, 2012, p.1) based on specific
requirements but receive a rebate on trading fees. Besides classical order types such
as market, limit, and stop orders, continuous stock trading on Xetra allows for several
non-standard order types. The official Xetra documentation (Deutsche Börse AG, 2015b)
gives an overview on trading rules and all available order types in continuous stock
trading on Xetra. Note that the referenced document is valid as of November 2015 and
several changes have been made during the sample period analyzed in this thesis (2008
to 2013). However, the respective documentations are not publicly available anymore
and therefore are not referenced here.
For expediency reasons, I only discuss those exotic order types which might be
relevant for the analysis of the microstructure of trading. Hidden orders and iceberg
orders are limit orders which are not or only partially (iceberg) displayed in the limit
order book but have no time priority against visible order types, i. e., the hidden part of
the order is executed only if it improves the current bid or ask price. With respect to
market quality measures, hidden orders have an effect in the sense that trade executions
can occur inside the bid-ask spread.
Midpoint orders are special orders which are aggregated separately from the limit
order book and are executed at the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. However, midpoint
13
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orders only account for a negligible number of transactions. Based on the data sample
from the Thomson Reuters Tick History introduced in Section 2.2, less than 0.01% of
DAX30 transaction during continuous trading in December 2013 were due to midpoint
orders.
In 2002 Deutsche Börse introduced the Xetra BEST functionality which offers an
integrated feature for the execution of bilateral trades between the so-called Best
Executor and an order flow provider based on reference prices from continuous limit
order book trading on Xetra (Deutsche Börse AG, 2015a). Technically, a Xetra BEST
order is executed against the Best Executor at a price better than current quotes or
executed against the orders in limit order book, i. e., the order is automatically entered
into the Xetra order book. The price improving characteristics of BEST orders lead to
the observation of inside spread executions which usually have a price improvement of
EUR 0.001 compared to the current bid or ask. Since this order type is a normal function
of continuous stock trading on Xetra, excluding those trades seems inconvenient with
respect to measures of trading activity, liquidity, and price discovery. In December 2013
the order type accounted for 0.64% of executed transaction in DAX30 stocks which
seems to be sufficiently small to reject potential systematic effects on any result.
A detailed introduction and description of the employed data sets from Xetra follows
in in Section 2.2.1.
2.1.2 Stuttgart Stock Exchange
Besides the fully electronic trading system Xetra, there are seven regional floor-based
exchanges in Germany. Among these, Stuttgart Stock Exchange, which is operated by
the Boerse Stuttgart GmbH2, is the largest in terms of trading turnover but plays a
minor role in stock trading, which is dominated by Xetra3. The business focus of Boerse
Stuttgart is to provide exchange services which primarily address the trading needs of
retail investors.
2For further information on the corporate structure of institutions associated with Boerse Stuttgart
see https://www.boerse-stuttgart.de/en/company/exchange/ (accessed on July 18, 2016).
3In 2014, the overall turnover in equities on Stuttgart Stock Exchange was EUR 87.8 billion compared
to EUR 1259.6 billion on exchanges of the Deutsche Boerse Group. Source: Federation of European
Securities Exchanges (http://www.fese.eu/).
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The major segment of Stuttgart Stock Exchange is listing and trading of structured
products. Structured products (also known as bank-issued products, securitized deriva-
tives, and certificates) are technically bearer bonds issued by an investment bank that
typically have a non-trivial payoff function depending on one or multiple underlying
instruments. The structured products trading segment at Stuttgart Stock Exchange was
introduced in 1999 and has grown considerably since then. At the end of 2014, there
were 1.121 million structured products listed on Stuttgart Stock Exchange making up
for more than 95% of all listed instruments on the exchange (Baden-Württembergische
Wertpapierbörse, 2015).
In contrast to Xetra, Stuttgart Stock Exchange has a hybrid trading model which
combines electronic limit order book trading and floor-based market makers (so-called
quality liquidity provider). Especially for trading of illiquid instruments such as most
structured products, the market makers of the EUWAX AG, which is subsidiary of Boerse
Stuttgart GmbH, are necessary to ensure that trades are executed quickly at reasonable
prices. In many instruments traded at Stuttgart Stock Exchange, client orders are
usually executed against a market maker who sets prices with respect to some reference
market. For example, orders in DAX30 stocks which are smaller than a given trade size
are executed at the Xetra midquote price during Xetra trading hours. This implies that
stock trading at Stuttgart Stock Exchange has virtually no price discovery function.
Similarly, trading of structured products does usually not reveal the price of the
instrument as it is the case for exchange-traded options on Eurex4, for example. Since
the price of structured products is a function of traded instruments and other inputs
(risk-free rate, maturity, etc.), prices can be calculated based on reference prices of the
inputs and some valuation function. In practice, price quotes are typically provided by
the products’ issuing bank.
2.1.3 Bank-Issued Structured Products
Structured products denote a large universe of bank-issued investment instruments pri-
marily addressing trading needs of retail investors. From a legal perspective, structured
4Eurex exchange is a derivatives exchange operated by Deutsche Börse (http://www.eurexchange.
com). With a total trading volume of 1.5 billion contracts in 2014, Eurex is among the largest derivatives
exchanges world-wide.
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products are bearer bonds issued by an investment bank which have a non-trivial payoff
function, such as derivative components with respect to some underlying instrument.
Stock exchanges like Stuttgart and Frankfurt Stock Exchange list these products to
make them tradeable and employ market makers to increase liquidity. However, it is
also possible to trade the product with the issuing investment bank directly via over-
the-counter (OTC) transactions. In contrast to funds or exchange-traded derivatives,
structured products include an additional default risk due to the legal classification as
bonds.
Structured products give retail investors the possibility to invest in underlyings
(e. g., commodities, interest rates) and derivative strategies (e. g., options) to which
they usually have no or only limited access, for instance, due to specific capital or
admission requirements (e. g., for derivative exchanges such as Eurex), inconvenient
market characteristics (e. g., commodity spot markets), or missing (broker) access to
international markets. The vast universe of structured products covers a large range of
underlyings and payoff functions. Naturally the benefits of such products come at a cost
for the retail investor. Besides trading fees and bid-ask spreads, structured products
contain a (price) premium charged by the issuing bank. These premia are contained in
the price quotes of issuers which gradually decrease over the product lifetime (so-called
life cycle effect). Since short-selling of structured products is not permitted, it is not
possible to arbitrage the overpricing of products.
The product classification introduced by the Deutsche Derivate Verband5 divides
structured products into investment products (with and without capital protection) and
leverage products (with and without knock-out). Investment products are intended
to provide improved long-term return characteristics for the investor. For example,
discount certificates are covered calls (i. e., underlying long and call option short) on
the underlying instrument and provide a discount on the current underlying price while
limited potential gains. Thus, the structured product allows retail investors to pursue
strategies to which they have no access otherwise. Similarly, there are a numerous
products which allow for other derivative features. Deutscher Derivate Verband (2016)
provides an overview on most common types of investment products.
5The Deutsche Derivate Verband is an association of 15 leading issuers of derivatives in Germany
(http://www.derivateverband.de).
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With respect to Research Question 1 and trading heuristics like Technical Analysis,
leverage products are of particular interest. Due to their characteristics, leverage
products could be favored by retail investors who pursue active and speculative trading
strategies. Empirically, the holding period of leverage is much shorter and trade
frequency is higher. As the name suggests, leverage products include a leveraged
payoff function, i. e., price changes in the underlying lead to disproportionate price
changes in the leverage product. Thus, leverage products are (in most cases) more risky
than a direct investment in the respective underlying but enable the investor to speculate
with less capital requirements in large (net) positions. Since there are long and short
(call and put) products, leverage products (as well as some investment products) allow
retail investors to assume short positions on underlyings such as stocks.
Similarly to investment products, there exists a wide range of leverage products.
In the following two common types which are empirically analyzed in this thesis are
introduced. Deutscher Derivate Verband (2016) gives an extensive overview on other
types of leverage products.
Warrants
Warrants are securitized plain vanilla call or put options and exist for many underlying
instruments, such as stocks, indices, and commodities. As it is generally common for
options, the specification of a warrant comprises time to maturity, strike price, exercise
type, and subscription ratio. The payoff function at maturity is depicted in Figure 2.1.
Before maturity the value of the warrant contains an additional time value, i. e., the
implicit value of the option to buy or sell at the time of maturity (in case of European
options). The fair price of a warrant with respect to the underlying can be calculated
on the basis of option pricing models such as the Black-Scholes model.
Knock-out Products
Knock-out products or knock-out warrants (henceforth knock-outs) are securitized
barrier options. Specifically, knock-out calls and puts are down-and-out calls and
up-and-out puts, respectively. While the payoff at maturity is basically equivalent to
warrants, the knock-out characteristic requires that the underlying price never reaches
the barrier during maturity. The knock-out expires worthless when the barrier is touched
17
Chapter 2 Foundations
Underlying Price 
P
ro
fi
t 
0 
Put Call 
Strike Call Strike Put 
FIGURE 2.1: Warrant payoff at Maturity. This figure shows the payoff function of a
call warrant and put warrant with respect to the price of the underlying at maturity. In
both cases, losses are limited to the purchase price of the respective warrant.
or crossed from above (call) and below (put), respectively. Thus, knock-outs are basically
riskier than standard warrants and are considered as highly speculative instruments for
short-term trading.
For standard knock-out products barrier and strike price are equal. In case of
open-end knock-outs, i. e., products without fixed time to maturity, there also exist
knock-out calls (puts) with stop-loss for which the barrier is larger (smaller) than the
strike. Furthermore, the barrier of open-end products is adjusted on a daily basis to
compensate for the issuer financing cost, i. e., the issuer is not able to include the
premium into the product price which then decreases until time to maturity, since
maturity is unlimited. Due to the additional complexity of these products and the
requirement of data regarding daily barrier adjustments, open-end products are not
considered for the empirical analyses presented in Section 3.5.
Academic Literature on the Market for Structured Products
The academic literature on the market for structured products are basically along
two directions. On the one hand, issuing and pricing of structured products (issuer
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perspective); on the other hand, behavior of retail investors trading structured products
(investor perspective).
As mentioned above, structured products can be traded on exchange or OTC against
the issuer. However, price discovery is generally quote-driven, i. e., issuers and market
makers set prices. Since the product price also contains the product’s premium,
several studies investigate deviations between observed prices and theoretical fair
values obtained by means of option pricing models. Wilkens et al. (2003) show price
deviations in discount certificates and provide evidence for the life-cycle effect. Baule
(2011) finds that issuers of discount certificates adjust overpricing with respect to the
anticipated retail investor demand for the product. Fritz and Meyer (2012) analyze
bonus certificates6 and find that overpricing varies over the trading day, which reflects
the varying risk associated with issuers’ hedging strategies. Product premia in bonus
certificates are estimated to impose costs of about 1% on the retail investors’ initial
position, on average. With respect to (open-end) leverage products, Entrop et al. (2009)
find premiums ranging between five and ten percent of the certificate price, which
theoretically implies profits for the issuers of 20% to 30% p.a.
Another branch of literature analyzes the trading behavior of retail investors in
structured products. Schmitz and Weber (2012) analyze the behavior of discount
broker clients in warrants and show that retail investor pursue negative feedback
strategies (contrarian trading) and exhibit disposition effects7, i. e., they are more likely
to realize gains than losses. Meyer et al. (2014) find negative returns for retail investors
trading leverage products which is driven by transaction costs and product premia.
Further, they show that retail investors are attracted by news events. Similarly, Schroff
et al. (2015) show that Google search volume in the underlying has a positive effect
on trading activity in speculative leverage products while there is no effect in case of
investment products.
Overall, the advantages of structured products, i. e., sophisticated payoff functions
with derivative components, come at high costs for retail investors, who on average fail
to earn excess returns on their trading activities. Hence, retail investor must either be
6Bonus certificates are investment products which protect the investor from adverse price movements
below the bonus level up to the so-called security level. If the latter is breached, the bonus certificates
remains a long position in the underlying.
7The disposition effect is discussed in Section 2.4
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unable to realize that their trading efforts are ineffective, or they gain other utility from
trading than profits. Several studies argue that retail investors who trade speculative
structured products or, in general, derivatives have a strong preference for lottery-like
payoff functions (Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009) while hedging seems to play no central
role (Schmitz and Weber, 2012).
2.2 Data
This section gives an overview on the data sets and data sources used within this thesis.
Furthermore, initial data processing steps, such as data cleanings and other adjustments,
are described.
2.2.1 Thomson Reuters Tick History
Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) is a large database of time-stamped market data
for more than 45 million instruments8. I access TRTH via the services of Securities
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA9), which provides researchers access to
several high-quality databases.
From TRTH I retrieve four types of data sets regarding stock trading on Xetra:
• End-of-Day data
• Intraday data
• Times & Sales data
• Depth data
End-of-Day data contains daily observation of opening, closing, highest, and lowest
price as well as trade volume and corporate actions such as stock splits, dividend
payments, and number of outstanding shares.
8See http://thomsonreuters.com/en/products-services/financial/market-data.html ac-
cessed on July 1, 2016.
9I thank SIRCA for providing access to their databases. For more information on SIRCA see http:
//www.sirca.org.au.
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Intraday data refers to stock market data aggregated on intraday intervals of specific
length such as 1-second, 1-minute, etc. For each interval, the same variables as for
daily data are provided. In particular, open, high, low, and last (trade) price as well as
volume are used for this thesis.
Times & Sales data provides a tick-based view on (stock) trading on Xetra. The
data set contains all executed trades, quote revisions and call auctions time-stamped
on a millisecond basis. For trade executions and auctions, price as well as executed
volume are reported. Quote observations show best ask and bid price as well as the
respective available limit order volume (number of shares). Appendix A.1 shows an
example of Times & Sales data. Since I am primarily interested in continuous limit
order book trading, executions of call auctions are disregarded as it is typically done
in the literature. Note that the parituclar orders involved in some execution are not
explicitly known. Thus, the trade direction, i. e., whether the liquidity demanding order
was a buy or sell, must be estimated from the data. The procedure applied to infer the
trade direction is described in Section 2.5.
Depth data contains information on the first ten levels of the bid and ask side of
the Xetra limit order book time-stamped with millisecond precision. For each level
price and limit order volume (number of shares) is reported. Each observation refers
to an update of the limit order book such that the state of the limit order book can be
reconstructed at any point of time.
I obtain these four datasets for all stocks of the Deutsche Aktienindex (DAX) and the
Mid-Cap-DAX (MDAX) based on the index compositions on December 31, 2012. The
sample of DAX (MDAX) stocks considered in this thesis range from January 1, 2008
(2009) to December 31, 2013. The last trading day of the year is disregarded due to
the shortened trading session. Changes in the index composition are not considered to
keep the set of stocks stable over time except ordinary shares of Volkswagen which are
replaced by its preference shares. Any other stock which entered the DAX had been
traded on Xetra before and analogously for stock which were removed from the index.
In sum, there are thirty DAX stocks (DAX30) and fifty MDAX stocks (MDAX50) under
consideration. The stock samples are listed in Appendix A.2 and A.3.
Besides stocks, Intraday data of the DAX index is obtained for the period January
2008 to December 2013. Furthermore, I use Intraday data on the volatility index
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VDAX-NEW10 (henceforth denoted as VDAX). The VDAX index is a proxy for market
volatility and is calculated on the basis of implied volatilities of DAX options traded on
Eurex11.
Data quality
For empirical analyses, data quality is an important factor. With respect to TRTH tick-
data (Times & Sales, Depth data), some potential data issues need to be considered.
First, trade executions and quote updates, i. e., observations in the TRTH Times & Sales
data set, are reported independently in the sense that time-stamps of trades and quotes
can appear in the wrong order. Note that time stamps in the data sets are not provided
by the exchange operator but are set by Thomson Reuters. Thus, biased time stamps
could appear for trades and quotes if they are extracted by different processes in the
trading system. For trades and quotes in the same millisecond, I compare trade price
and size with the respective quote and quote change of the prevailing and subsequent
quote observation and sort these observations accordingly. Misplaced trades and quotes
having differing time stamps do exist but are very rare. Tests on the basis of more
complex consistency algorithms show no relevant impact on trade- and quote-based
measures such as spreads. In general, it is not expected that the described issue has a
systematic effect on any variable calculated from this data set.
Second, it is suspected by researchers that data from TRTH is conflated, i. e., not all
quote revisions are reported. In particular, changes which do not effect prices on some
bid or ask level but only volume could be disregarded. While this might be critical for an
analysis of high-frequency trading strategies, for instance on the basis of reconstructed
orderflow from Times & Sales data, I do not expect any bias for the analyses presented
in this thesis. Applied measures are typically aggregated on a lower frequency weighted
by time and, thus, should not be systematically affected by missing short-lived quote
updates.
Third, erroneous observations and missing data naturally can appear in the data
recordings, for example due to system failures or incorrect data entries of Xetra or
10For details on the VDAX construction see http://www.dax-indices.com/EN/MediaLibrary/
Document/VDAX_L_2_4_e.pdf accessed on July 3, 2016.
11The European Exchange (Eurex) is a Frankfurt based options and futures exchange owned by
Deutsche Börse. http://www.eurexchange.com
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Thomson Reuters systems. All observations are checked for inconsistent entries such as
missing or zero values. If any data field is erroneous the observation is deleted. There
are some instances when data reporting starts delayed, i. e., several minutes at the
beginning of the trading day are missing. In most cases, this is uncritical to the analyses
as the first and last minutes of each trading session are disregarded anyway. If there
are longer gaps in the data the whole trading day is taken from the sample.
Data from the Thomson Reuters Tick History is a standard data source in financial
market research and has been applied in many academic studies. Overall, I believe
there is no impact from potential data issues on any results presented in this thesis.
2.2.2 Boerse Stuttgart Research Database
The Boerse Stuttgart Research Database12 provides an in-depth view on trading at
Stuttgart Stock Exchange and thereby enables researcher to analyze retail investor
trading and structured products. I obtain two datasets from Boerse Stuttgart:
• Master data
• Order flow data
Master data describes the instruments traded on Stuttgart Stock Exchange. Since
there exists a vast number of structured products and most have complex derivative
features, information on the explicit product characteristics is indispensable for re-
searching this trading segment. I use master data on knock-out products and warrants
(without open-end products13) described in Section 2.1.3 ranging from January 1,
2009 to December 31, 2013. I only use instruments for which complete master data
information is available. The sample contains 266,783 traded instruments, in total.
Table 2.1 shows the relevant data fields of the Master data and an explicit example for
a knock-out product. Order flow data contains all order submissions, modifications,
12I thank Boerse Stuttgart for providing data for this thesis. For further details on
the Boerse Stuttgart Research Database see https://www.retailinvestmentconference.org/
data-for-research/data-for-research.html.
13Open-end products have no fixed (limited) time-to-maturity. In case of option-like products such as
knock-outs, the product’s strike price is usually adjusted on a daily basis to compensate the issuer for
the cost and premium of the product. Since the strike price updates are not part of the database, these
instruments are not considered for the analysis presented in this thesis.
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TABLE 2.1: Boerse Stuttgart Research Database – Master Data Example. This table
shows a master data example entry of a warrant product traded on Stuttgart Stock
Exchange. Only an extract of relevant data fields is printed. The shown product is a
classical warrant product (German: "Optionsschein") on the DAX index by Commerzbank
AG.
Data Field Value
Type WAR
Option Type Call
ISIN DE000CK7XFH4
Product Name Optionsschein
Exercise Type a
Underlying Instrument DAX
ISIN Underlying DE000CK7XFW3
Underlying Type IND
Strike Price 7050
Expiration Date 05.04.2012
Subscription Ratio 0.01
First Trading Day 22.03.2012
Last Trading Day 04.04.2012
deletions, and executions at Stuttgart Stock Exchange. 2.2 shows all relevant data fields
and an exemplary order execution. The main advantage of order flow data compared
to Times & Sales data from TRTH is that it allows for a much more detailed view on
investor behavior since all messages from investors to the exchange are known. In
particular, the trade direction (buy or sell) of the executed order is known. In Chapter 3,
I use order flow data for the above mentioned knock-out products and warrants, which
comprises about 3.7 million executions. In Chapter 4, I analyze about 1.62 million
trades in DAX30 stocks executed at Stuttgart Stock Exchange.
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TABLE 2.2: Boerse Stuttgart Research Database – Order Flow Data Example. This
table shows a trade execution (message code "011") recorded in the order flow data
base. The traded instrument is the product shown in Table 2.1. Only an extract of
relevant data fields is printed. The shown trade. Note that in practice reported trade
execution do not contain order-level information such as limit price. In this example,
this information is updated from the order history (submission, modification, etc.).
Data Field Value
Message Code 011
Timestamp 2012-04-03 14:37:11.780
ISIN DE000CK7XFW3
Buysell K
Size 3081
Limit 0.3400
Stoplimit -
Trade Price 0.3400
Trade Quantity 3081
Routing ID xxxx
2.3 Behavioral Biases in Financial Decision Making
Standard financial market models assume that market participants act fully rational,
i. e., they make decisions based on all relevant information in order to maximize their
utility. However, through the observation of actual investor behavior the assumption
of fully rational investors is not always consistent, as the literature discussed in the
next section shows. In the research area behavioral finance, shortcomings of investors’
decision making are analyzed with respect to the impact on the behavior of investors
(among others, trading activity and portfolio choice) as well as on the market and, in
particular, market prices. Thereby behavioral finance has helped to understand many
financial market phenomena, which are considered as inefficiencies under classical
assumptions, e. g., the equity premium puzzle14.
14The equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) describes the empirically high average
return of stocks (equity) compared to other asset classes that cannot be justified by the risk-return ratio of
the stock. This means, investors demand a (unexpectedly) high risk premium to hold stocks. Behavioral
factors, such as prospect theory preferences, discussed in Section 2.3 provide explanations for the puzzle,
because it implies a substantial loss aversion of investors (Barberis and Huang, 2001) such that an
additional risk premium is required to compensate for holding stocks.
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This section provides a brief discussion of the behavioral finance literature focusing on
aspects that are related to results presented in this thesis. For an extensive introduction
and further discussion of behavioral finance topics, I refer to literature overviews by
Thaler (2005) and Subrahmanyam (2007).
Barberis and Thaler (2003) cluster cognitive limitations in decision making into
two components that affect the behavior of investors in a financial market context.
First, how investors form beliefs about the current state and future outcomes. Second,
what preference investors have with respect to the outcome of an investment. Both
components can have a significant impact on asset prices (e. g., in case of the equity
premium puzzle) and on the individual investment performance.
Besides the consideration of psychology findings on cognitive biases in decision
making, behavioral finance is based on the concept of limited arbitrage. This concept
disregards the assumption of rational agents who enforce efficient prices and ultimately
push irrational and uninformed traders (noise traders) out of the market. I discuss the
concepts of limited arbitrage and noise trading within Section 3.6.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, I differentiate between psychological heuristics for
decision making, which cause behavioral biases (deviations from rational decisions),
and investment heuristics, which intend to overcome optimization limitations occurring
within the investment process. The latter establishes the framework of "bounded ratio-
nality" (Simon, 1955, among others), which considers the application of simplifications
as rational behavior, since the full problem cannot be solved optimally. Naturally,
psychological heuristics can influence the choice and implementation of an investment
heuristic. For instance, cognitive limitations of humans make it impossible to process
all information sources that might be relevant for an investment decision, thus, it is
rational to focus on certain information. However, this focus could be biased by other
behavioral factors or be influenced by the choice of investment heuristics. In case of
Technical Analysis, the role of news about a stock company is considered to be only of
subordinate importance, since it is assumed the market price will reflect the necessary
information on the future price development anyway (cf. Section 3.3).
In general, the relation between biases is ambiguous and presumably varies between
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individuals. Related research15 typically isolates single biases, for example, through a
certain framing of an experiment task, in order to make assertion about the cognitive
heuristics causing the bias. Considering the investment reality of (human) investors,
behavioral effects are assumingly diffuse and superimpose each other. Hence, it is
difficult to argue what bias plays a dominant role for the application of Technical
Analysis and for round number effects based on a market-wide consideration. In the
following, I briefly discuss cognitive limitations which are expected to affect the usage
of Technical Analysis and round number biases. More specific implications with respect
to the trading and investment outcome of retail investors are discussed within the next
section.
Beliefs
The way people make beliefs is influenced by numerous cognitive heuristics which have
evolved in the evolutionary process that formed human behavior. Some of them have
implications for financial decision making as they can cause deviations from rational
economic behavior. Some biases stem from or are related to the inability to handle
randomness in a proper way. A reason might be that during the human evolution,
the quick assessment of deterministic and causal links is a more important ability for
survival, while probabilistic reasoning has fewer direct applications. Although literate
persons like statisticians undoubtedly are able to understand and handle randomness,
they still can be affected by related biases when they have to make decisions quickly or
subconsciously.
In several works, Kahneman and Tveserky have established the concept of fast
(System 1) and slow (System 2) thinking. While slow thinking tends to be more rational
and is able to perform statistical and mathematical calculations, fast thinking, which is
often associated with "gut decisions", is intuitive and allows to process more information
subconsciously without requiring much mental effort. However, System 2 is more likely
to be affected by biasing (cognitive) heuristics. In the following, I describe several beliefs
that can consciously or unconsciously affect financial decision making and trading.
Overconfidence appears when people are to sure about the outcome of an uncertain
15Several of the initial works on biased decision making are collected in Kahneman et al. (1982),
which resulted from a large research program supported by the Office of Naval Research in the U.S.
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event. Overconfidence causes people to state confidence intervals regarding future
outcomes that are to narrow. Furthermore, the chance of occurrence and the impact
of improbable events is neglected. Overconfidence can have implications for portfolio
choices and trading as people make decision based on imprecise estimates (information)
of future states, which means they might trade on bad information potentially causing
bad trading results.
Representativeness is a heuristic causing biased judgments of probabilities on the basis
of similarity of a realization compared to population characteristics. For instance, this
occurs when people assess the probability that an event is of a certain type by relying
on the level of representativeness of the event for the type, but disregard potential
other factors, such as prior probability, sample size, or frames. The tendency to infer
(statistical) properties of the sample population on the basis of too few observations,
which are assumed to be representative for the population, is referred to as the "law of
small numbers" (Rabin, 2002).
In case of investment decisions, representativeness can be problematic when strate-
gies are considered as profitable on the basis of a few positive events. Also the reliance
on trends as a result of ’streaks’ of subsequent positive returns might be related to this
heuristic. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) find evidence on this phenomenon in their
experiment in which participants judged sequences of coin tosses containing the same
number of heads and tails less probable if they contain longer streaks (subsequences
of the same type, e. g., three heads then three tails). Similarly, there is experimental
evidence that in simulated random walks of (stock) prices are perceived to contain
trends (i. e., streaks of the same type) based on only few observations and even if
participants are told that observations are actually simulated random walks (De Bondt,
1993; Bloomfield and Hales, 2002).
The availability bias denotes the behavior when people estimate the likelihood of
an event "by assessing the ease with which the relevant mental operation of retrieval,
construction, or association can be carried out" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). In
a financial decision making context, availability could affect investors’ perception of
risk and return prospects of assets on the basis of easily available information. Kliger
and Kudryavtsev (2010) show that the stock price reaction to analyst recommendation
revisions differs depending on the direction of recent market returns, which they
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interpret as a result of the availability bias. Availability is also related to recency, i. e.,
the tendency to rely on things that were perceived more recent. Obviously recency could
bias decisions by overweighting more recent information compared to other relevant
data. Similarly, investors could overestimate unlikely events that had a tremendous
impact on themselves in the past, since it comes to mind more easily.
Anchoring makes people to form judgments of outcomes that are biased towards
some initial value (anchor). This effect has been shown in experiments by providing
participants random numbers that in fact biased their estimate, although the numbers
were completely irrelevant for the estimation task (Kahneman et al., 1982, ch.1). In
the context of financial decision making, anchors can appear in several ways. First,
the communication and presentations of stock prices often takes place in the form of
key figures, e. g., when the DAX index approaches or breaks a level of 10,000 points,
although this value should theoretically be as likely or important than 10,123. This
effect is also related to round numbers, such as integers, which often serve as anchors.
Second, the buying price of a stock position can have a tremendous influence on the
subsequent behavior of the investors (Odean, 1998a; Shapira and Venezia, 2001).
Similarly, price targets recommended by analysts might serve as anchors for investors
leading to estimates biased towards the target of the analyst.
Belief perseverance is the tendency of people to stick to their initial belief despite
opposing evidence, or, even to misinterpret the evidence in a counterfactual way (Lord
et al., 1979). A related effect is the confirmation bias that occurs when people specifically
search for evidence which supports their initial hypothesis, while disregarding con-
trasting information. With respect to investment heuristics, such biases could motivate
investors to search for trading signals that confirm a decision they already have made,
e. g., to buy some stock because they like the company. Park et al. (2010) provide
empirical evidence for a confirmation bias among investors processing information from
finance message boards.
Preferences
Preferences describe how an investor orders different alternatives based on the utility
she gains from each alternative. In finance, the formulation of preferences are used to
describe how an investor values the outcome of an uncertain investment. Depending
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on her preference for risk, the investor probably will choose different assets or, more
general, build a different portfolio of assets. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
theorem (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) shows that if the utility functions
of investors have certain characteristics, investors will take the choice that maximizes
the expected value of their utility function. While the framework of expected utility
provides the basis of the analysis of rational economic behavior, there is much empirical
evidence that expected utility framework is often not the right approach to describe
reality, as elaborated by Rabin (1998). Consequently, several other models and theories
to describe preferences have emerged, of which Barberis and Thaler (2003, p.16) argue
that "prospect theory may be the most promising for financial applications".
Prospect theory was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and includes
several features of human decision making, such as reference dependence, loss aversion,
and non-linear probability weighting. The main characteristic of the proposed utility
function is the assessment of the utility gained from some choice (gamble) by valuing
the outcome (payoff) and the (perceived) likelihood of that outcome, receptively. The
value function is increasing and concave for gains and is decreasing and convex for
losses. Additionally, value decreases stronger for losses than it increases for gains,
i. e., the decision maker is assumed to have a loss aversion. Since gains and losses
are always considered with respect to the current wealth, a natural reference point
is established to which prospects are evaluated. Moreover, prospect theory applies
a probability weighting function that transforms actual probabilities such that small
probabilities are overweighted. An interesting implication in the context of financial
markets is that investors who have prospect theory preference will choose investments
which are similar to lotteries, i. e., gambles that have a high probability of a small loss
and a small probability of a high gain. In terms of (expected) returns of an investments,
prospect theory implies a preference for right-skewed distributions.
The lottery characteristics of investments predicted by prospect theory preferences
of investors could provide an explanation for the high level of speculative, lottery-like
stock trading among retail investor, which is discussed in Section 2.4. However, playing
a lottery could have a value for an investor, namely as a form of thrill and entertainment.
In this sense, the investors becomes an utilitarian trader, who pays for his demand for
entertainment by below average returns as she loses against informed traders and due
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to trading costs. Whether in the context of financial markets the demand for gambling
and entertainment makes prospect theory preference a suiting utility model assumption,
or whether demand for gambling is a result of the intrinsic preference of people being
as described by prospect theory is difficult to verify, however.
Another practically motivated aspect regarding utility preferences and the outcome of
uncertain payoffs is the assessment of the uncertainty involved in the utility evaluation.
That is, if the investor does not exactly know what the prospects of the uncertain payoffs
are and she is not completely sure about her own preferences, there is a second layer of
risk involved in the decision. Ambiguity aversion denotes the dislike decision makers
have for choosing between gambles with unknown characteristics. This involves missing
relevant information about the distribution of an uncertain event as well as contradictory
evidence or information (e. g., expert opinions) on some matter or event, which might
confuse people. Camerer and Weber (1992) provide an overview on studies analyzing
the effects of ambiguity on decisions. An important factor for the level of ambiguity
aversion are social effects related to the own competence compared to others, which
Trautmann et al. (2008) call "fear of negative evaluation". The authors link this effect to
several empirical findings regarding (retail) investor behavior. Since it seems likely that
retail investors are faced with higher ambiguity than professional investors, they could
be more prone to ineffective behavior reducing ambiguity, such as the home bias, i. e.,
buying stocks from companies they assume to know better (Kilka and Weber, 2000).
Ambiguity aversion could also serves as an explanation for the usage of investment
heuristics, such as Technical Analysis, since it offers the investor an alleged explanation
and solution for handling the uncertainty that is involved when investing in stocks.
2.4 Retail Investor Trading
It is a long-standing puzzle why irrational trading behavior among retail investors
persists despite the overwhelming empirical evidence of systematic underperformance
over many decades. Various studies document that investment accounts of retail
investors exhibit severe investment mistakes. One line of explanations for the suboptimal
trading and investing activities mentioned in the literature considers the behavioral
and psychological shortcomings introduced in the last section. In this section, empirical
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findings regarding retail investor trading are summarized in order to provide a context
for the retail investor related results presented in Section 3.5 and Section 4.6.
Ultimately, the most important question for the analysis of investor trading is to
what extent retail investors meet their investment goals. This implies the necessity of
some normative theory that provides a framework on how (retail) investors should
behave given their preferences. The latter section introduced concepts of preferences
that imply behavior which is not consistent with fully rational behavior, such as the
optimization of mean-variance returns. In particular the gambling and entertainment
aspect seems tricky with regard to an evaluation of retail investor behavior, since it
can basically justify any trading behavior as long as the investor states that the fun
she had by trading provided at least as much utility as the losses from the realized
underperformance cost. However, considering the saving and retirement provision
scenario discussed in Section 1.1, at least some part of most retail investor portfolios
should aim to maximize long-term returns. So the long-term performance of the overall
retail investor population is an important indicator of the effectiveness of saving efforts
of the population and as such has implications for their future prosperity.
In the following, I start by discussing retail investor performance in general. Then
I consider more specific trading characteristics and biases that have an effect on the
performance.
A wide range of empirical studies confirm that retail investors lose money by trading.
Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) are the first to analyze the performance
of retail investor based on a broad data set of discount brokerage accounts. They find
that retail investors underperform the market, which is increasing in the turnover rate
of the accounts. That is, more trading adds costs but earns no additional returns or
reduces risk. The reported average portfolio turnover of 75% per year is astonishingly
high given that the average yearly turnover rate of stocks traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) is also about 75%. Further characteristics found by the authors are
underdiversification and the tendency to hold small, value stocks.
Similarly, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) show that Finnish investors (households)
underperform compared to foreign institutional investors and tend to behave as con-
trarian traders, i. e., they buy losing stocks and sell winning stock based on a six months
horizon. More recently, Barber et al. (2014) analyze the long-term performance of
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speculative retail investors (day traders) in Taiwan and show that the majority loses
persistently. Less than 1% of traders in their sample are able to earn consistent excess
returns that cannot be explained by luck.
Several other studies focus on the characteristics of retail investor trading and on
the reasons of the observed underperformance. High turnover rates are confirmed by
Daniel et al. (1998), Glaser and Weber (2007), and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009),
among others. The authors attribute excessive trading to overconfidence of investors
and gambling intentions. Overconfidence causes retail investors to misinterpret signals
as information (Odean, 1998b), to overestimate the precision of their return forecasts
(Glaser et al., 2007), or, in general, to believe to be able to beat the market.
Entertainment and gambling as a motivation to trade has been documented in several
studies (Kumar, 2009; Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009) and implies a preference for assets
providing right-skewed payoffs (Han and Kumar, 2013). Kumar (2009, p.1891) reports
substantial socio-demographic differences in the attrition for lottery-like stock, that
is, "[p]oor, young, less educated single men who live in urban areas, undertake non-
professional jobs, and belong to specific minority groups[...]" are more likely to trade
lottery-like stocks. Similarly, Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) find significant differences
in portfolio diversification with respect to socio-demographic characteristics. In Taiwan,
the stock market is used as a substitute for lotteries as trading volume in stocks traded
by retail investor decreases as the lotto jackpots increase (Gao and Lin, 2015).
As a group, retail investors tend to trade simultaneously, i. e., they herd (Kumar and
Lee, 2006; Dorn et al., 2008). Since retail investor have very similar cognitive limitations
and limited resources (information), the considered reasons for herding are usually
related to the ways investors try to overcome these shortcomings. Similar information,
e.g. media (Engelberg et al., 2011; Barber and Odean, 2008) or other attention grabbing
events (Seasholes and Wu, 2007), (stock) familiarity biases (Keloharju et al., 2012),
investor sentiment (Kumar and Lee, 2006) or information processing effects, such
as alphabetical biases (Jacobs and Hillert, 2015) or rank order effects (Hartzmark,
2015), are common explanations for the herding behavior. Furthermore, related trading
strategies like a focus on dividend stocks play a role (Graham and Kumar, 2006).
In general, the evidence on the positioning and the investment style is somewhat
mixed, which presumably reflects different or superimposing intentions and investment
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heuristics that retail investors use. For example, Odean (1999) reports that retail
investor tend to buy stocks that have considerably risen or fallen over the previous six
months, while they tend to sell stocks that have risen in recent weeks, i. e., they act as
contrarian trader in the short-run. Contrarian trading of retail investors is confirmed in
a range of studies in different countries and asset classes (Goetzmann and Massa, 2002;
Schmitz and Weber, 2012). Kaniel et al. (2008) additionally show that excessive buying
(selling) of retail investors is associated with positive excess returns in the following
month. On the other hand, momentum and feedback trading (Jegadeesh and Titman,
1993) is also attributed to retail investors (Dhar and Kumar, 2001) suggesting that
there are groups of retail investor pursuing different investment styles.
This contradiction might be caused by opposed trading behaviors over different
time horizons and the use of different investment heuristics, such as momentum
trading, Technical Analysis, and fundamental analysis (e. g., price-earning ratios). The
survey conducted by Hoffmann and Shefrin (2014) provides insights into strategies and
objectives of retail clients of a Dutch discount brokerage. ’Capital growth’ (ca. 40%) and
’entertainment & gambling’ (ca. 40%) are the most important (main) objectives of the
retail investors who conducted the survey, while ’building financial buffer’ and ’saving
for retirement’ are in the focus of only a few investors (ca. 10% and 5%, respectively).
These results are compared to a similar survey by Lease et al. (1974) and interesting
differences appear (see Hoffmann and Shefrin, 2014, Fig.1). Specifically, the applied
strategies seem to have shifted from fundamental analysis and professional advice
towards Technical Analysis. Hoffmann and Shefrin (2014) further show that Technical
Analysts sell less on reversals compared to others leading to a more positive relation
to the momentum factor from a Carhart four-factor model, which are still negative16,
though. The usage of Technical Analysis and related behavior is discussed in more
depth within Chapter 3.
One of the most widely known properties of retail investor trading is the so-called
disposition effect. The effect denotes the behavior of investors to ride losing trades
long and to sell winning positions early (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), which has
been documented by Odean (1998a), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), among others.
Furthermore, the disposition effect is a driver of correlated trading of retail investors
16The average retail investor using Technical Analysis is less contrarian than the average investor, who
shows significant contrarian trading behavior.
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(Barber et al., 2009). Dhar and Zhu (2006) identify cross-sectional differences in the
disposition effect based on socio-demographic factors. Wealthy and financial literate
investors are less prone to the effect.
Two major explanations for the disposition effect have been put forward. The first
is related to the discussed contrarian positioning of retail investors. Since contrarians
expect prices to revert (also called mean-reversion investing), they are reluctant to sell
their losing stocks (as they expect profits), but do sell wining position (as they expect
them to fall again). The effect amplifies as retail investors are usually not able to short
stocks or other assets, so they must have bought a stock before they can sell it.
Second, reference dependence and loss aversion as implied by prospect theory
preferences introduced in the last section is considered as an important driver of the
disposition effect. Although loss aversion would imply that investors try to avoid or
limit losses, the reference dependence to the initial buying price leads to the situation
that investors are reluctant to close the position (sell) because this would mean the
realization of ’bad utility’. Furthermore, (subsequent) gains from an already losing
position add utility at a higher rate since the utility function is convex in the domain of
losses. Similarly, initial gains are valued more with respect to the initial price compared
to subsequent additional gains as the utility function is concave. Thus, an investor with
prospect theory preferences will typically sell a winning position more likely than a
losing one.
Another line of explanations for the observed underperformance of retail investors
considers their trade implementation. In particular, whether the usage of passive
compared to aggressive orders and market or limit orders makes a difference for the
investor performance. In the sample of Barber et al. (2009), the usage of aggressive
order drive losses retail investors incur. In contrast, Linnainmaa (2010) shows for
Finnish investors that limit orders of retail investors suffer from being adverse selected.
Kelley and Tetlock (2013) show that only aggressive retail investor orders predict firm
news, i. e., these orders contain valuable information about future prices. Effects from
biased limit order submissions and the tendency to cluster on round numbers are
considered in Chapter 4. For example, Kuo et al. (2015) provide evidence that limit
order prices can be used to assess the level of informativeness of an order.
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2.5 Market Microstructure and Market Quality
"Market microstructure is the study of the trading mechanisms used for financial
securities" (Hasbrouck, 2007, p.3). Since trading securities is an important factor
for the prosperity of an economy, it is important to understand how the organization of
trading on a market platform influences the market outcome (cf. Weinhardt et al., 2003).
Trading mechanisms must be effective and reliable in order to build and maintain the
trust of market participants into the market. Since financial markets highly depend on
their network externalities to work successfully (e. g., to ensure liquidity), trust in the
market is essential to maintain the externality effect. If trust in the (financial) system
vanishes and liquidity dries out, the consequences can be detrimental as happened
during the crisis of the market for subprime mortgages (Krugman, 2007), for example.
Empirical market microstructure research analyzes how dimensions of trading and
market quality alter with respect to external and internal factors, such as changes in
market organization (technical infrastructure, trading protocols), regulation, behavior
of market participants, economical situation, and competition between markets. O’Hara
and Ye (2011, p.463) define market quality as "a market’s ability to meet its dual
goals of liquidity and price discovery." Both aspects are naturally interdependent and
also influenced by numerous other internal and external factors. Zhang et al. (2011)
establish a framework for market quality of electronic (financial) markets that describes
the measurement of market quality and its links to external and internal factors, which
can influence market quality.
In this thesis, I specifically focus on the relation of participant behavior and dimen-
sions of market quality. In the following, the considered dimensions of market quality
and respective measurements are introduced. Extensive introductions to theoretical
and empirical market microstructure are provided by O’Hara (1995) and Hasbrouck
(2007), respectively. O’Hara (2015) discusses current findings and issues in market
microstructure with respect to automatized financial markets and high-frequency
trading.
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Liquidity
Harris (2003, p. 394) defines liquidity as a market’s "ability to trade large size quickly,
at low cost, when you want to trade,” which refers to depth, implicit and explicit trading
cost, as well as to execution speed, among others. The latter strongly depends on the
sophistication of the market’s information system infrastructure and communication
technology, which is not explicitly considered in this thesis.
Due to the various dimensions of liquidity, a formal measurement depends on the
market model and the goal of the analysis (e. g., a comparison of market structures or
trading protocols) but also on the type of trader, since different market participants
can have different requirements for liquidity. In this thesis, the main research object is
continuous trading on Xetra, which is organized as a limit order book market. Therefore,
I introduce measures typically used in the literature to assess the liquidity of such a
market.
Trading Activity
In limit order book markets trading activity, i. e., the amount of executed transactions,
measures the demand for liquidity. Chordia et al. (2011) state "that a decline in [implicit
and explicit] trading costs plays a role in the dramatic increase in trading" observed
from 1993 to 2008. Hence, with regard to the above definition by Harris, increasing
trading activity can also be a sign of increased liquidity supply.
Trading activity is measured as the number of trades, the number of executed shares
(volume), and the value of executed orders (turnover). In some instances, the number or
imbalance of liquidity demanding buy and sell orders are of interest. Since exchanges
typically report only transactions (see Section 2.2.1), it must be inferred from the data
whether a transaction was initiated by a liquidity demanding buy or sell order. This is
also necessary for several measures of implicit trading costs. To infer the trade direction
from Times & Sales data (tick-by-tick data), the classification procedure by Lee and
Ready (1991) is applied. Figure 2.2 visualizes the procedure.
The above measures of trading activity are naturally interdependent, but can signal
diverging behavior of market participants, e. g., when traders split their order into
smaller pieces. Besides transactions, limit order submissions leading to updates of best
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FIGURE 2.2: Lee and Ready Classification Algorithm. This flowchart illustrates the
procedure proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) to classify trades in market data into
liquidity demanding buy and sell orders. Starting point is the observation of a transaction
price (Price) and the prevailing mean of the prevailing bid and ask price (Mid).
bid and ask or other levels of the limit order book measure market activity, which in
modern financial markets is associated with high-frequency and market making activity.
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, quote data from Thomson Reuters Tick History might
provide an incomplete view on quote updates in order to reduce the size of data.
Implicit Transaction Costs
Implicit trading costs measure the cost of liquidity demander for demanding immediacy.
The Quoted Spread measures the hypothetical transaction costs based on the prevailing
best bid and ask, which is only valid for small trades or, more precisely for trades that
are not larger than the offered volume. The measure is calculated with respect to the
observed bid price Bidt and ask price Askt of some stock and stated in basis points.
Quoted Spreadt = 10, 000 ∗ (Askt − Bidt)/(2 ∗Midt), (2.1)
where Midt = (Askt + Bidt)/2 denotes the midquote. Obviously, the measure changes
as bid or ask price change, i. e., measuring at discrete points of time can bias the average
measure since substantial variation between the measurement points could be omitted.
Thus, I calculate the measure from tick-by-tick data and weight the observations by the
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duration the quote is valid in order to obtain an aggregated measure over some time
period (e. g., one trading day).
Effective Spreads measure the actual transaction costs of executed trades. Hence, it is
necessary to know the trade direction (buy or sell) of the demanding order. For trade i
at time t the measure is defined as
Effective Spreadi,t = 10,000 ∗ Di ∗ (Pricei,t −Midi,t)/Midi,t , (2.2)
where Midi,t denotes the midquote prevailing before trade i was executed. The effective
spreads can be larger than the (prevailing) quoted spread, if the demanded volume
is larger than the quoted volume, i. e., the trade ’walks up’ the book and realizes an
inferior average price. However, effective spreads can be smaller compared to lit quotes,
if hidden limit order volume exists in the book. When considering average spread
measures over some period (e. g., a trading day) the timing of orders can play a role,
i. e., if traders primarily demand liquidity when it is cheap (small quoted spreads),
average effective spreads can be smaller than quoted spreads. For these reason, it is
insightful to consider both measures for an empirical analysis.
In order to account for the impact of liquidity demanding trades in the calculation of
spread costs, Realized Spreads evaluate spread costs with respect to quotes some time
after the trade. The measure is defined as
Realized Spreadi,t = 10, 000 ∗ Di ∗ (Pricei,t −Midi,t+x)/Midi,t , (2.3)
where typical choices for the time lag x are 1, 5, and 15 minutes. The measure is usually
interpreted as the liquidity suppliers’ revenue, because if (quoted) prices do not revert
after the trade or even move in the direction of the trade, it is likely that the demanding
order was informed. Hence, the supplier has traded at an inferior price and the realized
spread of the liquidity demander is small.
Orderbook Depth
The amount of liquidity supplying limit orders available at a point of time is referred to
as Depth. Depth is usually calculated over both sides of the limit order book, that is, the
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available order volume (in Euro) on the bid and ask side:
Deptht = Bidt ∗ BidVolt + Askt ∗ AskVolt , (2.4)
where BidVolt (AskVolt) denotes the number of shares available on the bid (ask) side
of the book. The depth measure can be extended to include more levels of the limit
order book. Then, DepthX denotes the cumulated depth on the first X levels of the
limit order book, i. e., the X best prices. Cumulated depth is important for traders who
want to trade (demand) large sizes at a reasonable price. In practice single trades
rarely penetrate more than one level of the book, however. Nevertheless, depth on
higher levels of the book can be insightful with respect to slower traders who do not
continuously monitor bid and ask price movements and submit less aggressive orders.
Price Discovery
Price discovery means the ability of a market to determine the true fair value of the traded
asset. Both the quality of price determination, i. e., the absence of price deviation from
the fair value (pricing error), and the speed at which new information is incorporated
into prices is of importance. The analysis of price discovery also considers the channel
through which new information comes into prices. For instance, whether prices become
more informative by liquidity demanding trades enforcing the fair price or by liquidity
supplier who adjust their offered liquidity based on new information (quote-based price
discovery).
In the context of price discovery, the efficient market hypothesis naturally plays a role.
The efficient market hypothesis provides a normative framework on how we expect
efficient prices should behave such that deviations to that behavior can be analyzed.
In practice, it is evident that prices cannot always be fully efficient and the market
needs some time to adjust to new information. Hence, a consideration of market
efficiency depends on the time horizon. On a nanosecond basis different factors play a
role compared to a daily or monthly consideration. Consequently, there exist different
approaches to measure price discovery and price efficiency in these cases.
A way to measure the informativeness of a liquidity demanding trade is the so-called
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Price Impact, which is defined as
PriceImpacti = 10,000 ∗ Di ∗ (Midi,t+x −Midi,t)/Midi,t , (2.5)
where x specifies the duration after a trade to which the midquote is compared. Typical
values for the lag are 1, 5, and 15 minutes, but the actual choice depends on the type
of security, whereby for more liquid stocks shorter intervals should be considered.
Other approaches to assess the information content of trades (and quotes) apply
econometric models to the trade and quote time series, e. g., Vector Autoregressive Mod-
els (VAR) of quote revision (midquote price changes) and trading volume (Hasbrouck,
1991b,a). The model measures the impact of lagged trades (volume) on the quote
revisions, which is interpreted as the information content of these trades. Furthermore,
the model can be used to obtain a volatility decomposition of the total volatility of price
changes (i. e., the observed variance of the assumed random walk) into permanent
(information related) volatility and transitory volatility (noise).
In a more recent approach proposed by Menkveld et al. (2007), price changes are
decomposed into permanent and transitory components by the application of State
Space Models (SSM), which model the observed midquote as an unobserved efficient
price and a pricing error. The SSM methodology is introduced and applied in Section
3.6.5.
To assess price efficiency over longer horizons, there are several price based measures
that aim to detect deviations from the random walk (martingale) property as postulated
in the efficient market hypothesis. In contrast to VAR models, measures are calculated
on the basis of (low-frequency) price observations and are easier to calculate over long
periods compared to VAR models or similar. I introduce and apply three measures of
informational (in)efficiency in Section 3.6.4.
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Technical Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Technical Analysis (TA) has a long history in security analysis and its roots date back
to the invention of the Dow Theory in the late 19th century which is considered as
the foundation of Technical Analysis. The main approach of most Technical Analysis
methodologies is to analyze historical price and volume data regarding regularities and
other ’typical’ developments, which can be used to infer signals about future prices.
Many Technical Analysis concepts base on the idea that market prices behave cyclically
or move in trends. Thus identifying trends and trend reversals is considered as a major
task for the Technical Analyst as pointed out in popular textbooks on Technical Analysis
(e. g., Bulkowski (2011); Murphy (2011); Kirkpatrick II and Dahlquist (2012)).
Originally, the identification of Technical Analysis trading signals (TA signals1) is
based on the visual recognition of predefined patterns in price and volume charts, or
on some transformation of the data, such as (moving) averages of prices. To give
an example, Figure 3.1 shows the so-called head-and-shoulder pattern which shall
signal a reversal of an uptrend towards a downtrend. Consequently, the trigger of a
head-and-shoulder pattern implies to sell the security. Similarly, Technical Analysts use
1Henceforth, I use the abbreviation TA signal to denote explicit trading signals (recommendations)
to buy or sell a security based on the application of some Technical Analysis strategy. The latter shall
denotes an explicit calibration of some Technical Analysis technique. That is, moving averages are an
example for a Technical Analysis technique and the 200-day moving average is an explicit Technical
Analysis strategy of that technique generating TA signals.
43
Chapter 3 Technical Analysis
the moving average of the most recent price observations indicating the begin of an
uptrend (downtrend) if prices cross the moving average from below (above).
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FIGURE 3.1: Head-and-shoulders Chart Pattern. The figure shows an exemplary
illustration of the so-called head-and-shoulders chart pattern. The pattern indicates
a trend reversal from an uptrend to a downtrend. The breakout point constitutes the
actual trading signal to sell the security. The illustration is based on the definition given
by Technical Analysis textbooks (cf. Bulkowski, 2011, p.405).
A major problem for the financial economist arises from the vague definition of
trading strategies since Technical Analysts are usually reluctant to provide explicit
implementations of the proposed strategies. What data and observations frequency
should be used? How are methods and parameter supposed to be calibrated explicitly?
Which combination of methods is advisable? What shall be done if method A suggests
to buy while method B suggests to sell? The authors of Technical Analysis textbooks
argue that the investor must find the tools that fit to her investment style, her goals, and
her time-horizon, for example. While this statement might be a fair recommendation in
general, it obliviously gives the authors room to put forward recommendations which
are hard to falsify by means of quantitative analyzes. Statistical evaluations in Technical
Analysis textbooks mostly provide assertions of the type "strategy S worked in X% of the
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cases over the last N years". Hence, such evaluations should be considered as descriptive
at best.
In their consideration of Technical Analysis, Lo et al. (2000) state that "one of the
greatest gulfs between academic finance and industry practice is the separation that
exists between technical analysts and their academic critics". From my experience,
this still seems to be true today. An important difference between academics and
practitioners considering some profitable strategy is the ’why’. While a practitioner
might argue some profitable strategy works as long as it works, the financial economist
is primarily interested in the question why some strategy is actually profitable, i. e.,
are there any risks involved explaining excess returns; is there some form of market
anomaly or mispricing, or is the original claim of profitability just based on a flawed
analysis?
Hence, academics have put much effort in the analysis of the profitability of Technical
Analysis strategies. I review these results in Section 3.3 in more detail. In sum, the
evidence regarding profitability is mixed. Although profitability is an interesting question
as it would constitute an anomaly to the widely accepted weak form of the efficient
market hypothesis, I argue that for the research presented in this chapter it plays no
crucial role whether Technical Analysis is profitable or not. However, I show that it can
matter for the market outcome, e. g., in terms of trading activity, market liquidity, and
(short-term) price discovery.
As mentioned above, Technical Analysis is basically as old as the stock market itself,
but there has been an important change during the last two decades, namely the
electronic evolution of financial markets. The digitalization of financial markets and
the financial service industry enabled real-time access to markets and market data
for basically any person with an internet connection. Especially for online (discount)
brokers, Technical Analysis is an interesting way to get their clients into trading. As
outlined in Section 1.1 and 2.4, retail investors are faced with a complex decision making
problem when investing in financial markets. Compared to institutional investors, their
cognitive and technical resources to solve this problem are much more limited.
A major service of brokers is to support their clients with solving their investment
problem. Online brokerages typically do so by providing appropriate information
systems, market access, data as well as data visualizations (e. g., chart tools). Many
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brokers offer access to more detailed data sources for additional fees. While providing
data is basically neutral and provides clients with general market information, (discount)
brokers have an intrinsic motivation that their clients trade frequently due to the trade-
based fee structures. To get clients into trading, Technical Analysis could be a promising
tool for brokers as it provides explicit trading recommendations and thereby it ’helps’
the client with selecting the instruments to trade, specifying the trade direction, and
defining some exit strategy to close the trade. In fact, there are software providers2
which distribute tools for chart analysis and automatic detection of Technical Analysis
trading signals of various types. Interestingly, these tools are offered (to brokerages)
for "engaging and monetizing your account holders"3.
If the above slogan is true and retail investors actually use Technical Analysis, the
question arises whether Technical Analysis is a relevant factor for the decision making
of retail investors and what impact Technical Analysis has on their trading efforts. Since
professional investment advice from bank advisers or wealth managers is expensive,
particularly for small accounts, trading recommendations from Technical Analysis seem
cheap and easy to use for any investor. On the other hand, related strategies could be
perceived as complex enough to be considered as a form of serious investment analysis
providing a certain degree of validity compared to a buy-and-hold strategy or a random
approach.
The German market of speculative structured products is a promising research object
to analyze a potential relation between Technical Analysis and retail investor trading.
The unique data set provided by Börse Stuttgart allows for a precise consideration of
trading in structure products since it contains full trade and orderflow information.
Analyzing this data, I find a significant increase in trading activity on days of Technical
Analysis trading signals of various types. The increase in activity reverses on the
following trading days. Furthermore, I identify trading characteristics of round-trip
trades. First, raw returns in TA-related trades are significantly higher, while the leverage
level selected at purchase is lower and the holding duration tends to be shorter. Second,
the shape of the realized return distribution is significantly less left-skewed (more
2For example, the German software provider TraderFox GmbH (www.traderfox.de) and the Canadian
company Recognia Inc. (www.recognia.com) develop chart analysis tools for brokerages and other
information providers.
3Quote taken from https://www.recognia.com/, accessed on June 19, 2016.
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right-skewed).
The presented analysis provides further evidence that Technical Analysis plays a
role for retail investors. On the other hand, there is evidence regarding professional
investors, such as fund mangers, who rely on Technical Analysis to some extent.
For instance, Menkhoff (2010) documents that for 18% of the surveyed institutional
investors Technical Analysis is the preferred way of information processing and 87%
do at least consider it beside other things. Furthermore, there is evidence that trading
activity on major stock markets is related to Technical Analysis trading signals (Kavajecz
and Odders-White, 2004; Bender et al., 2013; Etheber, 2014). Since Technical Analysis
is primarily based on past price and volume information, trading on technical analysis
can be considered as noise trading if we assume markets are (weakly) efficient in the
sense of Fama’s efficient market hypothesis. If Technical Analysts account for a relevant
amount of trading volume, prices and market quality could be affected as "the price of
a stock reflects both the information that information traders trade on and the noise
that noise traders trade on" (Black, 1986, p.532). Thus, I assess whether trading signals
derived from popular Technical Analysis strategies are related to various dimensions of
market quality on the major German stock market Xetra.
Indeed, I find that several dimensions of market liquidity are affected by the con-
sidered trading signals. However, some findings are in contradiction to the expected
results derived from previous findings in the literature.
The results presented in this chapter contribute to the literature as follows. First,
it adds to the literature on retail investor trading and behavior by showing that
trading speculative financial products is related to Technical Analysis. In particular
for literature considering the German market of structured products, this is a novel
finding and adds a new information dimension that is used for trading, because existing
studies only considered (corporate) news, earning announcements, and various product
characteristics. Secondly, the analysis of the effect of Technical Analysis on (stock)
market quality based on intraday data and along typical dimensions of liquidity provide
new insights regarding this relationship. Additionally, the chapter provides first evidence
that price discovery is actually related to Technical Analysis trading signals.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 motivates the
research questions of this chapter. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the academic
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literature on Technical Analysis with a focus on the potential profitability of related
strategies. The methodological approach used to analyze Technical Analysis, i. e.,
the definition and recognition of TA-related trading signals, is introduced in Section
3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the role of Technical Analysis in retail investor trading and
constitutes the first part of main results presented in this chapter. Section 3.6 presents
the second part of main results focusing on the relation between Technical Analysis and
market quality in DAX30 stocks traded on Xetra. Eventually, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Research Questions
Chapter 3 of this thesis explores the meaning of Technical Analysis for securities trading.
I address two main research questions which consider trading on the market of structured
products and the stock market, respectively.
Research Question 1. Do investment heuristics that are summarized as Technical
Analysis influence retail investor trading in speculative structured products?
To make this question more tangible with respect to specific research objects I break it
down into two sub-questions. The first part seeks to substantiate the potential relevance
of Technical Analysis for retail investors trading. Since Technical Analysis subsumes a
vast range of different techniques the following sub-questions shall specifically refer to
chart patterns and moving average strategies, which will be defined in Section 3.4.
Research Question 1a. How are trading signals from Technical Analysis related to
trading activity in structured products on a retail investor dedicated market?
Technical Analysis gives investors quite precise trading recommendations compared to
other investment styles and existing research suggests that Technical Analysis (more
precisely moving average strategies) – if followed strictly – provides an different outcome
in terms of expected returns compared to a buy-and hold strategy, for instance. Thus,
basic characteristics of (round-trip) trades might be affected.
Research Question 1b. What are characteristics of trades which have been initiated
in accordance to Technical Analysis signals and do these characteristics differ from
other trades?
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Admittedly, the market of structured products is rather small compared to the stock
trading segment on Xetra which exceeds the turnover on Stuttgart Stock Exchange
many times over. Furthermore, the different market structure of Xetra and its greater
generalizability with regard to stocks markets world-wide allow for a broader perspective
on the relevance of Technical Analysis for financial market. Contrary to trading of
structured products on Stuttgart Stock Exchange, Xetra is the primary trading venue for
German stock companies and as such has an important price determination function
for the economy. Thus the relation between Technical Analysis and stock pricing is of
special interest which leads to the following research questions.
Research Question 2. What is the relation between Technical Analysis trading
signals and the market quality on Xetra?
More specifically, I assess whether trading signals derived from the Technical Analysis
techniques moving averages as well as support and resistance levels are related to
various dimensions of market quality. The following three sub-questions sharpen the
considered dimensions of the main research question and provide a structure for the
presented research approach.
Research Question 2a. What is the effect on dimensions of liquidity supply and
demand around Technical Analysis trading signals?
To answer this question, I analyze various dimensions of liquidity such as trading
activity, spread measures, and limit order book depth and assess which dimensions are
related to the considered Technical Analysis signals. If liquidity supply and demand is
influenced in any direction, price efficiency could be as well which is addressed by the
following questions.
Research Question 2b. Is there a relation between Technical Analysis trading
signals and measures of informational efficiency, i. e., do price processes show
characteristics associated with inefficient prices?
Research Question 2c. Given that technical traders are uninformed noise traders,
what is the effect on transitory and permanent price components when Technical
Analysis trading signals appear?
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3.3 Academic Perspective on Technical Analysis
Academic research on Technical Analysis and related strategies has a long history dating
back to the early nineteen-sixties when, among others, Alexander (1961) examined
whether filter rules were able to earn excess returns in the U.S. stock market. The
author – and other authors alike – argues that excess returns generated by strategies
based on past price information contradict the assumption of prices following random
walks (or, more general, having martingale properties). Since excess returns based on
past price information are a contradiction to the three forms of efficient capital markets
hypothesized by Fama (1970), many papers studied Technical Analysis and related
strategies to test market efficiency. In the following decades, several papers analyzed
different strategies with mixed results, e. g., James (1968), Jensen and Benington
(1970), and Irwin and Uhrig (1984).
An important factor in the analysis of profitability is how trading costs are incorpo-
rated. Considering a perfect market in a mathematical sense, i. e., a market without
transaction costs consisting of a risk-free asset and a risky asset following a random walk
which both are priced such that no arbitrage is possible, then there is no trading strategy
with limited capital requirement that earns risk-adjusted excess returns. However, there
is also no strategy in this market that underperforms since the opposing strategy would
earn profit. An important implication for the real-world investor in an efficient market is
the fact that in this scenario any kind of trading costs are the major reason for systematic
under-performance compared to market returns. This has been pointed out by many
financial economists when discussing how retail investors should improve their trading
approaches (e. g., Barber and Odean, 2000; Bauer et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2014).
So a crucial point for studies which focus on the profitability of TA-related trading
strategies is how trading costs and trading frictions are incorporated. Park and Irwin
(2007) provide a literature review on the profitability and conclude that profitability
must be seen skeptical as trading costs can be hard to measure ex post. The authors
review 95 ’modern’ studies beginning from 1988. The often cited4 study by Brock et al.
(1992) is considered as one of the first ’modern’ analyses and "provides strong support
4As of June 17, 2016, Google Scholar reports 2107 citations. It is one of the most cited papers on
Technical Analysis.
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for the technical strategies" based on daily data of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
Index over a 100-year period. Similar to this thesis, moving average and trading range
break-out strategies (which are similar to support and resistance levels) are examined.
Although Brock et al. (1992) and 55 other studies find positive evidence regarding
Technical Analysis profitability, Park and Irwin (2007) question whether all of these
results are thoroughly reliable. Besides trading costs, they mention risk estimation and
data snooping as potential sources of biases. Data snooping occurs when profitable
trading strategies are selected or calibrated within sample. Even if strategies are
predefined, using a very large set, say thousands, of strategies, the chance is high
to obtain positive results just by chance. Profitability can also evolve (over time) as
a type of survivorship bias when many investors analyze a large universe of trading
strategies and then narrow down the range of strategies based on their results, i. e.,
well-performing strategies receive more attention given they performed well in the
past.
More recent papers show that some studies actually face data snooping biases
implying that the considered Technical Analysis strategies are not persistently profitable.
Sullivan et al. (1999) introduce a refined data snooping detection based on White’s
Reality Check bootstrap methodology (White, 2000). The purpose of the methodology is
to rule out the possibility that some well-performing strategy is just chosen by luck while
many others in the sample show no over-performance. The main idea is to resample
historical returns to enhance the statistical power if some strategy actually has been
profitable on the original data sample. Interestingly, Sullivan et al. (1999) can confirm
the over-performance found by Brock et al. (1992), however out-of-sample performance
on the following 10-year period is not persistent. The issue of persistence is further
examined by Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012). They introduce an improved selection
method, which is able to select outperforming strategies more consistently compared to
previous studies. Yet these strategies are not able to earn out-of-sample excess returns
(after trading costs), i. e., "investors would never have been able to select ex ante the
future best-performing strategies" (Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012, p.473).
In general, persistence of trading strategies is a highly discussed issue in research
on security markets. An often mentioned aspect in the Technical Analysis literature is
the potential self-destruction of any profitable trading strategies. Timmermann and
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Granger (2004) argue that any stable forecasting pattern, i. e., any trading strategy that
can predict future returns will ultimately disappear after it has been made public. So
investors who are looking for new strategies and others adopting to them might cause
strategies becoming profitable for some time.
Form a theoretical point of view, this mechanism fits within the adaptive market
hypothesis put forward by Lo (2004). He suggests that the human nature seeks to
constantly adapt to changing environment conditions, which could explain market
anomalies, i. e., deviation from Fama’s efficient market hypothesis. In this context,
Neely et al. (2009, p.486) state that the time-varying profitability of technical trading
strategies are "consistent with the view that markets adapt to evolutionary selection
pressures".
If we consider financial markets as complex social systems of not fully rational
participants, strategies like Technical Analysis could become self-fulfilling because a
large group of market participants believes it is. If this belief is popular and ’opposing
forces’ (e. g., speculators who enforce efficient prices with respect to the fundamental
value of an asset) are weak, anomalies in terms of excess returns could occur (cf.
discussion of limited arbitrage in Section 3.6.1). The self-fulfilling property is also
considered as an explanation why investors use Technical Analysis, that is, because they
think others use it and, hence, Technical Analysis plays a relevant role as they try to
imitate others (Taylor and Allen, 1992; Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007).
In this sense, behavioral aspects could play a dominant role regarding the usage
and the effect of Technical Analysis in financial markets. Similarly, several behavioral
explanations have been put forwards in case of the momentum anomaly. The success
of momentum strategies, i. e., buying past winners and selling past losers, is a highly
discussed yet accepted finding in the asset pricing literature (Jegadeesh and Titman,
1993). Similar to Technical Analysis, it is related to trends in prices. Thus, it is hard to
infer what inter-dependencies between momentum (trading) and Technical Analysis
might exist. Given the definitions of momentum trading and Technical Analysis, one
could eventually cause the other to be profitable in certain situations (e. g., trend-
following Technical Analysis strategies), but momentum can be considered as a more
general concept. First, momentum strategies are often less complex than Technical
Analysis related strategies. Second, there are drivers and explanations that are not
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directly related to trading on momentum strategies, but can cause momentum in asset
returns (e. g., fund flows, herding, liquidity risk, etc.).
The scope of discussions and analyses in the asset pricing literature (and other
finance areas) regarding momentum is too far-reaching to be summarized within this
thesis5. One branch of explanations motivates behavioristical reasons for the momentum
anomaly. For instance, Barberis et al. (1998) argue that the representative heuristic
mediates momentum as investors extrapolate past returns. In a similar way, Daniel
et al. (1998) motivate overconfidence of investors as an explanation for short-term
momentum and long-term reversals in asset returns. Grinblatt and Han (2005) show
that prospect theory preferences and mental accounting (disposition effect) can explain
momentum in asset prices since after controlling for unrealized capital gains past
returns have no predictive power anymore. Although these arguments constitute only
one branch of explanations for the momentum effect, it demonstrates the influence
of behavioral aspects on asset prices and returns. This motivates the potential role of
behavioral aspects for Technical Analysis and price determination. Further literature
that considers the behavioral aspect as well as the potential impact on the trading
outcome is discussed in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.6.1 in detail.
Summarizing, this overview highlights the controversial discussion and perception
of Technical Analysis in the academic literature. To some extent, the question of
profitability has been answered inconsistently. While this might be due to adaption of
investors and markets leading to time-varying results or to relations which are hard
to proof by means of statistical analyses, the question of profitability is not a focus of
this thesis. I assume that some investors use Technical Analysis – whether profitable or
not –as a motivation to investigate the research questions postulated in the previous
section. Since these research questions consider the impact of such trading activities, it
is only of subordinate importance whether this behavior is actually rational in the sense
of statically significant and persistent excess returns.
5For a broader discussion of momentum in asset prices see, among others, Subrahmanyam (2007,
ch.2), Novy-Marx (2012), Fama and French (2012), and Moskowitz et al. (2012).
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3.4 Recognition of Technical Analysis Trading Signals
The foundation for a scientific analysis of Technical Analysis is to identify and to
reconstruct trading techniques and corresponding signals which Technical Analysts
postulate to be relevant for security prices. This involves three tasks. First, the
development of methods to identify chart patterns and other trading rules in price
series. Second, the selection and explicit definition of the Technical Analysis techniques.
Third, the calibration of these techniques since typically several parameters are needed
to describe the visual appearance of a pattern, the length of the considered time period,
etc.
The universe of Technical Analysis techniques and related strategies is immense.
For example, the popular handbooks on Technical Analysis by Bulkowski (2011) or
Kirkpatrick II and Dahlquist (2012) describe countless strategies and signals that could
be considered, yet there these are only two books in many. In this thesis, I focus on
three different classes of Technical Analysis techniques: chart patterns, support and
resistance levels, and moving averages. I keep the number of pattern types and moving
averages relatively small and specific in their calibration in order to obtain a narrow set
of trading signals. Due to the fuzziness of the recognition and definition of Technical
Analysis techniques, I intend to use the most popular ones in order to capture as many
Technical Analysis traders as possible. This section describes the algorithms used to
detect trading signals from Technical Analysis.
3.4.1 Moving Averages
A well-known Technical Analysis technique are moving averages (MA). More precisely,
the average of recent prices which is calculated over a certain period of time and
iteratively updated after a new price observation realizes. Moving averages are not
only used by Technical Analysts but are displayed in many financial charts in media or
trading tools. On the other hand, moving averages have already been proposed in the
1950s and earlier as the citations in James (1968) show. Although the implementation
of moving averages is relatively simple compared to other Technical Analysis techniques,
the selection of a moving average type and the calibration of parameters introduces a
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high level of uncertainty regarding the actually applied methods. For instance, there are
different types of moving averages, like simple, exponentially-weighted, truncated, or
filtered moving averages, which basically use different weights to calculate the average.
Furthermore, the number of observations used for averaging as well as the observations
frequency, e. g., daily, weekly, etc., results in many calibration dimensions. Lastly, the
actual signal trigger condition can vary. In the simplest case a buy (sell) signal occurs if
the price breaks its average from below (above) but often further conditions like filter
bands or a second, shorter moving average is used to reduce the effect of so-called
whiplash or whipsaw signals when prices fluctuate around their mean.
In this thesis, I use several types of moving averages but keep the number of different
calibrations small. The motivation behind the specific choice of moving average comes
from the impressions of moving averages available in financial media and trading tools
which usually have pre-defined lengths like 200 days, 50 days, and so on. The set
of moving averages covers simple moving averages (SMA) of different lengths with
and without 0.1% filter bands. Additionally, I consider 20-day/100-day dual (simple)
moving average crossover (DSMA), and 50-day/200-day DSMA.
The 200-day simple moving average with 0.1%−filter generates a buy signal on day t
if SMA200t−1 > Pt−1 and Pt > 1.001×SMA200t , and a sell signal if SMA200t−1 < Pt−1 and 1.001×
Pt < SMA
200
t , where SMA
200
t denotes the arithmetic mean of Pt , ..., Pt−199. The filter
bands shall reduce the number of so-called ’whipsaw’ signals when prices are moving
closely around the moving average. Analogously, SMA with other lengths and filters
can be calculated straightforward.
Dual moving average crossover generate buy (sell) signals when the shorter moving
average crosses the longer from below (above). That is, a buy signal of a 20-day/100-
day dual moving average occurs if SMA100t−1 > SMA
20
t−1 and SMA
20
t > SMA
100
t , and a sell
signal if SMA100t−1 < SMA
20
t−1 and SMA
20
t < SMA
100
t .
Naturally longer moving averages and larger filter bands generate fewer signals. In
general, it is not expedient for the empirical analysis to use a huge universe of strategies
because this might lead to data snooping issues. For a large set of trading signals, the
chance is high to find some result for some strategy just by chance. On the other hand,
using very uncommon strategies, e. g., a 273-day moving average, might reduce the
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observed effect strength if many signals are ’false signals’, i. e., signals which are not
used by the majority of Technical Analysts.
3.4.2 Chart Pattern Recognition
Contrary to moving averages, one cannot simply calculate chart patterns from price
data since the widely postulated definitions of chart patterns (e. g., Bulkowski, 2011)
involve visual recognition of certain patterns in the drawn price graph. Thus even the
way of drawing the chart has the some influence on the result of the recognition. A
wide-spread form of visualizing price data are so-called candlestick charts which in
addition to the last trade price in some observation interval (e. g., one trading day)
contains information on the first as well as highest and lowest price in the respective
interval. Figure 3.2 shows an example of such plot taken from the trading platform
SAXO trader6 by Saxo Bank A/S.
Most chart patterns are defined by a sequence of highs and lows (also called peaks
and troughs) followed by a trigger condition. Obviously, the additional information
on the highest and lowest trade price within a time interval, which is displayed in
the candle stick chart, can substantially change the exact location of a high or low
in the (drawn) price graph. In a first step, I focus on chart patterns based on daily
data. Because of this coarse granularity of observing patterns and associated signals,
the consideration of other price information than the closing price is of subordinate
importance for the recognition of chart patterns. In Section 3.4.3 the recognition is
refined for intraday data to allow for a higher signal precision.
The main idea of the pattern recognition used in this thesis is based on the seminal
paper by Lo et al. (2000) who use smoothing techniques to identify chart patterns.
Chart patterns are defined by a sequence of highs and lows and a trigger price condition.
The smoothing tries to capture the eye-balling of a human trader to reduce the noise in
the price movement which enables the identification of ’significant’ local highs and lows
in the price chart. Analogously to Lo et al. (2000) and Savin et al. (2006), I use kernel
6See http://www.saxobank.com/saxotrader (accessed on August 16, 2016) for a description of
the SAXo trader online trading tool.
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FIGURE 3.2: Candlestick Chart of Deutsche Bank Stock Prices. The figure shows an
example for a candlestick chart based on Deutsche Bank stock prices from July 2011 to
November 2011 drawn in Saxo Bank’s Saxo Trader tool. Each candle represents one
trading day. A green (red) candle signals that the closing price is higher (lower) than
the opening such that the bottom edge of the candle body refers to the opening (closing)
price and the upper edge refers to the closing (opening) price. The thin lines mark the
trading range during the trading day, i. e., the line ranges from the highest to the lowest
trade price. Furthermore the figure shows an example of a head-and-shoulder pattern
highlighted by the manually drawn hats and the vertical line. The pattern consists of
three subsequent highs of which the outer once are of similar height but visibly lower
than the one in the middle. The (approximately) vertical line defined by the two lows
between the highs is called neckline. If the price eventually falls below the neckline a
sell signal is triggered.
regressions to reduce the noise in some price series Pt , t = 1, ..., n, i. e., the so-called
Nadaraya-Watson estimator is applied to obtain the smoothed series
mt =
∑n
j=1 Pj × Kh( j − t)∑n
j=1 Kh( j − t)
, (3.1)
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where Kh(·) is the Gaussian Kernel
Kh(x) =
1
h
p
2pi
exp−x2/2h2,
with bandwidth parameter h> 0. Then all local extrema in the smoothed series mt , t =
1, ..., n are determined, i. e., all k ∈ {2, ..., n− 1}, satisfying mk−1 < mk and mk > mk+1
for a local high and vice versa for a local low. The actual local extremum is defined at the
maximum (minimum) of the actual prices around k, i. e., Ei = max(Pk−1, Pk, Pk+1), i =
1, 2, ..., where i numbers the sequence of extrema. The procedure based on the smoother
Kernel ensures that the sequence Ei, i = 1, 2, ... always consists of alternating highs and
lows since the Kernel is a continuous function.
The above procedure is carried out on a moving window of fixed length. The window
length restricts the duration over which patterns can evolve but it is only of subordinated
importance for the number of patterns found given the degree of smoothness defined by
parameter h is not extremely high. The analysis of daily data runs on rolling windows
of 84 (trading) days, which represents about four months. This seems to be sufficient
assuming that traders using daily price observations usually do not search for long-term
patterns evolving over multiple years. Furthermore, the instruments considered in
the analysis of retail investor trading in Section 3.5 are typically used for short-term
trading.
In general, the window length must not necessarily conform to the price window
which a trader would use in practice since it only restricts the maximum possible
length of a single pattern, i. e., the distance between the first and last price involved
in the pattern. The last extremum in the sequence defining a pattern must be the
75th observation in the window, which leaves nine observations subsequent to the
trigger point. The latter ensures that there are enough input observations for the kernel
regression in order to avoid boundary effects on smoothed prices in the range of the
pattern. The requirement of a single trigger point ensures that each occurrence of a
pattern is only found once.
The most influencing factor in the above procedure is the bandwidth parameter h
which defines the degree of smoothing. A large value of h results in fewer detected
extrema and thus fewer patterns. It also influences the average duration of patterns
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since more extrema in a fixed time window allow patterns to evolve over a shorter
period of time. Lo et al. (2000) and related papers use cross-validation to determine the
value of h. Cross-validation determines h by minimizing the overall squared error when
using the model to sequentially predict an observation by all others. The approach is
also called ’leave-one-out method’. However, my tests applying cross-validation tends
to produce some undesirable calibrations for the purpose of detecting chart patterns.
First, h becomes relatively small which is why other studies (e. g., Savin et al.,
2006) use multiples of h to increase the degree of smoothing. In general, it is not
surprising that the procedure results in small h values. If we assume the price series
to be close to random walks (without trend), the best place to look for the left-out
price observation within the cross-validation procedure would be between the two
adjacent observations. Therefore most of the weight is given to these observations,
i. e., the bandwidth h becomes very small such that the Kernel estimate of the left-out
observations is approximately the average of its adjacent neighbors.
Secondly, if determined by cross-validation the value of h varies quite much from
window to window, which I believe is not practical in the sense that traders probably
do not change their visual (eye-balling) or algorithmic recognition calibration when
a new observation updates the price graph. Furthermore, strongly varying h can lead
to the situation where a detected pattern is not detected in the next window which
would be inconsistent to some extent, even when repeating patterns are excluded due
to the trigger condition. Nevertheless, I share the view that traders might change
their cognitive degree of smoothing, for example when prices are more volatile (cf. Lo
et al., 2000, p.1710). Thus, for each window i let hi = 1+ 8σi, where σi denotes the
standard deviation of the price differences in window i. This definition results in a
similar average of h as in the cross-validation case with multiplier 3.0 but comes with
much less variation (in h) between windows and almost no jumps.
Chart Pattern Definitions
I consider three types of chart patterns each including a long (buy signal) and a short
(sell signal) version: (inverse) head-and-shoulders, double top & bottom, and rectangle
top & bottom. The pattern definitions are derived from the academic literature and
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all include a so-called neckline-conditions which Kirkpatrick II and Dahlquist (2012)
describe as an important aspect for the pattern validity.
The head-and-shoulder pattern (see Figure 3.1 for an illustration) requires a sequence
of extrema E1, ..., E6 such that
• E1 is a maximum
• E3 > E1 and E3 > E5 (head above shoulders)
• |Ei − E¯| ≤ 0.015× E¯, for i = 1,5,where E¯ = (E1 + E5)/2 (shoulders have similar
height)
• |Ei− E¯| ≤ 0.015× E¯, for i = 2, 4,where E¯ = (E2+E4)/2 (neck points are in similar
range)
If the above conditions are satisfied, it is checked whether the price crosses the so-called
neckline, which is defined by the line through E2 and E4. The sell signal (if any) is
generated at the first price between E5 and E6 below the neckline.
Analogously, the inverse head-and-shoulder pattern is defined as
• E1 is a minimum
• E3 < E1 and E3 < E5 (head below shoulders)
• |Ei − E¯| ≤ 0.015× E¯, for i = 1, 5,where E¯ = (E1 + E5)/2 (shoulders have similar
height)
• |Ei − E¯| ≤ 0.015 × E¯, for i = 2,4, where E¯ = (E2 + E4)/2 (neck points are in
similar range)
If the above conditions are satisfied, it is checked whether the price crosses the neckline,
which is defined as the line through E2 and E4. The buy signal (if any) is generated at
the first price between E5 and E6 above the neckline.
Let the function d(·) return the position of an observation within the window. Double
tops are characterized by (not necessarily consecutive) extrema E1, E2, E3 satisfying
• E3, E1 are maxima
• d(E3)− d(E1)≥ 10,
• |Ei − E¯| ≤ 0.015× E¯, for i = 1,3, where E¯ = (E1 + E3)/2
• E2 = min
i
(Ei : d(E1)< d(Ei)< d(E3))
• E j >max
i
(Ei : d(E1)< d(Ei)< d(E3)), j = 1, 3
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If the above conditions are satisfied, it is checked if the price crosses the neckline, which
here is defined as the horizontal line through E2. The sell signal (if any) is generated
at the first price after E3 below the neckline. Double bottoms are defined as inverted
double tops and generate a buy signal.
Rectangle tops consist of five consecutive extrema E1, ..., E5 satisfying the following
conditions:
• E1 is maximum
• 1/1.01< Ei/E¯ < 1.01, for i = 1, 3,5, where E¯ = (E1 + E3 + E5)/3
• 1/1.01< E j/E¯ < 1.01, for j = 2, 4, where E¯ = (E2 + E4)/2
• E j < Ei, for i = 1, 3,5, j = 2,4
If the above conditions are satisfied, we check if the price crosses the neckline, which is
defined as the line through E2 and E4. The sell signal (if any) is generated at the first
price between E5 and E6 below the neckline.
Rectangle bottoms are defined as inverted rectangle tops and generate buy signals.
Note that in technical analysis handbooks (e. g., Bulkowski (2011) and Kirkpatrick II
and Dahlquist (2012)) rectangle tops and bottoms are defined as both reversal and
continuation patterns depending on the direction of the breakout, that is, upwards
for buy signals and downwards for sell signals. For the analysis, the reversal types
are exclusively used in order to restrict this pattern type to generate either buy or sell
signals.
To assess the consistency of the calibration of smoothing parameter h and correspond-
ing multipliers,the introduced pattern recognition algorithm is applied with different
calibrations. The test procedure runs on the set of daily data (closing prices) in DAX and
DAX30 stocks from April 2009 to November 2012 which also will be used in Section 3.5.
For this sample and the parameter calibration used for further analyses (h = 1+ 8σ), I
find 529 patterns of which 52.17% are buy signals. Alternative calibrations are h = 1
constant, h = 1.5 constant, and h determined through cross-validation multiplied by
3. Table 3.3 shows the number of detections for each calibration and pattern type.
Larger h-values lead to fewer detected signals, but the set of signals remains relatively
consistent, i.e. the signals detected under stronger smoothing are a subset of the signals
61
Chapter 3 Technical Analysis
TABLE 3.1: Comparison of Pattern Recognition Calibrations. This table compares TA
signal generated from different calibrations of the smoothing factor h of the Kernel
regression. The first block shows the number of patterns from the final smoothing
parameter calibration h = 1+8σ, where σ denotes the return volatility of the respective
price window. The second block contains recognition results from h determined by cross-
validation with multiplier 3. The third and fourth block show results from constant
h = 1.0, and h = 1.5, respectively. Row (1), (2), and (3) show numbers for the
patterns (inverse) head-and-shoulders, double top & bottom, and rectangle top &
bottom, respectively. For each calibration the total number of signals as well as the
absolute and relative number of signals matching the signals of the final calibration are
reported.
Vola adj. Cross-validation Constant Constant
h=1+8σ h-multiplier=3.0 h=1.0 h=1.5
matches matches matches
#signals #signals abs. rel. #signals abs. rel. #signals abs. rel.
(1) 327 277 160 57.76% 361 281 85.93% 178 127 71.35%
(2) 100 89 58 65.17% 97 92 94.85% 116 77 77.00%
(3) 102 99 49 49.49% 128 96 94.12% 51 43 84.31%
detected under less smoothing. In the presented alternative calibrations the share of
signals in accordance to the final calibration is between 49% and 95%.
3.4.3 Intraday Trading Signals
The previous section introduced TA signal definitions and corresponding recognition
methods based on daily data. In order to analyze the microstructure of trading, a
higher observation frequency is expedient. When it comes to markets such as Xetra,
where trading is very intense, a daily observation of TA signals would introduce a
high uncertainty with respect to a relation between trading variables (e. g., spreads
and turnover) and observed TA signals. Hence, the precise definition of TA signals
matters more since already a small deviation of, say, the applied filter bands of a
moving average might lead to a substantial time shift of the actual signal trigger. In
case of chart patterns, which include a multitude of parameters, this problem might
become particularly cumbersome. Since I have no information on the actual calibrations
Technical Analysts use for intraday trading, it seems questionable whether chart patterns
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can be analyzed on an intraday level in a sensible way.
To address these issues, I simplify the employed Technical Analysis strategies and try
to keep the definitions as unambiguous as possible. For intraday analyses, an observation
frequency of one minute is used. This seems to be a realistic time granularity with
respect to Technical Analysis trading because minutely data is typically available in
popular trading tools such as Saxo Trader by Saxo Bank and the IB Trader Workstation
by Interactive Brokers. Furthermore, one minute should be a sufficient amount of time
for a human trader to process new price information, make decisions, and place an
order. For technical reasons, i. e., with respect to the statistical analyses conducted
in the following sections, minutely data results in a convenient sample size7 that still
allows for complex procedures.
In case of moving averages, I use SMAs of one minute midquote observations
calculated over 5, 10, 20 and 50 day periods. A long (short) signal is triggered
when the midquote price pt crosses the average from below (above) and exceeds
(undercuts) by at least one minimum tick size, i. e., the conditions for a long signal are
SMAdt−1 > pt−1 + t icksize and SMAdt < pt + t icksize. The conditions for a short signal
are defined analogously. Let the indicator variable SMA long equal 1 if any of the four
SMA triggers a buy signal and, analogously, SMA short shall equal 1 if any of the four
moving averages triggers a sell signal.
As mentioned above, chart pattern involve a higher fuzziness regarding a precise
signal definition that captures trading activities of potential Technical Analysis traders.
Thus, chart patterns are not used as defined in Section 3.4.2, but their components,
that is, the highs and lows in the price graph. Technical Analysts call these ’significant’
(local) lows and highs support and resistance levels8 (SRL). They interpret a support
or resistance level in the price graph as evidence that supply and demand will tend to
behave similarly when prices approach this level once more.
In order to detect such levels, I use an adopted version of the approach by Lo
et al. (2000) presented above. Based on intraday quote data, I determine support and
resistance levels in moving windows consisting of 510 1-minute observations, which
7A one year sample of 30 DAX stocks has about 4 million stock-minute observations.
8See Kirkpatrick II and Dahlquist (2012, p.230f) for a discussion of support and resistance levels
from the perspective of Technical Analysts.
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is equivalent to one trading day. In each window, I fit a cubic spline to the midquote
price data. Instead of the Kernel regression approach, splines are computationally more
efficient to smooth the price series. Due to the immense size of the intraday data and
because the algorithm must run over rolling windows for each observation, splines
improve the run time drastically. The smoothing parameter of the spline is selected
relative to the midquote volatility in the respective window, i. e., smoothing increases
when prices are more volatile. This yields a reasonable number of support and resistance
levels in calm as well as in very stressed market situations. Let vola denote the hourly
midquote return volatility in the respective window. The recognition algorithm works
follows:
1. Fit a cubic spline using the annualized midquote return volatility in basis points
(bps) as smoothing parameter.
2. Evaluate the spline at each observation.
3. Determine local extrema in the spline series.
4. Determine the positions of the actual highs (lows) by searching the highest (lowest)
trade price between two spline lows (highs).
5. A high (low) is valid if its relative size to the previous low (high) is larger (smaller)
than 1+ vola (1− vola) or if it is higher (lower) than the previous high (low). In
the latter case the previous high(low) is deleted.
6. An extrema is not valid if it appears within the last 60 observations of the window.
This algorithm results in a list of active highs and lows that refers to the last
observation within the window. Then the window is moved by one observation and the
algorithm is applied again to obtain a new list of highs and lows. Figure 3.3 illustrates
the algorithm procedure. In the shown window we find four local maxima (highs)
and two local minima (lows) highlighted by circles. Thereof one maximum and one
minimum is not valid, hence both are deleted from the list. In case of the maximum this
is because of a higher local maximum at a later point of time. In case of the minimum,
the current (last) midquote price is lower than the detected local minimum. In the
shown example, we obtain a list of three active maxima and one active minimum for
the current price (last price in the window).
The existence of active highs and lows does not mean that a support or resistance
level is necessarily active. A support level is trigger with respect to the current (bid)
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Daimler AG midquote, 23-Feb-2010 
FIGURE 3.3: Visualization of the Smoothing Algorithm. This figure shows an example
pass of the algorithm used to define support and resistance levels. The observation
window consists of 507 midquote prices of Daimler AG on February 23, 2010. The
black line shows the smoothed spline output. Crosses on the smoothed spline mark
local highs and lows. Encircled midquote prices refer to highs and lows satisfying the
minimum distance condition from the previous low and high.
quote when the best bid is within a range of one tick size around a local minimum
determined by the above procedure and lowest trade price in the previous 1-minute
interval was not below that range. The latter accounts for the situation when a support
or resistance level already has been broken, which typically would be noticed by the
Technical Analysis trader if she uses candlestick charts. The definition of an active
resistance level at the best ask follows analogously.
Since the recognition algorithm just considers observations from one day, the resulting
support and resistance levels do only refer to very recent price developments and should
be only be relevant (if at all) for trading in the near future. In particularly, for retail
investors it seems unlikely that (high-frequent) intraday data is used after weeks or
months and over long time periods. In addition, I performed tests including long-
term extrema, e. g., weekly and monthly highs and lows. The impact on the results is
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negligible as the number of occurrences when stocks trade exactly at such price levels
is very small.
Within a 6-year sample of 30 DAX stocks the relative appearance of support and
resistance levels among all 1-minute observations is 2.1% and 2.3%, respectively. Note
that a single level may be active across multiple observations if quoted prices satisfy the
defined conditions for several minutes. In comparison, intraday moving average signals
trigger more rarely. I find active SMA long or short signals in only about 1.0% of the
1-minute intervals across the sample.
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3.5 Retail Investor Trading
This section assesses the relation of retail investor trading and Technical Analysis. In
particular, I focus on two popular Technical Analysis techniques: moving averages and
chart patterns. Trading data from Stuttgart Stock Exchange provides a promising basis
to address Research Question 2 postulated in Section 1.2. I use trading data on the
extensively traded product types knock-out warrants and (vanilla) warrants due to
their predominately speculative characteristics, which are described in Section 2.1.3.
Furthermore the considered products must have the DAX index or its constituents as
underlying.
The main idea of the presented approach is to use the algorithmically identified
Technical Analysis trading signals in the underlyings and relate them to the trades in
associated knock-out products and warrants. Based on this relation, different dimension
of retail investor trading are studied, e. g., trading activity , trading performance, and
further trade characteristics.
3.5.1 Related Literature and Research Hypotheses
This section outlines TA-related literature with a focus on retail investor trading. For
the presented study it plays no crucial role whether Technical Analysis is actually
profitable or not. It seems unlikely that the typical retail investor determines the best
performing rules and calibrations. Yet she might use Technical Analysis because she
believes it is useful for trading or because other successful investor use it. In this respect,
behaviorally motivated papers on the usage of Technical Analysis find a high popularity
of TA-related methods among professional investors. For instance, Flanegin and Rudd
(2005), Menkhoff and Taylor (2007), and Menkhoff (2010) show that fund managers
and professional traders believe that Technical Analysis has some relevance in financial
markets.
The survey replies from fund managers in Menkhoff (2010) show that for 87%
Technical Analysis plays a role in their investment process and for 18% it is the
preferred way of information processing. On the other hand, it seems likely that
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similar considerations are valid for retail investors. First, information and knowledge on
Technical Analysis is widely available in textbooks and online resources. Secondly, retail
investors could imitate professional investors or experts if they follow their activities,
for instance, online blogs, boards, and social trading platforms.
Using a large sample of Dutch discount brokerage clients and a corresponding survey,
Hoffmann and Shefrin (2014) find that 32% use Technical Analysis to some extent
while for 9% it is the exclusive trading approach. By matching the survey responses
to the investor’s accounts, they show that Technical Analysis is highly detrimental
to the investors’ wealth causing a marginal cost of about 50 basis point per month.
Furthermore investors using Technical Analysis trade more frequently and hold more
concentrated portfolios with higher non-systematic risk exposure. Interestingly, the
share of Technical Analysis users is even higher than reported by Lease et al. (1974)
in the 1970’s which might be due to increased availability of Technical Analysis tools
typically provided by financial websites and online brokerages today. Hoffmann and
Shefrin (2014) also find that Technical Analysis investors trade lottery-like instruments
with right-skewed return distributions, but negative risk-adjusted returns.
Etheber et al. (2014) find intense TA-related trading activities for German retail
investors. About 10% of the retail investors in their brokerage dataset trading activities
can be consistently related to moving average trading strategies. Overall trading activity
of the sample population increases 30% on moving average signal days while earning
no abnormal returns.
From a theoretical point of view, Blume et al. (1994) develop a model which shows
that market price and volume information can play a role in the learning process
of investors. Hence Technical Analysis might have a value for investors who are
not fully informed. Ebert and Hilpert (2014) argue that trading based on moving
average strategies might be more appealing for retail investors compared to a buy-and-
hold strategy if they have prospect theory preferences (cf. Section 2.3). Assuming a
typical stock return distribution (e. g., log-normal) applying a moving average strategy
on such return series skews returns to the right because extreme losses are avoided
at the cost of usually higher transaction fees and a bad performance in sideways
markets. The resulting right-skewed (realized) return distribution is more attractive
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for investors having prospect theory preferences (instead of being risk-neutral mean-
variance maximizers).
Hence, the popularity of Technical Analysis might be explained by the fact that it
addresses typical behavioral characteristics of retail investors, e. g., prospect theory
preferences (Ebert and Hilpert, 2014), demand for gambling and entertainment (Hoff-
mann and Shefrin, 2013), or the confirmation bias (Friesen et al., 2009). Herding
behavior of retail investors could be promoted by the popularity of Technical Analysis
in financial media from which investors could obtain similar trading signals. Several
authors argue that Technical Analysis has a broad media coverage, e. g., Park and Irwin
(2007), Hoffmann and Shefrin (2014), and Avramov et al. (2015). The triggering of TA
signals might just generate attention in a particular stock and thereby addresses the
search problem of retail investors (Barber et al., 2008) resulting in increased turnover
due to an attention effect. Additionally there might be a cascading effect in the sense
that if there is a meaningful number of Technical Analysts causing a relevant amount
of turnover in that stock, non-TA trader might put their attention on this stock due to
the abnormal turnover. The actual relevance of Technical Analysis in financial media
(information provider) compared to other forms of information and security analysis
tools (e. g., fundamental data, analysts forecasts, corporate news) unfortunately is hard
to measure.
Apart from retail investor trading, there are several papers analyzing the effect on
the microstructure of stock trading, which is discussed in Section 3.6. However, some
of these studies have implications for the study of retail investor trading as well. In
particular, Bender et al. (2013) examine head-and-should chart patterns in NYSE and
AMEX stocks over a 40 year period of daily data and find excess trading volume on
trading signals days as well as narrower (quoted) bid-ask spreads. Etheber (2014)
confirms excess trading activity around moving average signals for the German stock
market. The latter suggests that retail investors trading on Stuttgart Stock Exchange
are also interested in TA-related strategies.
In sum, academic research indicates that Technical Analysis plays a role in security
markets and the decision making process of (retail) investors. Based on the presented
literature, I derive the following hypotheses regarding Research Question 1a.
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Hypothesis 1a:
(i) Trading activity in speculative (structured) products is abnormally high on TA signal
days.
(ii) TA buy (sell) signals lead to a positive (negative) net positioning of retail investor
trades.
Irrespective of surging trading activity, characteristics of (round-trip) trades associ-
ated with TA signals could be different compared to the overall population of trades.
Empirically, trading accounts of retail investor exhibit a bad (return) performance,
which is particularly true for trading structured products and other derivatives (cf.
Section 2.4). Likely drivers of this under-performance are informational and cognitive
shortcomings (cf. Section 2.3). As discussed by Ebert and Hilpert (2014), Technical
Analysis techniques can be considered as an algorithmic modification of the realized
return distribution. If followed strictly and if transaction costs are ignored the sample
of TA-related trades has different characteristics than typical trades by retail investors.
Potentially alternated characteristics might be performance, disposition effect (skewness
of realized return distributions), leverage and realized volatility. This leads to following
hypotheses regarding Research Question 1b.
Hypothesis 1b:
(i) Trades in accordance with Technical Analysis trading signals earn higher raw returns
and risk-adjusted returns.
(ii) The realized return distributions of trades which are in accordance to Technical
Analysis trading signals are less left-skewed than the realized return distributions of
comparable trades.
Part (i) of the hypothesis rests on the assumption that a systematic approach to trading
might lead to favorable trading results. Furthermore, investors who use Technical
Analysis might be more engaged with investment strategies in general. A principle
often stated in popular Technical Analysis textbooks is the limitation of losses from a
trade which would translate into assertion (i) of Hypothesis 1b. The second part of
Hypothesis 2b can be interpreted as a weaker propensity of TA-based traders to the
disposition effect. In this sense, Technical Analysis could be an effective tool for retail
investors to realize a return distribution which is more in accordance with their actual
preferences.
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3.5.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the data selection from the databases described in Section 2.2 used
within this study. The analysis of retail investor trading behavior bases on leveraged
structured products having the DAX index or one of its 30 constituents as underlying.
In particular, I use warrants and knock-out products with limited time to maturity for
which master and transaction data are available from 04/01/2009 to 12/31/2013.
I delete trades in the upper 1 percent turnover and volume quantiles based on each
underlying and product class, since these trades are unlikely to be on behalf of retail
investors. The selected sample contains 266,783 traded instruments and about 3.7
million trades accounting for EUR 15.2bn turnover in total. Table 3.2 shows the explicit
compilation of products and option types. For the analyses in the following sections, I
use April 2009 as pre-period and December 2013 as post-period.
TABLE 3.2: Descriptive Statistics - Trading Data Stuttgart Stock Exchange. Key facts
of trade data from Stuttgart Stock Exchange. The sample contains all trades in DAX and
DAX30 warrants and knock-outs from 2009/04/01 to 2013/12/31. The matching rate
refers to the share of buy transactions that can be matched by the algorithm described
in section 3.5.2. From the resulting sample of round-trip trades, trades below EUR 0.1
or completed in less than two minutes are deleted.
Knock-Outs Warrants
Overall Calls Puts Calls Puts
# Instruments 266,783 62,408 47,466 96,827 60,082
# Trades [mn] 3.6950 0.7647 0.9292 1.2330 0.7680
# Buys [mn] 1.9761 0.3753 0.4611 0.6974 0.4424
# Sells [mn] 1.7189 0.3894 0.4681 0.5357 0.3256
Total Turnover [mnEUR] 15.2376 2.1885 2.5711 6.7007 3.7773
Buy Turnover [mnEUR] 7.6444 1.0264 1.2414 3.3844 1.9922
Sell Turnover [mnEUR] 7.5932 1.1621 1.3297 3.3163 1.7851
Avg. Trade Size [EUR] 3,995 2,862 2,767 5,434 4,918
Avg. Time to maturity [d], buys only 129 60 92 234 131
Matching rate 58.1% 72.1% 71.9% 47.8% 49.8%
Round-trip trades [mn] 1.0853
The post-period is necessary to obtain a reliable matching of buy and sell orders. Since
orders are generally anonymous it is not directly possible to infer trading characteristics
of completed trades. Thus, I apply a methodology to deduce round-trip trades based on
the transaction data sample. As conjectured by market makers of the Stuttgart Stock
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Exchange, it is likely that retail investors who buy structured products at Stuttgart Stock
Exchange sell there as well. Based on this assumption, I use a matching algorithm to
find related buys and sells. Meyer et al. (2014) use a similar algorithm to analyze the
trading skill of retail investors.
The algorithm matches buys in an instrument with subsequent sells having the same
size and routing information given a first-in, first-out principle. Due to the huge number
of instruments there are usually only few trades in each instrument making the trade
characteristics quite unambiguous. Thus, the chance of mismatches is relatively low. If
no matching sell order is found, I check whether there are sells in the instrument having
the same routing information. If this is the case the buy order remains unmatched and
is dropped. If not, the algorithm checks whether the product has been knocked-out
or has expired and the corresponding final value of the instrument is assigned. Note
that knocked-out or expired instruments do not have to be sold by the investor as they
are automatically cleared from the trading account by the broker and the issuing bank,
respectively. The sell orders considered for matching also include orders which are
disregarded due to the filters introduced above.
Overall, 72.0% of knock-out buys and 48.6% of warrant buys can be matched. Most
trades are completed within one month. For the final sample, I delete round-trip trades
with buy prices below EUR 0.1, trades in the upper 1% volume and turnover quantile,
and trades completed in less than two minutes or more than one year. The final matched
sample contains 1,085,349 round-trip trades.
TABLE 3.3: Technical Analysis Trading Signals in DAX and DAX30 Stocks. Trading
signals in DAX and DAX30 stocks from May 2009 to November 2013 (1209 trading
days) generated by the technical analysis algorithms introduced in Section 3.4.
Event type Overall signals Signals per stock/day Buy signals Sell signals
(Inverse) Head-and-Shoulders 327 0.87% 172 155
Double Top & Bottom 100 0.27% 48 52
Rectangle Top & Bottom 102 0.27% 56 46
SMA 200 (0.1% filter) 979 2.61% 499 480
Dual SMA-20-100 522 1.39% 265 257
Dual SMA-50-200 208 0.55% 117 91
Overall 2238 5.97% 1157 1081
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To analyze the relation of round-trip trades to Technical Analysis, I focus on signals in
the considered underlyings, i. e., DAX and DAX30 stocks. I use moving average and chart
pattern signals from the recognition algorithms introduced in Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. I
use signals from SMAs with 0.1% filters as well as the DSMA-20-100 and DSMA-50-200.
All moving average strategies are calculated on the basis of daily observations. Chart
pattern signals are considered from head-and-shoulder patterns and its inverse version,
Double Tops and Bottoms, and Rectangle Top & Bottom. A detailed description of the
definition and calibration is provided in Section 3.4.2. The final set of signals in the 31
considered underlyings contains 529 pattern signals, thereof 52.17% buy signals. Table
3.3 shows detailed numbers on each type of pattern. Depending on the chart pattern
type trading signal appear on 0.27% to 2.61% of the 1209 considered trading days.
Finally, a third data set based on the 1-minute intraday data from TRTH is used
to calculate returns from the underlying of a product which is used as a benchmark
for round-trip trade returns in the trading performance analysis presented in Section
3.5.4.
3.5.3 Trading Activity
Excess Trading Turnover
To capture retail investor trading activity, I use two measures of trading intensity based
on the unmatched transaction sample of buys and sells in all considered instruments.
Because of the large number of knock-out and warrants from distinct issuers which
typically have different product characteristics, I adjust the actual trade turnover for
subscription ratio and leverage of the traded product. Otherwise the measure would
not reflect the net position size of retail investors, i. e., the funds that would have
been necessary to build a position in the underlying containing the same level of risk.
Performing additional trading activity analyses with the unadjusted actual turnover
yield similar results compared to the adjusted values defined in the following. From the
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actual turnover TOact of a transaction the leverage-adjusted turnover is derived as
TO =
TOact ∗

1+ R∗K
P

, if call product
TOact ∗

R∗K
P
− 1 , if put product (3.2)
where R and K denote subscription ratio and strike price of the traded instrument and
P is the trade price.
The first measure of retail investor trading activity is based on the logarithm of
aggregated (adjusted) turnover TO( j)t of all transactions on day t in underlying j. I
replace the 197 stock-day observations having zero turnover by the smallest observation
in the respective stock during the sample period in order to reduce the impact of
extreme observations and to be able to calculate logarithms. Since even small trades
have numerically large turnover values, zero-valued observations would introduce
relatively much meaningless variation to the time series which is omitted through the
proposed transformation.
In general, a time series of aggregated turnover has specific statistical properties
to consider. Turnover is always positive and typically has a right-skewed distribution.
Furthermore, turnover time series are auto-correlated and related to stock and market
volatility. To account for the above properties of the turnover series, I use a similar
approach as Bender et al. (2013) who define excess turnover as the residual of an
auto-regressive model. For each underlying j, the following model is applied to obtain
the resulting residuals {ε( j)t }t=1,...,T as a measure of excess turnover, i. e.,
ln(TO( j)t ) = α+
20∑
k=1
β ln(TO( j)t−k) +
5∑
i=0

γi Range
( j)
t−i +δi ret
( j)
t−i

+ ζ V DAX t +η ret
( j)
t,t+10 + θ t + ε
( j)
t ,
(3.3)
where Range( j)t is the absolute price range of underlying j on day t, ret
( j)
t denotes daily
log-returns, V DAX is the DAX volatility index, and ret( j)t,t+10 denotes the underlying’s
log-return over the next 10 day period. Hence this approach removes the trend and the
correlation to market and underlying volatility from the turnover series. The resulting
measure can be interpreted as the surplus of turnover on a given day that we would
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not have expected based on the model.
In order to analyze the positioning (long or short) of retail investors in relation to
the direction of TA signals, I define a second measure of directional trading activity.
The adjustments remain the same as in the first case, but aggregation is performed
separately for long and short position, i. e., purchases of calls (long turnover) and
purchases of puts (short turnover), respectively.
Sell transactions are excluded from this consideration for the following reasons. First,
due to the market structure of structured products and the exclusion of short selling,
a product must always be bought before it can be sold. Thus, the initialization of a
long or short trade always requires the purchase of a call or a put, respectively. Second,
selling a previously bought instrument can have several other reasons (e. g., liquidity
needs). Even if traders use Technical Analysis for their trading decision, they might
have to close their position because the original TA signal does not work as anticipated,
although there is no new opposed signal9 Third, because it is also possible to sell an
instrument on another exchange or directly to the issuer, missing sells could introduce
some bias regarding long or short positioning, e. g., investors could prefer selling calls
directly to the issuer.
For the directional measure of excess turnover, I use a vector auto-regression (VAR)
model as follows. Let L( j)t the aggregated turnover of knock-out calls and call warrants on
underlying j bought on day t and analogously S( j)t put purchases. Let X
( j)
t = (L
( j)
t , S
( j)
t )
ᵀ
and the VAR equation is defined as
X ( j)t = α+
5∑
k=1
β ln(X( j)t−k) +
5∑
i=0

γi Range
( j)
t−i +δiret
( j)
t−i + ζi VDAXt−i

+η ret( j)t,t+10 + θ t + ε
( j)
t ,
(3.4)
where the right-hand side variables follow the definitions from equation 3.3 but ex-
panded to two-dimensional vectors with identical entries. The resulting two-dimensional
9For instance, I do not consider pattern confirmations or failures like so-called pull-backs in case of
head-and-shoulders pattern. Furthermore, I do not check whether a triggered signal is negated which is
usually the case when price break the trigger price levels (e. g., the neckline) in the opposite direction (cf.
Bulkowski, 2011). In general, trading on chart patterns does not necessarily imply to close a position
only when a signal in the opposite direction occurs, but after a given time or a given price target has
been reached, for example.
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residuals ε( j)t measure excess long and short turnover and the difference δ
j
t = (1,−1)·ε( j)t
of its entries constitute the excess turnover imbalance, which will be used to analyze
the positioning of retail investors.
Results on Trading Activity
To test Hypothesis 1a, I consider the overall trading activity in warrants and knock-outs
at Stuttgart stock exchange measured as excess turnover defined above. In a first step,
I compare the average excess volume on TA signal days and non-signal days, as well as
on three trading days before and five trading days after a signal appeared.
Figure 3.4 shows the values and differences of (lagged) signal days and non-signal
days. The upper plot in Figure 3.4 shows the results for pattern signals and the bottom
plot moving average signals. In both cases, there is visual evidence that turnover on
signal days is different compared to non-signal days. In case of pattern signals the
shown values mean that on signal days there is about 35% more turnover than expected
based on model (3.3). For SMA signals the increase is about 11%. Table 3.4 lists the
values and shows the results from a Sattertwaith t-test on the difference between signal
and no signal days. For both cases, the t-test is only significant on a 0.1% level on days
of signal.
The generally smaller impact of SMA signals indicates a preference for patterns over
a long-term SMA. However, the rather short trading horizon of (round-trip) in trades
structured products could partially explain the higher activity around chart patterns
which evolve over shorter periods compared to the considered SMA. The considered
chart patterns typically evolve over less than two months. For pattern signals, negative
excess turnover is found two days before a pattern signal. Retail investors trading
patterns might wait for the triggering signal after the last relevant extremum has
emerged.
SMA signals exhibit a reversal in excess volume two days after a signal occurred as
well as positive excess turnover 4 days after the signal which is of smaller magnitude
than on the signal day, however. This might be a result of the considered SMA which in
practice are often applied with slightly shifted trigger conditions or varying filter criteria.
Assuming some retail investors are no day traders and trade infrequent, the lagged
observation of a TA signal could result in increased excess volume some days after an
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FIGURE 3.4: Excess Trading on TA Signal Days. The figure shows average excess
turnover in structured products traded at Stuttgart Stock Exchange three days before
up to 5 days after a TA signal occurred. The top and bottom plot are based on chart
patterns signals and moving average signals, respectively.
event. For example, Lo et al. (2000, p.1719) use a 3-day lag to "control for the fact that
in practice we do not observe a realization [...] as soon as it has completed" to account
for a potential recognition time. However, the presented descriptive evidence highlight
the strongest effect on the signal trigger day, so additional analyses of lagged days is
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TABLE 3.4: Excess Turnover on TA Signal Days. This tables lists average excess trading
activity on signal and non-signal days for different lags. A lag x means some day t
for which a signal (or no signal) appears on day t + x . The last two columns show
t-statistics and p-value from a Sattertwaith t-test on the difference between the signal
and no signal groups.
Panel A: Pattern signal
Lag No signal Signal Diff. t-stat p-value
-3 0.0018 -0.0272 -0.0290 -0.63 0.5260
-2 0.0037 -0.1327 -0.1364 -2.50 0.0125
-1 0.0010 0.0098 0.0088 0.18 0.8569
0 -0.0050 0.3018 0.3068 7.19 0.0001
1 0.0031 -0.0816 -0.0847 0.65 0.5175
2 0.0006 0.0236 0.0230 0.15 0.8778
3 0.0019 -0.0435 -0.0454 -0.90 0.3679
4 0.0006 0.0080 0.0074 0.46 0.6430
5 0.0004 0.0307 0.0303 -1.66 0.0982
Panel B: Moving Average Signal
Lag No signal Signal Diff. t-stat p-value
-3 -0.0011 0.0382 0.0393 1.21 0.2253
-2 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.01 0.9946
-1 0.0016 -0.0300 -0.0316 -0.94 0.3499
0 -0.0039 0.1082 0.1121 3.91 0.0001
1 0.0009 0.0056 0.0047 -0.27 0.7883
2 0.0045 -0.0862 -0.0907 1.99 0.0463
3 0.0021 -0.0252 -0.0273 -0.86 0.3925
4 -0.0014 0.0580 0.0594 -2.61 0.0091
5 0.0009 -0.0085 -0.0093 0.14 0.8895
not considered. In practice, retail investors should have the technological prerequisites
(e. g., online trading) to react to signals quickly.
A panel regression analysis is used to confirm the descriptive evidence. Therefore, I
estimate the following regression for the excess turnover measured as the residuals ε( j)t
obtained from model (3.3).
ε( j)t = α+ β ∗ Psig( j)t + γ ∗ SMAsig( j)t + ξ( j)t , (3.5)
where Psig( j)t and SMAsig
( j)
t are dummy variables indicating the occurrence of pattern
and SMA signal, respectively, on day t in underlying j. The specification does not
include firm dummies since the input excess turnover series was estimated per firm and
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TABLE 3.5: Regression Models of Excess Turnover. Column (1) presents estimation
results from the regression ε( j)t = α+ β ∗ Psig( j)t + γ ∗ SMAsig( j)t + ξ( j)t , where ε( j)t is
the excess turnover in stock j on day t, Psig( j)t and SMAsig
( j)
t equal 1 if a TA and MA
signal occurred in underlying j on day t or are zero, else. All models use standard
errors double clustered on underlying and day. In column (2) the model contains an
interaction term of pattern and moving average indicators and for column (3) each
pattern and moving average strategy is used as a separate dummy. Standard errors of
the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
on the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Excess Turnover
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.0101* -0.0103* -0.0070
(0.007) (0.0070) (0.0070)
Pattern signal 0.3012*** 0.3106***
(0.0443) (0.0466)
MA signal 0.1191*** 0.1232***
(0.0285) (0.0286)
Pattern ∗ MA signal -0.1937
(0.1575)
Double Top & Bottom 0.2607**
(0.1291)
Head & Shoulders signal 0.2164***
(0.0623)
Rectangle Top & Bottom 0.1824
(0.1497)
SMA200 signal 0.1774***
(0.0336)
DSMA20/100 signal 0.0329
(0.0427)
DSMA50/200 signal 0.0080
(0.0628)
Number of Observations 36301 36301 36301
R-Square 0.0015 0.0016 0.0010
the resulting residuals have zero mean. Consequently the intercept is not significant.
However, the variance of the residuals (from (3.3)) could vary between stocks and
thus I use Thompson (2011) clustered standard errors which cluster in time (day)
and stock as well as in the intersection. Estimation results are shown in Table 3.5,
column (1). Confirming the descriptive tests, both signal types have a significant and
positive effect on excess turnover in the considered products. Naturally, R-squares are
low as most of the explainable variation is already absorbed by the preceding models
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(3.3) or (3.4). Furthermore signals are in general a quite rare event – about 6% of
all stock-days – and therefore can not explain much of the overall variation. Despite
the model confirms the large impact of a triggered trading signal on excess turnover.
Extending equation (3.3) by an additional interaction term of SMA and pattern signal
indicators the corresponding estimate reported in column (2) shows that this effect is
not significant. In general, the intersection is a rare event since only on 36 stock-days a
pattern and SMA signal are triggered simultaneously.
An alternative to the two-step approach is to combine models (3.3) and (3.5) in
order to estimate the normalization and TA signal effects simultaneously. Although
the interpretation regarding the parameters used for the validation of Hypothesis 1a
remain unchanged, I prefer the two-step approach as the statistically more sound way
to obtain this results. This is basically because we allow the impacts of variables used
in model (3.3) to be stock specific and independent of potential effects from TA signals.
The estimation results from the full model add no further insights and for this reason
are not reported. Furthermore, the two-stage approach is more consistent to analyze
the hypothesized effect since it measures the effect with respect to the turnover that
would have been expected from contemporaneous and lagged trading variables.
To differentiate between the considered pattern and moving average types, I adapt
the regression model by including dummies for each considered pattern and SMA type.
Estimation results are reported in Table 3.5, column (3). Double Tops and Bottoms
and (Inverse) Head and Shoulder patterns have a large impact on excess turnover and
both are statistically significant. The estimated effect of rectangle tops and bottoms is
positive but not significant. This could be related to the more ambiguous definition of
this pattern type or mean that the pattern is not as popular as the two previous ones. For
moving average signals similar results emerge. The SMA200 with 0,1% filters can be
associated with a 20% increase in excess turnover which is highly significant on a 0.1%
confidence level. However, both crossover SMA types show values close to zero. This
might be due to the more subjective implementation of double moving averages. While
the 200-day SMA is quite unique, the shorter moving average of the DSMA strategy
could be applied with basically any length. This could dilute the time of observation
and could also mean that the turnover based on these strategies is distributed over
multiple days. I also test DSMA10/100 and DSMA20/200 with very similar regression
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results. Hence, I drop the dual SMA signals for the remainder of this chapter.
Positioning
With regard to Hypothesis 1b, I consider the excess turnover long-short imbalance
obtained from regression (3.4) by applying two regression models similar to model
(3.5). The first model includes two dummy variables which equal one if any buy (sell)
signal in an underlying occurred on day t. The second model utilizes all long and short
signals of Head and Shoulder, Double Top and Bottom, and Rectangle Top & Bottom
pattern, as well as the 200-day SMA, i. e., eight signal dummy variables in total. Table
3.6 reports the estimation results. Both models do not support Hypothesis 1b. For
the model reported in column (1), estimated coefficients of buy signal and sell signal
dummies are not significant and close to zero but the signs are in the expected direction.
Results from the second model in column (2) show that neither of the estimates of
individual trading signals imply a significant impact on turnover imbalances on a 10
% level. Note that only call buys and put buys are considered, i. e., there are no
direct reversal effects from selling positions which could be considered as long or short
positioning and thus might affect the model results in any direction.
A possible explanation for the insignificant results on excess turnover imbalances
could be that the subgroup of retail investor using Technical Analysis tends to trade
opposed to the remaining population of retail investors. Since TA signals always appear
after a price movement in the same direction of the signal, i. e., prices increase before a
buy signal decrease before a sell signal, contrarian trading usually is opposed to TA-based
trading. The fact that the increase in trading activity after a TA signal does not translate
into corresponding long-short positioning, makes it more likely that a general attention
effect around signals is relevant. As mentioned before, other groups of retail investors
might rely on volume, media, or other attention grabbing events to solve their search
problem of selecting instruments to trade. In this sense, TA-related trading or reports
on TA signals could draw the intention of retail investors on a specific instrument who
trade opposed to the signals, however. Overall, Hypothesis 1b is rejected, which means
that TA signals cannot reliably predict (net) positioning of retail investors measured by
daily excess trading imbalances.
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TABLE 3.6: Long-short Imbalance on TA Signal Days. This table presents result from
the regression ε( j)t = α+β ∗Psig( j)t +γ∗SMAsig( j)t +ξ( j)t , where ε( j)t is the excess turnover
in stock j on day t, Psig( j)t and SMAsig
( j)
t equal 1 if a TA and MA signal occurred in
underlying j on day t or are zero, else. Column (1) shows a regression specification
using aggregated TA signals. In column (2) each TA signal type is used separately, i. e., a
dummy variable indicating a signal is included for each TA strategy. In both regressions
stock-day double-clustered standard errors are used. *, **, and *** denote significance
on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Excess-long short imbalance
(1) (2)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept -0.0161 0.0119 -0.0164 0.0119
Buy signal 0.1072 0.1193
Sell signal -0.0737 0.1301
Head and shoulders -0.1162 0.2555
Inv. Head and shoulders 0.3694 0.2964
Double top 0.2334 0.5287
Double bottom 0.0443 0.3116
Rectangle top -0.3375 0.4019
Rectangle bottom -0.0173 0.3077
SMA200 long 0.0738 0.4019
SMA200 short -0.0698 0.3077
Number of observations 36301 36301
R-Square 0.0001 0.0001
3.5.4 Trade Characteristics
In this section, I consider trade characteristics of round-trip trades to assess the question
whether trades in accordance to TA signals have different properties compared to the
sample population. Therefore, I examine matched trades which are obtained through
the matching algorithm described in Section 3.5.2.
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Performance, Holding Duration, and Leverage
For each round-trip trade i, I calculate three return measures, i.e. log-return ri, risk-
adjusted return rad ji , and risk-adjusted excess return r
ad jex
i defined as
ri = 100 ∗ log
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, for puts,
(3.6)
where P buy (P sel l) denotes the buying (selling) price, U buyi (U
sel l
i ) the price of the
underlying at purchase (sale), Li is the leverage of the traded product at purchase
as defined in equation (3.2), and σi denotes the annualized 20-day volatility of the
underlying. Due to the nature of structured products, the selling price is set to 1 cent
if a product is knocked-out or to the product’s inner value if it expires. The historical
volatility accounts for the risk involved in a trade. In the literature realized volatility is
often used instead because it relates price deviation during the actual holding period to
the realized return. However, the calculation of realized returns over very short holding
period behave too erratically.
Figures 3.6 and 3.5 depict the empirical distributions of log-returns, holding period,
and leverage based on the whole sample. The high leverage ratio incorporated in the
traded instruments highlights the highly speculative character of these trades. Since
the population of retail investors is expected to be uninformed (cf. Meyer et al., 2014),
the gambling and entertainment aspect probably is a major incentive for trading knock-
out and warrants. The holding duration supports the perception of such trades (and
products) as short-term bets. The median holding period is less than two days, i.e. most
trades are completed within one or two days. Note that the histogram is cut off after
30 days, although the maximum trade duration considered is one year. Generally there
are also long-term trades as the mean of about 14 days indicates.
Realized returns appear to be quite devastating for the wealth of retail investors
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FIGURE 3.5: Leverage of Round-Trip Trades at Purchase. The figures shows the
distribution of log-returns of round-trip trades in knock-out products and warrants
traded at Stuttgart Stock.
trading knock-outs and warrants. On average, a trade loses about 4% of the invested
capital. Interestingly, the median log-return is positive, i. e., the log-return distribution
is highly skewed to the left. Retail investors realize profits more often, but also realize
extreme losses which in many cases means the total invested capital. Approximately
7.48% of the considered trades are knocked-out or expire worthless. Hence the
descriptive facts are an indication for the presence of the disposition effect among
retail investors trading structured products which confirms several existing studies
mentioned in Section 3.5.1).
To assess research question Research Question 1b, I analyze whether there are
differences between trades that have been entered on days of a TA signal. Therefore I
use trading signals generated by the long and short versions of the three chart pattern
types and the SMA200 with 0.1% filters. The dummy variables buysigi and sel lsi gi
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FIGURE 3.6: Log-returns and Holding Duration of Round-Trip Trades. The figures
shows the distribution of log-returns and holding duration of round-trip trades in knock-
out products and warrants traded at Stuttgart Stock. The histogram of holding duration
is cut off after 30 days.
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TABLE 3.7: Performance of Round-trip Rrades. This table presents estimation results
from regression model (3.7) defined by ri = β1 ∗ buysigi ∗ ci + β2 ∗ buysigi ∗ pi + γ1 ∗
sel lsi gi∗ci+γ2∗sel lsi gi∗pi+δ1∗holdingi∗ci+δ2∗holdingi∗pi+η∗market i+ζ∗koi+
cont rols+εi, where ci and pi are dummy variables for call and put, holdingi denotes the
duration of trade i in days, market i is a dummy for market buy order, and koi indicates
trades in knock-out products. The term cont rols is defined as
∑
j

ul( j)i ∗ ci + ul( j)i ∗ pi

,
where dummy ul( j)i equals 1 if the underlying of t radei is j. I regress three return
measures, i.e. raw log-return, risk-adjusted return, and excess return, which are reported
in column (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are
listed in parentheses. All regressions use standard errors double clustered on underlying
and day. *, **, and *** denote significance on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Round-trip trade performance
Raw log-return Risk-adjusted return Risk-adjusted ex. return
Buy signal ∗ call 8.2668*** 1.1130*** 0.0528***
(2.7153) (0.4115) (0.0284)
Buy signal∗ put -13.9863*** -1.9780*** -0.0652***
(1.2242) (0.2201) (0.0187)
Sell signal ∗ call -3.2263*** -0.7176 -0.0096
(1.2234) (0.2305) (0.0203)
Sell signal ∗ put 5.2310*** -1.0733*** -0.0348*
(0.9175) (0.2573) (0.0257)
Holding ∗ call -0.2450*** -0.0628*** -0.0074***
(0.0356) (0.0092) (0.0025)
Holding ∗ put -0.6815*** -0.2502*** -0.0151***
(0.0323) (0.0114) (0.0026)
Market order -0.6821*** -0.1781*** -0.0141***
(0.2116) (0.0463) (0.0049)
Knock-out product 0.8899 -1.1081*** -0.0792***
(0.7381) (0.0664) (0.0254)
Controls
underlying ∗ put, underlying ∗ put, underlying ∗ put,
underlying ∗ call underlying ∗ call underlying ∗ call
Number of Obs. 1085349 1085349 1085349
R-Square 0.0785 0.1499 0.1188
are defined such that they indicate a triggered buy signal and a sell signal, respectively,
on the day round-trip trade i was entered. The following regression model, which
employs standard errors double-clustered on underlying and days as proposed by
Thompson (2011) and Cameron et al. (2011), analyses potential drivers of round-trip
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trade returns:
ri =β1 ∗ buysigi ∗ ci + β2 ∗ buysigi ∗ pi + γ1 ∗ sel lsi gi ∗ ci + γ2 ∗ sel lsi gi ∗ pi (3.7)
+δ1 ∗ holdingi ∗ ci +δ2 ∗ holdingi ∗ pi +η ∗market i + ζ ∗ koi + cont rols + εi,
where ci and pi are dummy variables for call and put, holdingi denotes the duration of
trade i in days, market i is a dummy for market buy order, and koi indicates trades in
knock-out products. The term cont rols is defined as
∑
j

ul( j)i ∗ ci + ul( j)i ∗ pi

, where
dummy ul( j)i equals 1 if the underlying of t radei is j and is set to zero otherwise. The
latter means that the model includes fixed effects for each underlying and trade direction
(i.e. long or short trades) in terms of call or put products. Hence, I evaluate whether
trade performance varies within the peer group of products on the same underlying
and of the same option type given the assumption of other effects are related across all
groups. This specification is necessary because puts and calls on the same underlying
generally behave diametrically10. Since the expected effects of trading signals on
performance are opposed for puts and calls, I use separate dummies for buy signals and
sell signals, respectively.
Table 3.7 reports estimation results for the three return measures defined in (3.6).
Round-trip trades entered on the trigger day of a TA buy signal in the same direction,
i. e., call products, earn higher (raw) log-returns, while put trades earn lower returns
(see Table 3.7, column 1). Parameter β1 and β2 show that trades in calls earn 8.27%
higher log-returns while put trades earn 13.99% lower log-returns. Both estimates are
significant on a 1% level. Note that the abnormal returns estimated by the parameter
coefficients are with respect to other trades on the same underlying and option type.
Therefore such trades must not necessarily have been profitable, but, at least, have
been more profitable relative to comparable trades. Analogously, trades entered on sell
signal days exhibit a better performance in puts and weaker performance in calls. The
estimates indicate an impact on log-returns of 5.23% for puts and -3.23% for calls, thus
the effect is slightly smaller than for buy signals but still significant both statistically
10In case the underlying price does not change while the underlying volatility increases or time
progresses, both, put and call prices could increase or decrease. However, due to the large number of
trades and the long observation period such special cases can be neglected here. Alternatively, one could
estimate the model for puts and calls separately but then it is not possible to distinguish whether all
trades were profitable on buy (sell) signal days or just calls (puts).
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and economically.
For risk-adjusted returns, the same effect is present in case of buy signals. The
parameter estimates become smaller since dividing by leverage and volatility dampens
the return values. If a call trade is entered on a buy signal, there is a positive effect on
performance of 1.11% while puts earn 1.97% less. For sell signals the estimates differ
from the non-adjusted case. While calls do not earn significantly different risk-adjusted
returns compared to the remaining trades, puts even show worse performance than
puts on non-signal trades and on the same underlying. This could mean that puts on
signal days buy the extra return from increased risk. So results regarding raw returns
of puts bought on sell signal days might be driven by some very successful trades which
use very high leverage.
For risk-adjusted excess returns results are similar to those of risk-adjusted returns. In
this case, estimates are very small as much variation is removed by the standardization.
Since the return of a knock-out or warrant is a function of the return of the underlying
and the incorporated leverage, the standardized excess return mainly consists of time-
dependent and non-linear components of the price and mispricing, which includes
product premia and other costs, among others. For the remaining part of the return,
effects are close to the risk-adjusted case, i. e., a significant positive (negative) effect for
calls (puts) on buy signal days and no effect in case of sell signals.
Other trade characteristics affecting the performance of a round-trip trade turn out
to be as expected. A longer holding duration has a negative impact on returns which is
primarily due to the inner costs of structured products. Not surprisingly, market orders
also imply lower returns since retail investors have to pay the spread. Note that the
applied return measures always include spread costs but do not consider exchange fees
or other costs. This implies that the impact on investors’ wealth is even worse. Spreads
are usually fixed by the market maker and issuing bank on a specific level (typically
EUR 0.01) and thus can have a major impact on returns, in particular for low-priced
products.
If the adjustment for leverage is omitted, there is no significant difference between
knock-outs and warrants. In case of risk-adjustment, knock-outs earn higher returns
since trades in this product type exhibit less leverage. On the other hand, price changes
are more affected by leverage in case of knock-outs compared to warrants. Since the
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TABLE 3.8: Characteristics of Round-trip Trades. This table shows results from two
regression models using (log-) leverage and holding duration as independent variables.
The model is defined as yi = β1 ∗ buysigi ∗ ci +β2 ∗ buysigi ∗ pi +γ1 ∗ sel lsi gi ∗ ci +γ2 ∗
sel lsi gi ∗pi+η∗market i+ζ∗koi+δulvolai+cont rols+εi, where ci and pi are dummy
variables for call and put, holdingi denotes the duration of trade i in days, market i is a
dummy for market buy order, and koi indicates trades in knock-out products. In case of
holding duration a dummy variable for call products and the leverage at purchase are
added to the equation. In case of leverage as independent variable, the term cont rols
is defined as
∑
j

ul( j)i ∗ ci + ul( j)i ∗ pi

, where dummy ul( j)i equals 1 if the underlying of
t radei is j. In case of holding duration we only use control dummies per stock. Results
for leverage is reported in column (1) and for holding duration in column (2). All
regressions use standard errors double clustered on underlying and day. *, **, and ***
denote significance on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Round-trip trade characteristics
Log. leverage Log. holding duration
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Buy signal ∗ call -0.1077*** 0.0405 -0.2158*** 0.0181
Buy signal ∗ put -0.1011*** 0.0163 0.3667*** 0.0178
Sell signal ∗ call 0.0525*** 0.0148 0.1269*** 0.0285
Sell signal ∗ put -0.2644*** 0.0178 -0.7433*** 0.0527
Call -0.2063** 0.1076
Log. leverage -0.8990*** 0.0378
Market order -0.2091*** 0.0046 0.2236*** 0.0592
Knock-out product -0.1840*** 0.0061 -2.1629*** 0.0748
Underlying vola. -1.6850*** 0.3105 -1.8639*** 0.3360
Controls
underlying∗put, underlying
underlying∗call
Number of Obs. 1085349 1085349
R-Square 0.9476 0.3093
absolute (option) delta of warrants is always smaller than for equivalent barrier options,
prices of warrants change less given the leverage of both products is equal.
To check whether differences in realized returns can also be found in other trade
characteristics, the leverage at purchase and the holding period of a round-trip trade
are considered. I run a regression model similar to (3.7) where only variables that are
known at the entry time of a trade are used as independent variables. Thus, terms
containing the holding period are not regressed on leverage which is measured at
purchase. I also add terms for the underlying volatility. In case of holding duration, the
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model controls for underlying and uses a single call product dummy instead of one for
each underlying. Table 3.8 reports the estimation results.
Higher underlying volatility leads to less leverage in the selected product as the
underlying itself tends to be more risky. With respect to TA signals the results confirm
the interpretation from model (3.7) of risk-adjusted returns. Call round-trip trades
on buy signal days do not incorporate higher leverage – which might have explained
the positive effect on performance – but tend to involve less leverage. An analogous
interpretation holds in case of puts. That is, in those trades which are in accordance to
TA signals, retail investors have chosen less leverage compared to trades on the same
underlying and option type on non-signal days.
With regard to the duration until a round-trip trade is completed, call trades initiated
on buy signal days and put trades on sell signal days tend to be sold sooner compared
to their benchmark group. Although a longer holding period is generally costly due to
the inner costs of a structured product, which logically influence the performance of a
trade, a favorable (unfavorable) performance of trades influences the holding duration
if retail investors are affected by the disposition effect. Since the sample contains no
subject-level information, it is impossible to disentangle the inter-dependencies between
realized returns and holding duration, i. e., the decision to close a position, which would
allow for a straightforward analysis of potential disposition effects in retail investor
decisions.
Skewness
In the models discussed above, I consider trading performance of round-trip trades with
respect to TA buy and sell signals and the results show that there are differences in the
means of the considered groups of trades. To extend the presented evidence on the
mean of returns, I explore potential differences in the return distributions. Figure 3.7
shows the demeaned empirical distributions of round-trip trades in calls and puts on
signal, and no-signal days, respectively. For the upper plot buy signals are considered
and for the bottom plot sell signals, respectively. In case of buy signals, we see empirical
distributions of differing shape. Call trades that are in line with TA signals (group ’call,
signal’) show less extreme and more symmetric returns around the mean in comparison
to call trades on non-signal days (group ’call, no signal’). In case of puts the difference
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is also evident. Put trades entered on buy signal days have a very long left tail and
generally more extreme returns compared to put trades on non-buy-signal days.
Two tests assess the differences in the shape and the higher moments of the return
distributions. First, a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the standardized (by
mean and standard-deviation) return distributions compares call (put) trades on buy
(sell) signal days to the other groups. The test results shown in column 3 of Table 3.9
confirm that the considered return distributions are significantly different on a 0.1%
level. This means the return distributions have statistically significant differences in
their higher moments. I also run Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the original and centered
distribution, both resulting in rejection of the null in all pairwise comparisons.
Second, I analyze the skewness of realized returns which can be associated to certain
preferences and behavioral effects of retail investors. Therefore I calculate the Bowley
coefficient sB and Groeneveld and Meeden (1984) skewness measure sGM . For a random
variable X with mean µX , median νX , and quartiles Q i, i = 1,2,3, these measures are
defined by
sB =
Q3 +Q1 − 2Q2
Q3 −Q1
sGM =
µX − νX
E|X − νX | .
(3.8)
The standard sample skewness calculated as the empirical third moment is not robust in
the presence of outliers and fat-tailed distributions, which both is the case in this sample
(cf. Groeneveld and Meeden, 1984). To test whether the skewness measures can be
statistically distinguished between two sets of round-trip trades, I construct confidence
levels based on a sampling procedure because – to the best of my knowledge – there
are no applicable non-parametric two-sample tests for differences in skewness.
The sampling procedure works as follows. I pool the observation from both samples
and randomly draw two new sets having the same size as the original ones. For the
sampled sets I calculate the absolute difference of the skewness measures. I run 100,000
repetitions to obtain the distribution of this difference from which the 0.1% confidence
levels can be derived.
Panel A of Table 3.9 shows the results for buy signals while Panel B presents results
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FIGURE 3.7: Kernel Densities of Realized Log-returns. The figures show kernel density
of the empirical log-return distributions of call and put round-trip trades on signal
and non-signal days, respectively. The upper (bottom) plot depicts trades from the
classification based on TA buy (sell) signals. In each group the respective mean return
is subtracted to improve the comparability between the density graphs.
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TABLE 3.9: Skewness of Realized Returns. The table reports robust skewness measures
of log-return distributions grouped by TA signal events and option type. Panel A reports
buy signals and analogues Panel B sell signals. Column 2 and 3 show the Groeneveld-
Meeden skewness measure and the Bowley coefficient, respectively. Absolute differences
between the call bought on buy signal group and the other groups are validated
by bootstrapping from the overall sample (one-sided). 99.9 % confidence internals
are reported in parentheses. Column 4 shows two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
statistics and p-value based on the standardized (by mean and standard deviation)
empirical return distributions of buy signal call (panel A) and sell signal put group
compared to the particular other groups.
Panel A: Buy Signals
GM skewness Bowley skewness Kolmogorov-Smirnov
# trades Estimate Abs. diff. Estimate Abs. diff. KS statistic p-value
Signal, Call 9407 -0.1048 - 0.1993 - - -
No Signal, Call 564528 -0.2403 0.1356 -0.0456 0.2449 0.1115 <0.0001
(0.0444) (0.0606)
Signal, Put 16286 -0.4482 0.3434 -0.3825 0.5819 0.2080 <0.0001
(0.0470) (0.0648)
No Signal, Put 495128 -0.3560 0.2512 -0.2615 0.4608 0.1776 <0.0001
(0.0378) (0.0556)
Panel B: Sell Signals
GM skewness Bowley skewness Kolmogorov-Smirnov
# trades Estimate Abs. diff. Estimate Abs. diff. KS statistic p-value
Signal, Put 8498 -0.3035 - -0.1092 - - -
No Signal, Put 502916 -0.3628 0.0593 -0.2739 0.1647 0.0541 <0.0001
(0.0391) (0.0575)
Signal, Call 22157 -0.2453 0.0582 -0.1666 0.0574 0.0564 <0.0001
(0.0506) (0.0717)
No Signal, Call 551778 -0.2374 0.0661 -0.0363 0.0728 0.1715 <0.0001
(0.0478) (0.0652)
for sell signals. The corresponding confidence levels for the absolute difference of
the skewness measures are reported in parentheses. For buy signals (Panel A), the
return distribution of calls bought on signal days is less left-skewed (sB = −0.1049,
sGM = 0.1993) than the return distributions of other groups. In all cases the difference
is significant on a 0.1% level. Puts bought on buy signal days, i. e., opposed to trade
direction of the TA signal, exhibit the most left-skewed return distribution (sB = −0.4482
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and sGM = −0.3825). A reason might be that signal triggers are associated with short-
term momentum since the signals typically require a preceding price movement in
the direction of the signal. The opposite trade could then suffer from this short-term
momentum since the high leverage and risk to be knocked-out can quickly lead to
an undesirable situation for the investor who might have to sell the position with a
big loss. Assuming traders prefer right-skewed returns, then traders who follow TA
signals actually achieve this in the present sample. The latter is in accordance to the
simulation result of Ebert and Hilpert (2014). The tendency to realize less left-skewed
returns indicates that retail investor who use TA-based strategies are less prone to the
disposition effect. Using a static rule or another systematic approach might reduce
the risk to be influenced by behavioral biases because the decision of closing a trading
position is then given by the applied strategy.
For sell signals (Panel B) it turns out that call trades exhibit less left-skewed returns
than trades in put products. A reason might be the generally worse performance of
round-trip trades in puts which to a large extent is due to the strong market recovery
during the observation period. The DAX surged more than 134% (about 19% p.a.)
during the sample period of less than five years. Thus, a randomly entered put trade
was in most situations an unfavorable bet with a high chance that the investor’s position
falls below the purchase price. Consequently, these trades are more likely to be negative
at some stage and traders who are prone to the disposition effect would be reluctant to
realize the loss. Eventually the trade ends up even worse, in particular for knock-out
products, since the risk of a total loss rises inevitably and limits the option to wait for a
potential recovery in the long-run.
The comparison of put trades entered on sell signal with trades entered on non-signal
days shows that the skewness measure significantly different on 0.1% level. For the
non-signal group skewness is sB = −0.1092 (sGM = −0.3035) and for the signal group
sB = −0.2739 (sGM = −0.3628). So for both buy and sell signals part (ii) of Hypothesis
1b can be confirmed, i. e., trades in accordance to the respective trading signals are
less (left-)skewed than trades in the same direction on non-signal days. In this sense,
Technical Analysis traders seem to be more disciplined in their trading and realize losses
sooner.
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3.5.5 Conclusion
Section 3.5 explores the relation between Technical Analysis and trading on a market
dedicated to retail investors. Based on a set of trading signals from typical Technical
Analysis techniques, chart patterns and moving averages, I address two research
questions regarding the influence of Technical Analysis on trading (cf. Section 3.5.1).
How do TA-based strategies and the corresponding trading signals influence trading
activity[...] (Research Question 1a) and which are the characteristics of trades that
have been initiated in accordance to TA trading signals[...] (Research Question 1b).
With respect to Research Question 1a, I find that overall trading activity is substan-
tially increased on TA signal days. A pattern signal from the three considered pattern
types is associated with a 35% increase in excess turnover, on average. Regression
results show that Head & Shoulders and Double Tops & Bottoms have a particularly
strong impact on market activity. For SMA signals an increase of 11% is observed. This
means trading activity in speculative structured products is related to TA signals.
However, the analysis of long-short excess trading imbalances of retail investors
exhibits no significant relation between trading signal direction and the positioning
of retail investors. This might be due to other attention effects which influence retail
investors in their decision making and trading behavior. For example, on an intraday
level the increased turnover could initially induce attention and thereby attract more
traders who tend to trade in a contrarian way, i. e., opposed to the TA signal. Then, we
would find increased excess turnover on this day, but no reliable explanation for the
exposure in the direction of the TA signal. Unfortunately, the sparsity of retail investor
trading activity in products on a specific stock and the fuzzy observation of TA signals
does not allow for a higher time granularity based on the used sample.
Regarding Research Question 1b I find that the trade characteristics of round-trip
trades which are initiated in accordance to the direction of TA signals (i.e. long or
short) differ from round-trip trades on the same underlying and in the same direction.
This supports the view that Technical Analysis changes typical characteristics of retail
investors’ round-trip trades. In terms of raw returns, trades tend to perform significantly
better than comparable trades on non-signal days. Although previous studies show that
Technical Analysis – as a systematic trading strategy – is not able to beat the market
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consistently, people might perform better due to the more systematic trading approach
Technical Analysis compared to purely intuitive trading decisions.
Furthermore, I demonstrate that trades in accordance to TA signals have realized
a return distribution differing from comparable trades. Round-trip trades in calls on
buy signal days, and puts on sell signal days, respectively, are less left-skewed than
their peers. By applying a sampling methodology I show that these differences are
not merely by chance. This finding indicates a reduced propensity to the disposition
effect among the respective group of trades, i. e., losses are realized earlier which
results in a more right-skewed return distribution. Further, this result is in-line with the
notion that Technical Analysis addresses the gambling aspects of trading and could be
used by traders to place their bets. Thereby the simulation evidence of right-skewed
return distributions realized from TA strategies (Ebert and Hilpert, 2014) is empirically
confirmed.
The presented results are limited with respect to the set of Technical Analysis
strategies that I assume to be relevant based on related literature and practice, i. e.,
articles in financial media, Technical Analysis handbooks, or trading blogs. The
calibration of the patterns and MAs is arguably subjective, however the consideration
of daily observations should offset some of the fuzziness regarding the exact trigger
time of a signal. It is also possible that the relatively narrow set of MAs and the fixed
pattern calibration do not include the calibrations retail investors typically use to trade
structured products. However, I believe that searching or fitting the Technical Analysis
method yielding the highest result would not have been a sensible approach for this
study.
The trading data from Stuttgart Stock Exchange allows for an observation of trading
on a population level, i. e., no individual trading information is available. Therefore,
the observed effects can not consistently be related to a group of traders who actually
traded on TA signals and will do so in future. Similar to the approach of Hoffmann and
Shefrin (2014) who use a survey to identify the investment style of broker clients, a
complementary survey among trading participants could be an interesting extension
to shed light on the trading incentives of retail investors trading at Stuttgart Stock
Exchange.
Overall, the study indicates a relevant role of Technical Analysis in retail investors
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trading, so the question arises why people actually use it. Does the use of Technical
Analysis and the related trading just entertain investors – hence it had a value in itself –
or is the lack of investment knowledge and the demand for a ’guiding system’ for making
investment decisions a dominant factor? If the latter is true, many offers by brokers and
information providers excessively praising chart and Technical Analysis tools should
be considered critically. How Technical Analysis, charts, and other related methods
influence individual trading decisions of investors remains an important question to be
answered in future research.
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3.6 Liquidity and Price Discovery on Xetra
The previous section highlights the role of Technical Analysis in retail investor trading
on a market for speculative financial products. Hence, the questions arises whether
the results also hold for the general stock market, which has a much more important
role for the economy than the market of structured products. As the primary market
for German stock companies the stock trading segment of Xetra operated by Deutsche
Börse has a major role for the German economy. Furthermore, the market design of
Xetra is comparable to most other relevant international stock markets making it a
promising research object.
For structured products traded at Stuttgart Stock Exchange, Section 3.5 shows an
increase in trading activity when Technical Analysis trading signals are triggered. Since
the market for structured products essentially is as a dealer market in which prices are
exogenously given, the price of some product is (almost) unaffected by the orderflow
in the respective product. In contrast, trading on Xetra actually determines the (spot)
price of a share. So if Technical Analysis based trading generates a significant amount
of order volume, it has a real influence on supply and demand in the traded stock and
ultimately could influence the determined price.
As highlighted in Section 3.3, there is little evidence that Technical Analysis is
able to predict future price developments and, in this sense, could make prices more
informative. Consequently, Technical Analysts are considered to be uninformed noise
traders. However, if the induced noise is of relevant size, there might be effects on
price efficiency in the sense that prices could temporarily deviate from efficient levels.
These deviations could even be persistent as long as potential gains from enforcing
efficient prices are smaller than trading costs which naturally set a limit to arbitrage
(Bessembinder and Chan, 1998). Whether such deviations around TA signals exist is a
central aspect of the study presented in this section.
In the following, I address the overarching Research Question 2. Section 3.6.3
analyzes the relation of Technical Analysis and liquidity, that is:
Research Question 2a. What is the effect on dimensions of liquidity supply and
demand around Technical Analysis trading signals?
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Section 3.6.4 and Section 3.6.5 deal with questions regarding price efficiency and
price discovery:
Research Question 2b. Is there a relation between TA trading signals and measures
of informational efficiency, i. e., do price processes show characteristics associated
with inefficient prices?
Research Question 2c. Given that technical traders are uninformed noise traders,
what is the effect on transitory and permanent price components when Technical
Analysis trading signals appear?
Section 3.6.1 presents the existing literature on the relation of Technical Analysis
and liquidity from which I develop hypotheses regarding Research Questions 2a, 2b,
and 2c. Furthermore, I discuss the noise trading characteristic of Technical Analysis and
its implications. Section 3.6.6 provides additional robustness analyses complementing
the main result sections. Section 3.6.7 concludes on Research Question 2.
3.6.1 Related Literature and Research Hypotheses
Sections 3.3 and 3.5.1 outlined the academic discourse concerning Technical Analysis
with a focus on profitability of related strategies and the role of Technical Analysis
for retail investor trading, respectively. The latter motivates to assess the relevance
of Technical Analysis for the German stock market where retail investors trading only
accounts for a small proportion of the overall trading volume, however. As already
mentioned, there is evidence that professional investors such as fund mangers, FX
traders, and other institutional investors rely on Technical Analysis to some extent (e.g
Cheung et al., 2004; Flanegin and Rudd, 2005; Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007; Menkhoff,
2010; Wang et al., 2012). Naturally, institutional investors are associated with larger
trading volume and high sophistication suggesting a greater importance for trading on
stock markets like Xetra. Given the assumption that TA-related order flows of relevant
size exist, the question arises what impact such order flows have for the microstructure
of stock trading.
Following the literature, I assume that Technical Analysis traders are uninformed
and tend to herd, i. e., they act as noise traders in the sense of Black (1986) and Shleifer
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and Summers (1990). "Noise makes trading in financial markets possible", i. e., noise
trading activity plays an important role as "with a lot of traders in the market, it now
pays for those with information to trade" (Black, 1986, p.529, p.531). In the models by
Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) noise trading leads to reduced spreads
as the adverse selection risks of liquidity supplier decrease. Therefore trading based
on Technical Analysis should have a positive effect on market quality. On the other
hand, in the model of De Long et al. (1990a) noise trader can have negative effects
on price efficiency when arbitrage is limited. They argue that noise trader can limit
arbitrage trading when they push prices far from fundamental values because risk-
adjusted short-run profits become unattractive for arbitrageurs. Similarly, De Long et al.
(1990b) analyze a model in which noise traders pursue positive feedback strategies11
and rational speculators expect their demand resulting in higher levels of price volatility
than fundamentals would justify.
Based on experiments Bloomfield et al. (2009) show that beside having positive
effects on liquidity, noise trading can slower the adjustment to new information.
Empirically, Foucault et al. (2011) find that retail investor act as noise traders since their
trading activity has a positive (increasing) effect on volatility. Among others, Barber
et al. (2009) and Han and Kumar (2013) show that stocks with high retail trading
activity tend to be overpriced. They also demonstrate that overpricing can be persistent
over relatively long time periods. Hence, even if traders (arbitrageurs) certainly know
that mispricing exists, it might be painful for them to trade in the opposite direction
in case the mispricing is persistent. Obviously, persistent mispricing would mean a
substantial impairment of market quality.
Generally speaking, "market quality refers to a market’s ability to meet its dual goals
of liquidity and price discovery" (O’Hara and Ye, 2011). Yet the measurement of market
quality has various dimensions. Trading activity, depth, trading costs (spreads), and
price efficiency measured by volatility ratios and decomposition are standard measures
applied in the literature. Chordia et al. (2011) provides an overview on market quality
11As mentioned in Section 2.4 and Section 3.3, positive feedback strategies or momentum strategies
buy winning stock and sell loosing stocks based on some past period. As such, moving average strategies
are similar to positive feedback strategies, since in most cases prices need to increase (decrease) before a
buy (sell) signal is triggered.
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measures and empirical analysis of market quality trends. Many studies12 analyze
market quality measures with respect to some factors of interest, e. g., changes in
market systems and microstructure, trading behavior, specific order flows, changes in
legislation. Evidently there are strong inter-dependencies between measures of market
quality while there is no accepted model which establishes universally defined links
between them. Following the literature, I analyze market quality in a static way by
considering variations in each measure isolated.
In fact, there is only little evidence on the relation of Technical Analysis to liquidity
and market efficiency. Motivated by the behavioral perspective onto Technical Analysis,
Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) analyze the role of Technical Analysis for liquidity
provision in terms of limit order book depth. They focus on moving average strategies
and SRL in a sample of NYSE stocks during 1997. Level and location of depth in the
analyzed limit order books coincide with SRL and trading signals from dual moving
averages. Bender et al. (2013) examine head-and-shoulder chart patterns in NYSE
and AMEX stocks over a 40 year period of daily data. On trading signal days they find
excess trading volume and narrower (quoted) bid-ask spreads. The decrease in spreads
is interpreted as a result of lower adverse selection costs of liquidity supplier due to
Technical Analysis traders acting as noise traders.
For German large cap stocks Etheber (2014) finds excess trading activity around
moving average trading signals. Controlling for a wide range of stock- and market-
related variables, aggregated daily trading volume increases by 15% to 55% on days of
buy or sell signals compared to normal levels (depending on moving average type and
signal direction). The mentioned studies on Technical Analysis and market liquidity
use relatively low measurement frequencies or use relative short sample periods13.
Especially moving average signals appear quite rarely due to their construction which
leads to few events per stock-month, for example. Furthermore, the availability of data,
market access and automated trading system – even for retail investors – makes it more
likely that signals are recognized and traded very immediate (Schulmeister, 2009).
This would make it necessary to consider a more immediate relation between Technical
12For example, Chordia et al. (2008), Hendershott et al. (2011), Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012),
Riordan et al. (2013), Comerton-Forde and Putninš (2015).
13Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) use snapshots taken every 30 minutes over a period of three
months.
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Analysis and liquidity. Thus, I focus on contemporaneous effects between TA-related
signals and measures of market quality.
Based on the research implications summarized above, I derive hypotheses regrading
Research Questions 2a and 2b. Due to their relevance for the central concepts of
Technical Analysis and due to related academic literature, I focus on SRL and SMA
signals which are defined in Section 3.4.3. Since each type basically leads to different
trading recommendations14, the respective hypotheses can differ. For Research Question
2a, I establish the following hypothesis regarding liquidity demand and supply.
Hypothesis 2a:
(i) SMA trading signals can be associated with an immediate increase in trading activity,
(ii) SRL coincide with levels of excess depth in the limit order book,
(iii) around TA signals implicit trading costs measured by quoted and effective spreads
are lower.
The latter is based on the argument that the potential noise trading characteristic of
Technical Analysis traders reduce adverse selection risks for liquidity providers allowing
them to set quotes more aggressively (Bender et al., 2013). Because there is no empirical
evidence of increasing liquidity demand around SRL so far, I stick to the assumption
that it primarily drives liquidity supply. Naturally more supply can well lead to rising
turnover. Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) provide evidence for the interpretation as
liquidity supplying since depth measures rise even after controlling for turnover, but
the effect of support (resistance) levels on buy (sell) side demand is not considered.
The consideration of liquidity naturally leads to the more ambiguous questions
regarding price efficiency for which literature suggests that both positive and negative
effects are possible. Since trading on SRL could be implemented through market
and limit orders, the hypothesis regarding a relation to price changes is quite vague.
Assuming clustered limit orders have less influence on prices than (directional) excess
liquidity demand, persistent effects on the price process seems to be unlikely in case of
SRL.
14Moving average strategies are basically trend following, while SRL (as defined in this thesis) indicate
reversals.
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Hypothesis 2b:
Measures of informational inefficiency rise in the presence of SMA signals, i.e. price
process characteristics deviate from random walk properties more intensely.
In the context of this study, I suspect TA signals are short-lived, so potential effects
on price efficiency should be temporary as well. Therefore, I use an approach to
analyze instantaneous deviations from the efficient price (pricing errors) by decomposing
prices into transitory and permanent components, which are used to test the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2c:
Price discovery is distorted around TA signals since they are related to larger transitory
pricing errors while permanent price components are not affected.
3.6.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The study focuses on the thirty largest German stocks based on the DAX30 index
composition at the end of 2013. From the data sets described in Section 2.2 the times
and sales data and limit order book depth data are employed. The sample period spans
from January 2008 to November 2013.
Based on the times and sales data, the common scope of trade and quote based
liquidity proxies are calculated15, namely quoted (half-) spread, effective spread,
realized spread (15 min), and price impact (15min). Based on the order book data
I calculate cumulative depth on the first (Depth1), first five (Depth5) and first ten
(Depth10) levels, respectively. Analogously, Depth5Ask (Bid) refers to depth on the
respective side exclusively. AskBalance (BidBalance) is defined as the quotient of the
cumulative depth on level 6 to level 10 and the cumulative depth on levels one to five,
i. e., Depth10−Depth5
Depth5
. Depth5Imbalance(Depth10Imbalance) refers to the ratio of cumulative
depth on ask and bid side of the respective levels in the limit order book. To quantify
the shape of the depth in the limit order book, Askmode (Bidmode) is calculated as the
distance between the limit price of the order book level with the most shares on the ask
(bid) side and the midquote price. Lastly, relative depth calculated for each level on
15See Section 2.5 for explicit formulas of the measures applied in this section.
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bid and ask side, respectively, that is, Reldepthi,t( j) =
Depthi,t ( j)∑10
k=1 Depthi,t (k),
where Depthi,t( j)
denotes the depth (in EUR) on the j-th level in stock i at time t.
To reduce the immense size of the trade, quote, and order book data for further
analyses, I aggregate all measures, except Reldepth, with respect to 1-minute intervals.
An interval begins with every full minute. In the following, an index t of minutely
aggregated measures refers to the interval [t, t +1), while in case of atomistic variables
(e. g., quoted prices, returns, Reldepth) t refers to the observation prevailing at the
beginning of these intervals. A 1-minute frequency seems convenient with regard
to the recognition of TA signals. First, this frequency should still be practicable by
human traders working with charts. Second, a 1-minute frequency results in a level of
granularity which mitigates the fuzziness arising from the potentially inexact observation
of TA signals by market participants (and by the recognition algorithm), but still is
reasonably granular to remain a high precision in the measured variables. In fact, it
is an important feature to conduct this study on an intraday level in comparison to
existing literature on Technical Analysis and liquidity which has mainly considered
lower frequencies. Thereby I intend to identify more immediate relations between the
variables of interest.
Within each interval, trade-based measures are weighted by trade volume (in EUR)
while quote-based measures are time-weighted, i. e., the weighting factor is determined
by the duration a quote observation is active within an 1-minute interval. Intervals
during which the daily midday auctions or any other interruption of continuous trading
took place are removed. The variable Rangei,t is defined as 100 ∗ log(Highi,t/Lowi,t),
where Highi,t and Lowi,t refer to the highest and lowest trade price within the interval
(t − 1, t].
Furthermore, I obtain a set of intraday trading signals by applying the recognition
methods for SMA and SRL introduced in Section 3.4.3 to the series of 1-minute midquote
prices within the selected sample period. Based on these signal, I define the following
indicator variables. AtSuppor t i,t equals 1 if for stock i the best bid at time t is within a
range of one tick size around a local minimum determined by the recognition procedure
and the lowest trade price in the previous 1-minute interval (t − 1, t] was not below
this particular range. The latter accounts for the situation when a support or resistance
level already has been broken which can be noticed by the Technical Analysis trader
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TABLE 3.10: Descriptive Statistics. The table shows descriptive statistics for trade
variables of the complete sample of DAX30 stocks from February 2008 to November
2013 used for the regression analyses in this paper. First and last 15 minutes of a
trading day are excluded. Quoted (half) spread is calculated as time-weighted average.
Effective and realized spreads and price impact are calculated as volume-weighted
averages within the 1-minute intervals. All other trade- and quote-based variables
in Panel A are expressed as unweighted averages of 1-minute interval measurements
across all stocks. Limit order book variables reported in Panel B are calculated as
time-weighted averages.
Panel A: Trade-/quote-based variables Unit Mean Std. dev. Median IQR
Turnover 1000 EUR 179.8964 363.3769 66.6989 182.0398
Tradesize 1000 EUR 10.6774 13.3164 7.9651 16.3581
Log-return % -0.0001 0.0957 0.0000 0.0590
Range % 0.0705 0.1094 0.0441 0.0950
Quoted Spread bps 3.9961 4.3318 2.9470 2.2975
Effective Spread bps 2.9434 3.5350 2.2307 1.9293
Realized Spread, 15min bps 0.8256 22.6400 0.9747 14.7740
Price Impact, 15min bps 2.1147 22.5606 1.2431 14.6893
Panel B: Limit order book variables
Depth5 Ask 1000 EUR 423.0024 496.5318 273.0806 347.1077
Depth5 Bid 1000 EUR 414.2604 474.0321 270.2734 340.7579
Depth5 Imbalance % 0.6076 22.0254 0.5547 26.5521
Depth10 imbalance % 0.8617 18.7542 0.7998 21.1708
Askmode EUR 0.0994 0.2031 0.0600 0.0633
Bidmode EUR 0.0959 0.1914 0.0598 0.0628
Depthbalance Ask % 51.9734 12.8503 52.3107 17.5622
Depthbalance Bid % 51.6436 12.6256 51.8831 17.2527
if she uses candlestick charts, for instance. The dummy variable AtResistancei,t is
analogously defined with respect to local highs and ask quotes. Additionally I define
the variables SupActiveL1-L5i,t and ResActiveL1-L5i,t which signal an active support or
resistance level on the first five levels of the limit order book. SupActiveL6-L10i,t and
ResActiveL6-L10i,t refer to an active support or resistance level on levels 6 to 10 of the
limit order book.
As it is standard in the literature, I drop the first and last 15 minutes of each
trading day to avoid potential boundary effects on liquidity measures. Table 3.10 shows
descriptive statistics for the introduced liquidity measures. The shown statistics are
equally weighted across all stocks and 1-minute intervals in the sample. For example,
the average turnover in a 1-minute interval is EUR 179,896. The average quoted spread
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of 4.00 bps is slightly larger then the average effective spread (2.94 bps), which is a
known result on Xetra (Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2012) and mostly due to order types
providing hidden liquidity and other features of Xetra such as Xetra Midpoint and Xetra
BEST (see Section 2.2 for details).
To give an impression on the number of SMA signals and SRL found in the sample,
Table 3.11 shows descriptive statistics for the defined TA signal indicator variables.
Across all stocks the relative appearance (i. e., the mean of an indicator variable in
percent) of SRL in the sample of 1-minute intervals is 2.1% and 2.3%, respectively.
Logically the likelihood of finding a support or resistance level that coincides with one
of the first five order book levels (level 5 to 10) on the bid or ask side is larger. In
comparison, SMA signals trigger more rarely. Long and short signals are active in about
0.5% of the 1-minute intervals across the sample. Yet this should be a sufficiently large
number to compare differences in measures in relation to the defined indicator variables
given the large sample size.
TABLE 3.11: Technical Trading Signals. The table shows the number support and
resistance levels determined by the smoothing algorithm described in Section 3.4.3 and
moving average signals. Signals within the first and last 15 minutes of each trading day
are exlucded. Moving average long and short signals are aggregated for 5-, 10-, 20-, and
50-day simple moving averages applied to minutely midquotes. Support and resistance
levels refer to triggered levels, i.e. the current midquote is within the trigger range
defined by the respective level. SupActiveL1-L5 (ResActiveL1-L5) and SupActiveL6-L10
(ResActiveL1-L10) indicate that in the respective 1-minute order book snapshot a support
(resistance) level is active on the first 5 levels of bid (ask) side and on levels 6 to 10,
respectively. Relative appearance refers to the relative number of minutely observations
having the respective variable triggered, i.e. the mean of the indicator variables. Mean
and standard deviation of the indicator variables are also presented as daily averages,
i.e. scaled by the number of 1-minute observations per trading day.
Variable Rel. Appearance Mean (per day) Std. dev.(per day)
Support Levels 2.1104% 10.1088 17.7409
Resistance Levels 2.3369% 11.1936 19.0736
SMA long signals 0.4887% 2.3408 3.3840
SMA short signals 0.4936% 2.3644 3.4098
Sup. ActiveL1-L5 9.0212% 43.2116 122.0634
Res. ActiveL1-L5 9.6584% 46.2638 126.1326
Sup. ActiveL6-L10 11.2505% 53.8900 151.3578
Res. ActiveL6-L10 11.7401% 56.2351 154.1889
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3.6.3 Limit Order Book Liquidity
To assess whether Technical Analysis is related to variations in market liquidity on Xetra,
I analyze DAX30 stocks along the dimensions trading activity, spreads, and order book
depth. Based on the sample of stock-minute observations, I use panel regressions with
stock, day, and minute fixed effects (F E) of the type
LMi,t = β1AtSuppor t i,t + β2AtResistancei,t +
∑
j
TradeVar j +
∑
F E, (3.9)
where LMi,t denotes the respective liquidity measures of stock i at time t, AtSuppor t i,t
and AtResistancei,t indicate active SRL as specified in Section 3.4.3, and TradeVar j
summarize a number of trading related control variables. This includes turnover, market
capitalization, (squared) midquote log-return, Range, VDAX, and the limit order book
measures Depth1, Depth5Ask, and Depth5Bid. Regression models of depth variables
additionally include TickdepthAsk and TickdepthBid which are defined as the number of
price levels (ticks) between the first and tenth level of the limit order book, but logically
do not include depth variables.
Stock-day fixed effects control for cross-sectional differences not captured by other
stock characteristics (e. g., market cap) and non-linear trends which can be observed
over time (cf. Section 2.1.1. For example, markets mostly became more liquid during
the last decades (Chordia et al., 2011). I use minute fixed effects to control for intraday
variation that can be found for stock market liquidity and depth measures (Ahn et al.,
2001). Standard errors are clustered by stock. Due to large sample size the feasible
complexity of the applied type of standard error and estimation method is somewhat
limited. For instance, stock-day double-clustered errors would mean to cluster along
approx. 45,000 dimensions which typically leads to memory problems during the
computation.
For each variable of interest, I estimate a second model which contains the SMA
indicator variables SMAlongi,t and SMAshor t i,t instead of the SRL indicators. In the
following, I present regression results for the liquidity measures as defined in Section
3.6.2. Section 3.6.6 presents two alternative approaches to strengthen the validity of
the results.
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Limit Order Book Depth
To analyze liquidity provision in the limit order book, I use an approach similar to
Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004). Since I only have data on the first ten bid and ask
levels of the limit order book, some measures applied by Kavajecz and Odders-White
(2004) cannot be calculated. In particular, depth measures which are calculated in
relation to a specific amount of order volume in the book (e. g., x% of the daily average
turnover) are less meaningful if only ten levels of the limit order book are known and
therefore would result in many missing or boundary values. I employ the measures
Depth5Ask, Depth5Bid, Depth5Imbalance and Depth10Imbalance as defined in Section
3.6.2 to analyze effects on the amount of depth available in the book. Relative depth
(Reldepth) and the variables Askmode (Bidmode) and ask balance(bid balance) are used
to analyze the location of depth in the book to assess whether the shape of the book
differs from its typical appearance if TA signals are active.
Table 3.12 shows estimation results for measures based on cumulative depth. Results
from model specifications including SRL indicators are reported in Panel A. When the
AtResistance condition is active cumulated depth on the ask side of the limit order
book increases significantly. After controlling for contemporaneous variables, the effect
strength indicated by the estimated coefficient means an EUR 252k increase in limit
sell order volume on the first five levels of the limit order book. For support levels the
estimate is also significantly positive which shows that active support and resistance
levels can be associated with periods of generally increased depth. A Wald test on
the coefficient differences between support and resistance indicators (F-value 30.81)
demonstrates that on the ask side the effect is significantly larger for support than for
resistance levels side which supports item (i) of Hypothesis H2a.
Bid side results are accordingly. In this case the estimate means additional 225 kEUR
limit buy order volume. The At Support indicator coefficient turns out to be larger (Wald
test F-value 11.23) than at resistance levels (EUR 170k) supporting the interpretation
that depth is increased on both sides of the market but of greater magnitude on the
side of the SRL.
Considering depth imbalance ratios between ask and bid side controls for an overall
increase in market depth. The regression model of Depth5Imbalance employs the
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TABLE 3.12: Depth and Depth Balance Regressions. This table shows regression
results for depth measures regressed on SRL and MA dummy variables as specified in
equation (3.9). All depth variables are time-weighted averages over 1-minutes intervals.
Depth5Ask, Depth5Bid, Depth5, and Depth10 denote the Euro-volume on the bid side,
ask side, or both sides on the first 5 resp. 10 levels of the limit order book. Depth
imbalances are calculated as the net difference between ask and bid depth divided by
the total depth on both sides (in percent). AtResistance (AtSupport) is a dummy variable
indicating an active resistance (support) level for the current observation. Analogously,
Res.(Sup.) Active L1-L5 (L6-10) indicate an active resistance (support) level on the first
five levels (on level 6 to level 10) of the limit order book. All regression specifications
contain stock, day, and minute fixed effects and standard errors clustered by stock. *,
**, *** denote significance on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. The sample comprises 30 DAX stock from February 2008
to November 2013.
Panel A: Depth5 Depth10
Support & Resistance Depth5 Ask Depth5 Bid Imbalance Imbalance
At Support 159.0528*** 225.8590***
(44.5200) (55.2319)
At Resistance 251.5223*** 170.4022***
(59.9531) (45.7775)
Res. Active L1-L5 3.8101*** 4.0783***
(0.3584) (0.4519)
Sup. Active L1-L5 -3.5971*** -3.9401**
(0.2625) (0.3297)
Res. Active L6-L10 0.4171** 2.0809***
(0.1416) (0.2304)
Sup. Active L6-L10 -0.6275*** -2.2743***
(0.1434) (0.1900)
Quoted Spread 12.4330** 11.5893** -0.0274 -0.1067***
(5.7548) (5.5680) (0.0179) (0.0368)
Turnover 0.1035*** 0.0822*** 0.0004 0.0003**
(0.0202) (0.0217) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Market cap -0.3065 -0.3281 0.0052*** 0.0044
(0.5293) (0.5212) (0.0047) (0.0041)
Log-return 12.2034*** -11.2657** 2.8751*** 4.6961***
(4.2384) (5.2887) (1.3297) (1.1476)
VDAX -14.2867*** -4.6107*** -0.7661*** -0.9957***
(2.3611) (0.8359) (0.1122) (0.1435)
Range -209.0537*** -184.4425*** -0.2446 0.0302
(73.0599) (65.8218) (0.3843) (0.5099)
Tickdepth Bid -0.2991 -0.2590 -0.0163*** -0.0082
(0.2455) (0.2296) (0.0015) (0.0086)
Tickdepth Ask -0.4729 -0.5123 0.0185*** 0.0318***
(0.3753) (0.3728) (0.0027) (0.0066)
Continued on next page
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Panel B: Depth5 Depth10
Moving Averages Depth5 Ask Depth5 Bid Imbalance Imbalance
SMA long -23.6179*** -47.9918*** 3.2258*** 2.9379***
(6.3386) (7.6422) (0.2268) (0.3084)
SMA short -53.6498*** -22.6500*** -3.6154*** -3.3350**
(9.2880) (6.7167) (0.2195) (0.3242)
Quoted Spread 13.2344** 12.3746** -0.0284** -0.1077
(6.1410) (5.9269) (0.0192) (0.0383)
Turnover 0.1031*** 0.0819*** 0.0004*** 0.0003***
(0.0202) (0.0217) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Market cap -0.3163 -0.3388 0.0054 0.0047
(0.5318) (0.5237) (0.0047) (0.0041)
Log-return 16.9712*** -14.3965** 3.4872 5.5599
(4.399) (5.3917) (1.3295) (1.1353)
VDAX -14.9996*** -4.6442*** -0.8794*** -1.1469
(2.5428) (0.8817) (0.1191) (0.1560)
Range -217.0744*** -192.2555*** -0.2413*** 0.0190***
(75.0135) (67.7551) (0.3926) (0.5186)
Tickdepth Bid -0.3101 -0.2685 -0.0174*** -0.0094***
(0.2546) (0.2388) (0.0016) (0.0089)
Tickdepth Ask -0.4924 -0.5320 0.0198 0.0332***
(0.3902) (0.3871) (0.0027) (0.0070)
dummy variables SupActiveL1-L5 (ResActiveL1-L5) and SupActiveL6-L10(ResActiveL6-
L10) to identify active resistance (support) levels on level 1 to 5 and on level 6 to 10,
respectively. If a support (resistance) level is active on the first five levels, a significantly
positive (negative) shift to the ask (bid) side of about 3.8% (-3.6%) takes place. If
a support (resistance) level is present on level 6 to 10 of the limit order book, the
estimate is positive (negative) but of much smaller magnitude. This means a support
or resistance level is particularly related to depth in close proximity instead to overall
depth on the respective side of the order book. The results for Depth10 imbalance
support this view. Here the indicators SupActiveL6-L10 (ResActiveL6-L10) have a more
substantial impact of about 2.1% (-2,3%).
If traders submit orders in accordance to a support or resistance level, the increase
should already be visible in the limit order book before the best bid or ask price reaches
the respective levels. To test this hypothesis, I estimate a model of type (3.9) for each
order book level where Reldepth serves as independent variable. The model employs
dummy variables (TAlevel1-TAlevel10) for active support (resistance) levels on the bid
(ask) level as regressors and the same control variables as in model (3.9).
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TABLE 3.13: Regression Models of Depth Location Measures. The table presents
regression results for depth location measures regressed on support and resistance level
dummies and trading variables as specified in equation (3.9). Askmode (Bidmode) is
defined as the distance (in EUR) between the order book level on the ask (bid) side
having the highest depth and the midquote. Ask(Bid)balance is defined as (Depth10−
Depth5)/Depth10, where Depth5 (Depth10) is calculated as the cumulated depth (in
EUR) on the first 5 (10) levels of the ask (bid) side of the limit order book. TA-level
distance denotes the distance of the midquote to the nearest resistance (support) level
on the ask (bid) side of the limit order book, but only if this TA level is within the
range of the reported limit order book levels. Level1-5(6-10)Active indicates an active
resistance on the ask side or support level on the bid side on the respective first five
levels (on level 6-10) of the limit order book. All regression specifications contain stock,
day, and minute fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by stock. *, **, ***
denote significance on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors of the
coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. The sample comprises 30 DAX stock
from February 2008 to November 2013.
Panel A:
Support & Resistance Askmode Bidmode Ask balance Bid balance
TA-Level distance 0.1825*** 0.1817***
(0.0390) (0.0380)
Level 1-5 active -1.0612*** -1.2009***
(0.2373) (0.2438)
Level 6-10 active 0.6035*** 0.4296**
(0.1708) (0.1778)
Quoted Spread 0.0021*** 0.0040*** -0.1694** -0.1068
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0690) (0.0645)
Turnover 0.0000*** 0.0000** -0.0014*** -0.0012***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Market cap 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0010 0.0015
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0043) (0.0038)
Log-return 0.0003 -0.0078* 0.4094 -0.4709
(0.0053) (0.0044) (0.5666) (0.5964)
VDAX -0.0012** 0.0045 -0.1170*** 0.0289
(0.0006) (0.0029) (0.025) (0.0207)
Range 0.0151 -0.0151 3.6855*** 3.3299***
(0.0098) (0.0147) (1.1001) (0.9929)
Askdepth10 0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Biddepth10 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0025***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Tickdepth Bid 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0026*** 0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Tickdepth Ask 0.0003*** 0.0022*** 0.0061*** -0.0008
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0068)
Continued on next page
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Panel B:
Moving Averages Askmode Bidmode Ask balance Bid balance
SMA long 0.0016 0.0037*** -0.1142 0.6301***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.1863) (0.1406)
SMA short 0.0033*** 0.0024* 0.6048*** -0.1190
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.1375) (0.175)
Quoted Spread 0.0031*** 0.0053*** -0.1719** -0.1117
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0699) (0.0661)
Turnover 0.0000*** 0.0000** -0.0014*** -0.0012***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Market cap 0.0003 0.0004 0.0010 0.0015
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0043) (0.0038)
Log-return 0.0048 -0.0106*** 0.3700 -0.4108
(0.0047) (0.0034) (0.5652) (0.6)
VDAX 0.0007* 0.0015 -0.1079*** 0.0170
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.025) (0.0212)
Range 0.0188* -0.0073 3.6579*** 3.3242***
(0.0094) (0.0190) (1.0987) (0.9954)
Askdepth10 0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Biddepth10 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0002 -0.0024***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Tickdepth Bid 0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0026*** 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Tickdepth Ask 0.0003*** 0.0027*** 0.0063*** -0.0010
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0020) (0.0068)
Figure 3.8 illustrates the results for all 20 order book levels. The bottom right panel
shows the estimates for regressing order volume on tenth bid level on the ten support
level indicators. Each bar represents an estimated TA indicator variable and the error
bars correspond to 95% confidence levels. The highest estimate of a bid or ask level is in
accordance with an active indicator variable on the same level (e. g., for level 2 on the
ask side TAlevel2 yields the highest estimate). All estimates of TAlevel indicator variables
are significant except level 8 and level 9 on the bid side. It seems that depth around
active support or resistance levels increases most on the first five levels and the effect
decreases afterwards. The figure also shows that order book levels close to the SRL are
influenced which is similar to the findings of Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004). The
imprecise recognition and definition of levels could lead to multiple levels of increased
depth. Furthermore, liquidity supplier might undercut price levels of increased depth
(e. g., SRL) to increase their execution probability. At best bid and ask (level 1) limit
order volume is naturally influenced by liquidity demand which could explain that
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effects are less evident than on levels 2 to 5.
I refine the analysis of depth location by measures adopted from Kavajecz and Odders-
White (2004) to verify their results for the Xetra sample. This includes the measures
Askmode (Bidmode) and Askbalance (Bidbalance). For order book mode measures the
distance (in EUR) to the nearest support (resistance) level is used as explanatory
variable. In order to check whether peaks in depth are in accordance to the SRL only
observations with an active support or resistance in the book are considered. Then
the variable TA-level distance is defined as the distance of the midquote to the nearest
resistance (support) level on the ask (bid) side of the limit order book.
Table 3.13 shows the results. For the bid and ask side significantly positive estimates
support this relation confirming the results of Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004). Thus,
the distance to SRL can be used to identify a location of increased depth in the LOB.
The estimated relation between the variables seems to be weaker. An influencing factor
in this analysis is the usage of aggregated depth measures (averages) instead of values
from snapshots.
Askbalance (Bidbalance) measure whether limit order book depth is more concen-
trated near the best available price or on higher levels of the book and is similar to
the ’near depth’ measure used by Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004). The negative
coefficient estimates indicate that depth on the bid (ask) side of the book is more
concentrated on the first five levels if a support (resistance) level is active. Analogously,
Bidbalance (Askbalance) increases when support (resistance) levels are active on the
upper levels of the book. In both cases effects are relatively small since coefficients
indicate a shift of 0.4% to 1.2% compared to the unconditional standard deviation of
Bidbalance and Askbalance of 12.6% and 12.9%, respectively.
Considering SMA signals, the hypotheses regarding depth and depth location are
ambiguous assuming that trading on signals from moving averages mainly influences
liquidity demand. If liquidity supplier cannot adjust to the demand quickly, liquidity
supply could be adversely effected, which should only effect order book levels close to
the best price, however.
I estimate the above regression models using aggregated long and short signals
from four SMA strategies. Results for measures of total depth and depth location are
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FIGURE 3.8: Limit Order Book Depth on Support and Resistance Levels. This figure
depicts coefficient estimates of regression models of relative depth on each limit order
book level on the ask and bid side. In addition to the dummies signaling active support
(resistance) levels on a certain bid (ask) level, the same control variables as in model
(3.9) are applied. The regression specifications contain stock, day, and minute fixed
effects and standard errors clustered by stock. The drawn bars show the estimated
value, error bars refer to 95% confidence intervals.
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reported in Panel B of Table 3.12 and Table 3.13, respectively. Cumulative depth on the
bid and ask side of the LOB decreases around long and short signals. The estimated
effect is stronger for signals in the opposite direction, that is, for Depth5Ask in case
of short signals and for Depth5Bid for long signals, respectively. This seems to be
counter-intuitive since we expect liquidity demand in direction of the signal. In fact,
limit order supply on one side of the book typically has an inverse U-shape. For example,
the execution of one or several levels of the book can lead to an increase of Depth10
since the succeeding tenth level usually has more depth than the previous best bid or
ask.
On the other hand, if the ask moves up (spread widens), traders could adjust their
bid accordingly creating a new best bid level which would decrease Depth10 given the
limit order has average size. Although averaging should diminish this effect to some
extent, the restriction to a specific number of order book levels is a limitation of the
used depth measures and the data sample.
Results regarding depth location measures and SMA signals strengthen the above
interpretation. Askmode and Bidmode increase for signals in opposite direction of the
ask side and bid side, respectively, which means depth is located further away from the
midquote. The latter is tautological if SMA signals cause midquote changes while order
book mode remains unchanged. Controlling for midquote returns might not completely
account for this effect since changes in mode are in absolute numbers. Note that the
SRL distance variable includes the midquote change as well and thereby accounts for
such shifts in the mode measures. Overall, results on depth and depth location indicate
no imminent relation between SMA signals and depth in the (higher) levels of the order
book. This supports the conjecture that moving average signals primarily drive liquidity
demand and thereby affect the state of lower limit order book levels.
Trading Activity and Spread Measures
Table 3.14 shows results from the regression models of turnover, quoted spreads,
and effective spreads. Panel A presents results from model specifications containing
indicators for active support levels and active resistance levels, respectively. Both
coefficient estimates are negative and significant on a 1% level, i. e., trading activity
is lower when (best) bid or ask prices are close to a support or resistance level. The
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coefficients imply an average drop of about EUR 22,000 to EUR 23,000 for intervals
with active levels. This is equivalent to approximately 12.5% (6.2%) of the 1-minute
average turnover (standard deviation). Although traders who rely on SRL would want
to sell (buy) at a resistance (support) level, a particular trade implementation is not
directly given. If they believe that (trade) prices reach the respective level limit orders
could be preferred to avoid spreads. The results on liquidity supply and demand suggest
that the latter case is actually more likely since limit order volume increase and market
(marketable) order volume decreases.
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TABLE 3.14: Regression Models for Liquidity Measures. The table presents estimation
results from the panel regressions defined by equation (3.9). Independent variables
used to measure market liquidity are turnover, quoted spreads, effective spreads, price
impacts and realized spreads (15-minute horizon). Each observation refers to a 1-
minute interval over which variables are aggregated per stock. Quote-based measures
are calculated as time-weighted averages, trade-based measures as volume-weighted
averages. Panel A and Panel B show results for support and resistance levels and moving
average trading signals, respectively. All regression specifications contain stock, day, and
minute dummies. Standard errors are clustered by stock. *, **, *** denote significance
on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors of the coefficient estimates
are reported in parentheses. The sample comprises 30 DAX stock from February 2008
to November 2013.
Panel A: Quoted Effective Price Realized
Support & Resistance Turnover Spread Spread Impact Spread
At support -22.1024*** 0.6244*** 0.4068** 0.1788** 0.2306
(4.3786) (0.1883) (0.1727) (0.0658) (0.1402)
At resistance -23.7086*** 0.4814*** 0.2992*** 0.2027*** 0.0976
(4.4895) (0.1151) (0.0951) (0.0521) (0.0796)
Turnover -0.0010*** -0.0012** 0.0003* -0.0014**
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0006)
Market cap 0.2939 0.0010 0.0012 -0.0004 0.0016**
(0.2422) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Squared log-return -17.3329 3.9208*** 0.6154 4.5748*** -3.9584
(66.0499) (0.6354) (1.6952) (1.106) (2.5459)
Range 1153.3233*** 1.4032 13.2965*** 5.4025*** 7.8952
(280.3664) (1.0166) (4.7595) (1.1269) (5.8595)
VDAX 4.4131*** 0.0801*** 0.0122 -0.0018 0.0137
(1.4209) (0.0128) (0.022) (0.0266) (0.0403)
Depth1 -0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0000*** 0.0001*
(0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Biddepth10 0.0089 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0059) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Askdepth10 0.0259*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0083) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Continued on next page
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Panel B: Quoted Effective Price Realized
Moving Averages Turnover Spread Spread Impact Spread
SMA long 27.2520*** 0.4906*** 0.0708 0.0227 0.0492
(6.0237) (0.1249) (0.0819) (0.0702) (0.0996)
SMA short 33.1651*** 0.5592*** 0.0862 0.0769 0.0112
(6.9841) (0.144) (0.0965) (0.0796) (0.1253)
Turnover -0.0010*** -0.0012** 0.0003* -0.0014**
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0006)
Market cap 0.2946 0.0010 0.0012 -0.0004 0.0015**
(0.2418) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Squared log-return -17.8502 3.9919*** 0.6308 4.6624*** -4.0305
(66.8657) (0.6418) (1.7139) (1.1784) (2.658)
Range 1153.6798*** 1.3572 13.2830*** 5.3706*** 7.9134
(280.5307) (1.0169) (4.7675) (1.1499) (5.8898)
VDAX 4.4271*** 0.0805*** 0.0124 -0.0018 0.0139
(1.4262) (0.0127) (0.0221) (0.0267) (0.0405)
Depth1 -0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0000*** 0.0001*
(0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Biddepth10 0.0086 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0059) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Askdepth10 0.0255*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0083) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Results for quoted spreads exhibit positive and significant estimates for support levels
and resistance levels. At support (resistance) levels quoted spreads broaden about 0.62
bps (0.48 bps). Also effective spreads increase at SRL indicating higher implicit costs for
liquidity demander. However, the AtSupport coefficient estimate is not significant on a
1% level suggesting the effect is relatively weak. The effect size implies additional costs
of EUR 0.32 to EUR 0.43 for liquidity demanding orders of average size (EUR 10,677).
So the hypothesis that uninformed trading around TA signals leads to decreasing spread
(costs) does not hold in case of SRL (cf. item (iii) of Hypothesis 2a). A reason for
increasing spreads might be the imbalance in limit buy and sell orders as the analysis of
depth imbalances shows. Excess depth on the side of the SRL could discourage traders
on the opposite side to submit aggressive orders as shown by Ranaldo (2004).
To gain insights about adverse selection costs, I analyze the decomposition of effective
spreads into realized spreads and price impact with respect to midquotes 15 minutes
after a trade. Realized spreads are a proxy for liquidity supplier revenues and the price
impact is an approximation of the information content of a trade (Bessembinder and
Kaufman, 1997). While I find no significant results for realized spreads, price impacts
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turn out to be significantly positive at resistance levels. The support level estimate is
significant on a 5% level. Despite the noisy estimate, the larger price impacts suggest
that marketable orders tend to be more informed. If uninformed traders in the book
cause (quoted) prices to be too low, underpricing could be recognized by some market
participants who then trade accordingly. In particular at resistance levels, buy orders
which are executed against potentially uninformed sell orders on the resistance level
could have a stronger impact on the midquote. In Section 3.6.5 I consider the aspect of
price discovery and pricing errors in more detail.
Panel B of Table 3.14 reports estimation results for models including SMA indicator
variables (SMAlong and SMAshort). In contrast to SRL, turnover rises significantly after
both SMA signal types. After controlling for various trading-related variables, turnover
increases about EUR 27,000 (EUR 33,000) for long (short) signals implying 15.1%
(18.4%) higher turnover, on average. This finding confirms the daily-based results of
Etheber (2014) and corroborates the evidence that an increase on moving average
signal days is actually due to trading directly related to such signals.
Similar to SRL, quoted spreads tend to increase significantly. The estimates imply
0.49bps (0.56bps) wider quoted spreads after a long (short) signal occurred. Inter-
estingly, the increase in quoted spreads is not accompanied by a significant increase
in effective spreads. Liquidity provider might be encouraged to offer hidden liquidity
inside the spread since liquidity provision becomes more lucrative in case of wider
quoted spreads or BEST executors execute their order flow at better price than current
quotes. If they expect that the additional order flow around SMA signals is more likely
to be uninformed, providing additional liquidity inside the spread becomes less risky
with respect to persistent adverse price changes. The insignificant effect of SMA signals
on price impacts supports this view. Consequently, I find no changes in liquidity supplier
revenues measured by realized spreads.
In summary, the results on liquidity measures around SMA signals do not support
the hypothesis of decreasing quoted spreads which would indicate reduced adverse
selection risks as shown by Bender et al. (2013) for head-and-shoulder chart patterns.
Furthermore, I find no significant effect on effective spreads which contradicts item (iii)
of Hypothesis 2a.
Because the considered TA signals give a directional trading recommendation, I
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conduct separate analyses of realized spreads and price impact for liquidity demanding
buy orders and sell orders, respectively. In that case the measurement of realized spreads
does not readily translate into liquidity supplier revenues, since liquidity supplying
strategies typically require trading on both sides of the market. Realized spreads of
buys and sells traded at the best bid and ask consist of the (half) quoted spread and
the subsequent price move which always is in favor of either the buy or the sell order.
Thus, comparing realized spreads of buys versus sells means to compare the future
price development after these trades plus average spread costs which might be better
for buys or sells depending on trade size and timing. By averaging, price effects on buys
and sells do offset in the standard calculation of realized spreads as long as there is no
buy-sell-imbalance and no systematic timing advantage of either buys or sells during
the considered interval. After splitting buys and sells, the measure basically states how
well the execution of specific order types performed over the considered time horizon
including spread costs.
Similarly, price impacts are less meaningful as in most cases either buys or sells tend
to have a positive impact depending on the sign of the return. In this regard, price
impacts of buys and sells basically measure raw returns of a trade over a given horizon
(e. g., 15 minutes) excluding implicit costs.
Table 3.15, Panel A (Panel B) shows results for model specification of type (3.9)
including SRL (SMA signal) indicator variables. In all four cases, realized spreads
increase (decrease) when trades are in the same direction as the TA signals and vice
versa for trades in the opposite direction. All coefficient estimates of TA signal dummies
are significant on a 1% level. For example, market buys after a SMA long signals tend
to have about 1.07 bps higher realized spreads or, in terms of price impacts, midquote
prices tend to be about 0.88 bps lower over a 15-minute horizon, on average.
In case of SMA signals, the associated short term directional liquidity pressure could
move the price and afterwards it takes some time until liquidity recovers and quoted
prices return to the previous levels. The mechanism could be similar to cascade effects
of stop-orders causing liquidity pressure when they are highly clustered at some price
level. For example, Osler (2003) shows that clustered stop-loss orders in the FX market
lead to fast short-term price movements. An empirical study from 2005 mentions that
5% of the liquidity demand on Xetra is due to stop-orders (Prix et al., 2007). Similarly,
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increased depth on SRL might cause quoted prices to be too high or too low such that
market orders in the same direction obtain an inferior price resulting in unfavorable
short-run returns. Additionally, I perform the analysis with a 5-minute horizon, which
qualitatively yields the same results but smaller coefficient estimates. Although the
shown evidence provides no encompassing profitability analysis for the considered TA
signal, liquidity demanding orders in direction of a TA signal seem to have inferior
short-run performance than comparable trades. This implies that costs of demanding
liquidity are relatively high when trading on TA signals.
TABLE 3.15: Realized Spreads and Price Impacts of Buy and Sell Orders. The
table presents estimation results from the panel regressions defined by equation (3.9).
Realized spreads and price impacts are calculated with respect to midquotes 15 minutes
after a trade. The measures are aggregated separately for liquidity demanding buy and
sell orders over each stock-minute interval. The four regression specifications contain
stock, day, and minute dummies. Panels A and Panel B show results for support and
resistance levels and moving average trading signals, respectively. Standard errors
are clustered by stock. *, **, *** denote significance on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses.
The sample comprises 30 DAX stock from February 2008 to November 2013.
Panel A:
Support & Resistance
Buy Orders Sell Orders
Realized Spread Price Impact Realized Spread Price Impact
At support 1.8548*** -1.4630*** -1.4294*** 1.7554***
(0.2744) (0.1870) (0.1658) (0.1920)
At resistance -1.2158*** 1.4495*** 1.4430*** -1.1509***
(0.1419) (0.1671) (0.1924) (0.1329)
Turnover -0.0007*** 0.0001 -0.0011*** 0.0003**
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Market cap 0.0025 -0.0014 0.0004 0.0006
(0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0006)
Midquote log-return 3.4087*** -3.2709*** -3.2457*** 2.9887***
(0.2896) (0.2839) (0.2414) (0.2424)
Range 4.5022*** 1.9344*** 9.7901*** -1.0126*
(1.4211) (0.6221) (0.8656) (0.4954)
VDAX -5.5358*** 5.5801*** 5.5595*** -5.5304***
(0.3053) (0.3058) (0.3057) (0.3054)
Depth1 0.0001* 0.0000*** 0.0001** 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Biddepth10 -0.0003** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Askdepth10 0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Continued on next page
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Panel B:
Moving Averages
Buy Orders Sell Orders
Realized Spread Price Impact Realized Spread Price Impact
SMA long 1.0726*** -0.8820*** -1.0529*** 1.1413***
(0.1538) (0.1418) (0.1428) (0.1462)
SMA short -1.1905*** 1.3090*** 1.2731*** -1.0813***
(0.1332) (0.1303) (0.1401) (0.1248)
Turnover -0.0007*** 0.0001 -0.0011*** 0.0003**
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Market cap 0.0025 -0.0014 0.0004 0.0006
(0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0006)
Midquote log-return 3.3348*** -3.1999*** -3.1726*** 2.9171***
(0.2876) (0.2825) (0.2399) (0.2407)
Range 4.4995*** 1.9294*** 9.7810*** -1.0105*
(1.4216) (0.6227) (0.8625) (0.4950)
VDAX -5.5250*** 5.5697*** 5.5493*** -5.5203***
(0.3047) (0.3053) (0.3052) (0.305)
Depth1 0.0001* 0.0000*** 0.0001** 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Biddepth10 -0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Askdepth10 0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
3.6.4 Informational Efficiency
The previous section shows that TA signals can be associated with changes in liquidity
supply and trading activity. The increase in limit order book depth around SRL and the
spiking turnover after SMA signals trigger suggest that price process characteristics could
be affected. Since the considered signals recommend to trade in a specific direction
prices could be pushed from efficient levels. Even if prices return to their fundamental
value, volatility could increase or impounding of other information could be distorted
given the directional liquidity shock was sufficiently large. To assess whether prices
show characteristics associated with informational inefficiencies, i. e., prices deviate
from random walks or become (partly) predictable, I follow the approach by Comerton-
Forde and Putninš (2015) and use three typical measures which are calculated on a
stock-day basis.
The first measure is based on serial autocorrelations of midquote returns calculated
over 10-, 30- and 60-second intervals (cf. Hendershott and Jones, 2005). Both positive
and negative autocorrelation in midquotes indicate inefficiencies, for example when
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new information is priced in slowly or prices tend to overshoot due to liquidity demand.
Thus the absolute value of autocorrelation can be used as a measure of informational
inefficiency. Since empirical autocorrelation is typically a noisy measure, aggregating
autocorrelation over three frequencies results in a less volatile measure (Comerton-
Forde and Putninš, 2015). The single aggregated measure is obtained as the first
principle component from a principal component analysis applied to the three absolute
autocorrelation series. The reasoning behind using the first principal component of the
different autocorrelation horizons is to reduce measurement error in each series. Based
on the assumption that the measurement error for each series is correlated, the first
principal component explains the maximal amount of common variance of the actual
inefficiency, but is less noisy than a simple average of the inputs. In order to make
the measure comparable, it is scaled to range from 0 (highly efficient) to 100 (highly
inefficient).
The second measure is based on ratios of midquote return variances defined by
VarianceRatiokl =
 σ2klkσ2l − 1
 ,
where σ2k and σ
2
l denotes the k-second and kl-second midquote return variance,
respectively, which are calculated per stock-day. If midquote returns follow a random
walk then variance should be (close to) time-scaling. Thus non-zero values of the above
ratio signal a deviation from the random walk property. As above, the three measures
are aggregated by taking the first principal component and then are scaled to range
from 0 to 100.
Third, the degree of predictability of stock returns by past market returns measures
inefficiencies in the adjustment of stock prices to new market-wide information, i. e.,
information is incorporated with delay (cf. Hou and Moskowitz, 2005). The basic idea
is to run the following two regressions per stock-day.
Regression 1: ri,t = αi + β0rM ,t and
Regression 2: ri,t = αi +
10∑
j=0
β j rM ,t− j,
where ri,t denotes 1-minute midquote return of stock i at time t and rM ,t denotes the
1-minute return of the DAX30 index (market return). I calculate the R-squares of both
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regressions and define the delay measure as
Dela y = 100 ∗

1− R
2
(1)
R2(2)

.
If lagged market returns cannot explain any of the stock’s return variability then R2(2)
should be close to R2(1) and the delay becomes zero indicating a high informational
efficiency. Contrary, if much variability can be explained by past market returns, R2(2)
will be larger than R2(1) and delay increases.
To assess whether informational efficiency alters when TA-based signals are triggered
on a trading day, I relate the above measures to the TA-based trading signals as defined
in Section 3.6.2. If TA-based trading has an effect on the degree of informational
inefficiency, the effect should be increasing in the number of signals on a given day.
Since informational efficiency measures are calculated on a daily basis and would be
little meaningful when calculated on more granular intervals, I accumulate the intraday
SRL indicators AtSupport and AtResistance, ResActiveL1-L5 and SupActiveL1-L5, as well
as SMAlong and SMAshort. Instances where a support and a resistance level are active
in the same 1-minute interval are not double counted. The resulting variables are called
AtSRL, LOB_SRL, and SMAsignals, respectively. From the resulting stock-day panel I
estimate the following type of regression model, where I Mi,t denotes one of the three
informational efficiency measures for stock i on day t and TAcount i,t denotes one of
the daily accumulated TA indicator variables. The regression equation is defined as
I Mi,t = β TAcount i,t +
6∑
j=1
δ jCont rol
( j)
i,t +
∑
F E, (3.10)
where Cont rol( j) include volatility of midquote returns, market capitalization, turnover,
as well as time-weighted averages of quoted spread, Depth1, and Depth10, respectively.
The regression contains fixed effects for stock and day, standard errors are clustered by
stock. I estimate the above model for each informational efficiency measures and TA
count variable.
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TABLE 3.16: Regression Models of Informational Efficiency Measures. This table shows regressions results using three
informational efficiency measures based on midquote autocorrelation, variance ratios, and delay to index price movements,
respectively. For each measure, three different models are reported. The model in column (1) includes the number of
intervals when support and resistance are active at the best bid or ask (At SR-level). Analogously, the model reported
in column (2) uses a variable for active support and resistance levels on best five levels of the limit order book (LOB
SR-levels ) aggregated per stock-day. Column (3) the number of SMA events during a stock-day (SMA signals) is applied.
The set of control variables are the same throughout all models and include daily 1-minute midquote return volatility,
market capitalization, aggregated turnover, as well as time-weighted average quoted spread, depth1, and depth10. All
models include stock and day fixed effects and standard errors double clustered by stock and day. Standard errors of the
coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Autocorrelation Variance Ratios Delay
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
At SR-level 0.0019 -0.0106 0.0102
(0.0065) (0.0083) (0.013)
LOB SR-level 0.0056** 0.0003 0.0288***
(0.0022) (0.0051) (0.0089)
SMA signals 0.0307** 0.0251*** 0.2209***
(0.0128) (0.0091) (0.0606)
Volatility 0.0035*** 0.0038*** 0.0035*** 0.0074*** 0.0075*** 0.0075*** 0.0044** 0.0061*** 0.0043**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0017)
Market Cap. -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0035 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0011 0.0164 0.0187 0.0163
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0237) (0.0246) (0.0236)
Avg. Quoted Spread 0.1330* 0.0604 0.1383* 0.1263 0.1021 0.1080 3.1029*** 2.7324*** 3.1220***
(0.0711 (0.0703) (0.0708) (0.2367 (0.203) (0.2394) (0.2704 (0.2736) (0.2682)
Turnover 0.0064** 0.0067*** 0.0065*** 0.0140*** 0.0143*** 0.0144*** 0.0136** 0.0154*** 0.0133**
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0058)
Avg. Depth1 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Avg. Depth10 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)125
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Table 3.16 shows the estimation results for all specifications of (3.10). The autocorre-
lation measure is not significantly affected by the variable AtSRL. In case of the number
of SRL in the limit order book (LOB_SRL) and the number of SMA signals coefficient
estimates are positive but only significant on a 5% level indicating that the effect is
relatively weak and noisy. Considering the effects of trading variables on the measure,
volatility and turnover exhibit a significantly positive relation to the autocorrelation
measure. Although high trading activity is usually considered as positive for liquidity,
high directional liquidity demand, e. g., due to herding behavior of investors, could
induce short-term autocorrelation in stock prices (Barber et al., 2009).
The analysis of variance ratios yields similar results. The coefficient for SMA signals
is positive and significant while the null for both support and resistance variables
can not be rejected. With respect to the average number of daily SMA signals, the
estimated coefficient (0.0268) means an increase of about 0.95% of the measure’s
standard deviation. Since SMA signals appear rarely and are short-lived, the potential
impact on total fluctuations in informational efficiency measured by variance ratios is
very limited in general.
For the delay measure a positive and significant estimate appears for LOB_SRL and
SMAsignals. The coefficient estimate translates into a 5.33% standard deviations increase
in the delay measure when an average number of SMA signals are trigger on a trading
day. Assuming that SMA trading signals cause temporary (uninformed) directional
liquidity demand which is unrelated to fundamental (market-wide) information, stock
prices would lag the index price for this short period of time and have to revert afterwards
becoming predicable with respect to lagged index price movements. Given that SMA
strategies usually16 need a price movement in the same direction to be triggered,
exogenous market-wide events like central bank announcements could temporarily
cause high market-wide volatility and at the same time trigger the directional SMA
signal resulting in the shown regression result. The consideration of news in order to
control for fundamental information events would be out of the scope of this analysis,
however.
16In general it is possible that a SMA long signal is triggered even if stock prices decrease, for instance
when an observations with a relatively high price is dropping out of the SMA calculation and, thus, the
average decreases more than the last price.
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Summarizing, a relation between informational efficiency and SMA signals exists,
but is hardly present for SRL. While SRL increase liquidity provision in the book, which
theoretically should support efficient price movement to some degree, the directional
liquidity demand associated with moving averages could result in the opposite. The
fact that considering SRL on the first five levels of the limit order book (which is a
superset of the variable AtSRL) leads to stronger effects might be due to liquidity supply
clustering on support and resistance price levels instead of levels close to the best bid
and ask thereby influencing price discovery in front of the SRL.
Furthermore, the effects on informational efficiency stemming from SRL are partially
explained through the relation to other liquidity dimensions like quoted spreads, for
instance. As analyzed by Anderson et al. (2013), high-frequency autocorrelation
measures are driven by partial price adjustments and overshooting which might be
caused by excessive trading around SMA signals. Using low-frequency measures of
informational efficiency (e. g., monthly measurement based on daily observations),
which principally are correlated with high-frequency measures (Rösch et al., 2013),
seems not to be expedient to analyze the relation to intraday TA signals. The statistically
significant effect in case of SMA signals indicates that there is a relation to price
characteristics associated with inefficient prices. The small effect size reflects the rare
and short-living appearance of TA signals, which should restrict the potential impact on
a macroscopic measure. Overall, the increase in informational inefficiency is of limited
scope.
3.6.5 Price Discovery
State Space Model of Midquote Prices
The previous sections provide evidence that trading around TA signals alters in terms
of liquidity supply and demand (e. g., limit order book depth and turnover) and
informational efficiency is influenced by some of the signals under consideration. For
the latter, the analysis based on global measures of informational efficiency is limited
and provides little insight regarding short-term price formation when TA signals occur.
Therefore, I apply a state space model(SSM) of midquote prices to analyze permanent
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and transitory price changes and volatility in relation to the TA signals selected in Section
3.6.2. Since TA traders are assumed to be uninformed noise traders who potentially
trade on the same side of the market, I expect price effects to be increasingly transitory
around TA signals. To decompose prices into transitory and permanent parts, I use an
adopted approach of the SSM methodology17 introduced by Menkveld et al. (2007) in
the context of market microstructure. Further applications of the state-space approach
in the context of price decomposition are, among others, Menkveld (2013), Brogaard
et al. (2014), and Hendershott and Menkveld (2014).
The mentioned papers vary in the formulation of the efficient and transitory price
components (e. g., inclusion of more lags, trends, exogenous variables) depending on
the goal of the analyses. Furthermore, the observations frequency varies from tick
(event) time, or equally-spaced intraday observations to daily observations. In contrast
to the literature, I do not incorporate treatment variables (e. g., TA signals) into the
component equations. First, a pure indicator variable would not be sensible in the price
process with respect to the hypothesized effect. Secondly, unlike net order flows or
inventory positions of some group of market participants the virtually hypothetical TA
signals are more likely to be exogenous to the price discovery process compared to real
order flows.
The basic state space model is defined as follows. The observed (log-) midquote
price pi,t for stock i at time t is modeled as
pi,t = mi,t + si,t , (3.11)
where mi,t is the unobservable efficient price and si,t the transitory price component
(pricing error). The efficient price shall follow a random walk
mi,t = mi,t−1 +ηi,t , (3.12)
where ηi,t is a normally distributed error term with zero-mean and variance σ
2
η
.
Following Brogaard et al. (2014) and Hendershott and Menkveld (2014), pricing
errors are modeled as an auto-regressive process, i. e.,
si,t = φsi,t−1 + εi,t , (3.13)
where εi,t is a Gaussian error term independent of η with zero mean and variance σ
2
ε
.
17Durbin and Koopman (2001) provide a comprehensive introduction to state space models.
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The three model parameters φ,ση, and σε are estimated from 1-minute (log-)
midquote observations per stock-day. To fit the model, I optimize the diffuse likelihood
function based on the (augmented) Kalman filter output (cf. Durbin and Koopman, 2001,
Sec. 7.2), where the initial conditions of the unknown variables are assumed to have
infinite variance (so-called diffuse initial values). The transitory error term variance
parameter is restricted to 90% of the unconditional variance of pi,t (cf. Brogaard et al.,
2014). The auto-correlation parameter φ is allowed to take values between ±0.9 in
order to avoid non-stationary boundary solutions (see Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014,
p.421f, for further discussions). I use the double dogleg optimization algorithm, which
yields a high convergence rate (over 99.9%) while being computationally efficient for
large samples. Stock-days on which the algorithm does not converge are not considered
for further analyses. The unobserved efficient price, which is part of the state vector in
the SSM connotation, is obtained through the Kalman smoother by using the (final)
Kalman filtering output in a backwards recursion. The smoothing output is used to
determine all components of the model given the full sample, i. e., I obtain estimates
for the efficient price and pricing error.
The smoothed state variables (efficient price and pricing error) are used to determine
the instantaneous level of noise at a point of time. Therefore I calculate the following
ratios based on pricing error transitory innovation defined as
PEratioi,t =
|si,t |
|si,t |+ |ηi,t | and T I ratioi,t =
|εi,t |
|εi,t |+ |ηi,t | . (3.14)
Relating the pricing error (pricing error innovation) to the permanent innovation
measures the share of the transitory part (noise) compared to total price fluctuation.
SSM Estimation Results
Panel A of Table 3.17 shows descriptive statistics of the estimated SSM parameters
across stock-days. The transitory price component (pricing) error is positively auto-
correlated (φ¯ = 0.3766), on average. Innovation volatility estimates of σ¯η = 7.35bps
and σ¯ε = 2.03bps yield an average decomposition of stock volatility (unconditional
cross-sectional average 9.57 bps) into permanent and transitory volatility. Note that
the conditional volatility is not directly comparable to the sum of the two components
since the model parameters are derived from the maximum likelihood function such
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that the realization (data) is most likely given the parameters, while the unconditional
volatility is an empirical value. Furthermore I fit the SSM for the whole trading day and
trim the first and last 15 minutes afterwards, hence the parameter estimates are with
respect to the whole trading day as well. For the same reasons, the standard deviation
of ε reported in Panel B is basically different from the volatility parameter σε.
TABLE 3.17: State Space Model Estimation. The table shows summary statistics based
on the output of the state space model defined by (3.11),(3.12), and (3.13). Panel A
shows average parameter estimates, standard deviation, median, and inter-quartile
range (IQR) for the AR-coefficient of the transitory price component and the error term
volatilities. Panel B reports descriptive statistic for the Kalman smoother output, i. e.,
price components derived from the smoothed state variables mi,t and si,t .
Panel A: SSM Parameter Estimates Unit Mean Std. Dev. Median IQR
AR-coefficient φ 0.3766 0.4142 0.4415 0.7512
Permanent innovation volatility ση bps 7.3501 4.4219 6.1906 3.9199
Transitory error volatility σε bps 2.0290 2.9620 1.1323 2.8434
Panel B: SSM Components
Permanent innovation (ηi,t) bps -0.0091 7.9352 0.0000 4.9073
Transitory component (si,t) bps 0.0009 2.8456 0.0000 0.1996
Transitory component ratio % 23.0402 29.3000 8.1728 39.3972
Transitory error (εi,t) bps 0.0002 2.3200 0.0000 0.1595
Transitory error ratio % 19.9048 25.2823 7.6245 33.7491
Table 3.17, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the smoothed SSM components
and the ratios defined above. The SSM estimates indicate that on average the transitory
innovation accounts for 23% of the total fluctuation in the model components, on
average.
To relate the SSM output to the defined TA-based trading signals, I merge the SMA
long and short as well as the SRL indicators with the (smoothed) SSM components. For
smoothed pricing errors si,t of stock i at time t I estimate a regression model containing
only intercept and TA indicator variables and an extended model specification defined
by
si,t = α+ β1TA1i,t + β2TA2i,t +δ1âV DAX i,t1(si,t>0) (3.15)
+δ2âV DAX i,t1(si,t<0) +δ3ãMCapi,t1(si,t>0) +δ4ãMCapi,t1(si,t<0),
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where 1(·) is the indicator function and âV DAX and ãMCap denote standardized VDAX
and market capitalization. Since idiosyncratic stock volatility is typically correlated
with market volatility (Guo and Savickas, 2006), we can expect that market volatility is
related to the size of pricing errors given the ratio of permanent and transitory effects is
unchanged. Thus, I split the effects for positive and negative values of si,t . As before, the
models are estimated for SRL and SMA signals separately. For PEsharei,t and T Isharei,t
the respective regression models include TA indicator variables, âV DAX , ãMCap and
stock fixed effects. Because both ratios should not be affected by market volatility
and capitalization in a non-linear way, the model includes both variables as they are.
All regression models use stock-day double clustered standard errors as proposed by
Thompson (2011).
I estimate the defined regression models from the SSM output and use all observations
between 09:15 and 17:15. The latter should reduce the influence of extreme values at
the boundaries of the time series18.
Table 3.18 shows the regression results. Panel A reports models including SRL
indicators. Models (i) and (ii) indicate that pricing errors tend to be more negative
at support levels and more positive at resistance levels. This means transitory price
deviations appear in direction of support levels and resistance levels, respectively. Thus,
quoted prices tend to be too high (too low) at resistance (support) levels. The estimated
coefficient imply (absolute) pricing errors ranging between 0.29 bps and 0.34 bps. The
effect is also present after controlling for external factors. Higher market capitalization
has no significant effect while the sign of both estimates suggests a negative relation to
the size of pricing errors. Market volatility is associated with both large positive and
negative pricing errors.
The latter is considered more detailed in models (iii)-(vi) where the ratios defined by
(3.14) are taken as independent variables. Thereby I control for the case that transitory
and permanent component increase proportionally. The results are very similar across
the four models indicating that the proportion of pricing error in total price change is
significantly larger around SRL, respectively. Depending on the model, the estimates
18This can arise from higher uncertainty in the trading process itself as well as from fitting the SSM
model which can exhibit boundary effects.
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TABLE 3.18: Regression Model of SSM Price Components. This table presents results
from regressing price components on TA indicators. The pricing error is derived from
the SSM model defined by equations (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13). Error ratio sets the
absolute pricing error in relation to the sum of absolute pricing error and permanent
innovation. Analogously, innovation ratio utilizes the transitory innovation instead of
the pricing error. Panel A and Panel B show results from regressions employing support
and resistance level indicators and moving average indicators, respectively. Models
(i), (iii), and (v) include an intercept and TA indicator variables only, while models
(iv) and (vi) control for market volatility (VDAX) as well as market capitalization and
apply stock fixed effects. In model (ii) the VDAX and market cap effect is separated
depending on the sign of the independent variable as specified in equation (3.15). All
models contain standard errors double-clustered on stock and day. *, **, *** denote
significance on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
Panel A: Pricing Error Error ratio Innovation ratio
Support & Resistance (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Intercept 0.0007 -0.0002 22.8376*** 19.7433***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.6467) (0.5064)
At support -0.3147*** -0.3434*** 4.4104*** 3.3983*** 3.5426*** 2.7115***
(0.0236) (0.0227) (0.5076) (0.4587) (0.4394) (0.3828)
At resistance 0.2901*** 0.3226*** 4.8947*** 4.0136*** 3.8778*** 3.1482***
(0.0202) (0.0208) (0.4591) (0.4354) (0.4112) (0.3730)
VDAX
×1yt>0 0.6173***
(0.0658) 0.8189*** 0.7168***
×1yt<0 -0.6244*** (0.3342) (0.307)
(0.0658)
Market cap
×1yt>0 -0.0420
(0.0998) -0.6511** -0.4000
×1yt<0 0.0411 (0.3842) (0.3435)
(0.0995)
Fixed effects no no no yes no yes
Panel B: Moving Averages
Intercept 0.0012** 0.0005 23.0551*** 19.9275***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.6590) (0.5177)
SMA long 0.8931*** 0.8636*** -1.4830*** -1.5624*** -2.3190*** -2.3867***
(0.0637) (0.0610) (0.3181) (0.3134) (0.3042) (0.3003)
SMA short -0.9583*** -0.9308*** -1.6344*** -1.7104*** -2.4301*** -2.4936***
(0.0801) (0.0778) (0.3218) (0.3151) (0.2974) (0.2918)
VDAX
×1yt>0 0.6217***
(0.0682) 9.2606*** 7.5421***
×1yt<0 -0.6310*** (3.2736) (2.9032)
(0.0682)
Market cap
×1yt>0 -0.0003
(0.0317) -1.5640** -1.4001**
×1yt<0 -0.0025 (0.7335) (0.6559)
(0.0320)
Fixed effects no no no yes no yes
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imply an increase of 14.7% - 21.2% of the average pricing error share around support
or resistance levels (15.8% - 20.1% for the transitory innovation share).
Panel B of Table 3.18 presents the estimation results for models including SMA
signal indicators. Model (i) and (ii) show that pricing errors are significantly positive
(negative) when an SMA long (short) signal is triggered implying that quoted prices are
above efficient prices. The coefficient implies overpricing (underpricing) at SMA long
(short) signals of 0.89 bps (0.95 bps) which is about 30% of the transitory component
standard deviation. Thus the effect appears to be stronger as in case of SRL.
Considering the transitory component shares, the significant pricing errors do not
lead to a larger proportion of the transitory price component, however. Models (iii)
and (iv) indicate a decrease of 1.48% to 1.71% in the pricing error share. For the
transitory innovation share a decrease of 2.3% to 2.5% is estimated. While SMA signals
can be associated with the direction of the pricing error and its absolute size19, the
denomination through the permanent innovation component shows that relative values
are slightly decreasing. I also estimate models for permanent price components wi,t
(not reported) showing a positive (negative) effect for SMA long (short) signals. Price
movements are generally of larger magnitude around SMA signals which is driven by
both more extreme pricing errors and permanent price innovations.
Discussion of Results
In case of resistance levels where the midquote price is closely below a specific price level
the pricing error tends to be more positive implying overpricing. As shown in Section
3.6.3, such levels are associated with excess limit order book volume. Overpricing
implies that informed traders would sell in this situation. However, if quoted spreads
are larger than the pricing error, they can realize potential profits only by placing
aggressive limit orders which could account for the increased depth at the best ask. The
presented evidence regarding excess depth being already visible in the LOB before the
support or resistance level reaches best bid or ask contradicts this mechanism, though.
On the other hand, if the depth increase means that limit order cluster at a specific level
instead of being distributed over several levels, price discovery could be distorted in
19I also estimate models with absolute pricing errors yielding a similar result as (i) and (ii). For brevity,
these results are not reported.
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the sense that liquidity demand of a given size has a greater impact and prices tend
to overshoot until the price level of increased supply is reached. In this scenario, we
would find overpricing (underpricing) in front of resistance (support) level.
In case of SMA signals, the increased liquidity demand in the direction of the SMA
signal might not be compensated immediately. If directional excess liquidity demand
occurs over a long period then the price change becomes persistent. Varying signal
processing times of Technical Analysis traders and the application of different trigger
conditions could spread the demand for liquidity over some period of time. If the
uninformed liquidity demand is (expected to be) persistent, the short-term risk for
informed trader increases and could limit arbitrage trading (De Long et al., 1990b;
Bloomfield et al., 2009). In this scenario, the increase in the size of transitory and
permanent price components, i. e., short-term price volatility, would be due to directional
noise trading that discourages informed traders (arbitrageurs) and liquidity suppliers to
trade in the opposite direction. Eventually prices would revert after liquidity demand
in direction of the signal vanishes.
Overall, both types of TA signals are associated with increased fluctuations in pricing
errors supporting item (ii) of Hypothesis 2b. In case of SMA the increase in permanent
component outweighs the transitory part which contradicts the statement on permanent
price changes in this hypothesis but reveals a different view on the effect of TA-related
trading. Section 3.6.6 presents further evidence on the volatility of transitory and
permanent price components on a higher frequency, which confirms the results of this
section.
3.6.6 Robustness Tests
Liquidity Measures
To check the robustness of results presented in the previous sections, I use two alternative
approaches to test the relation between liquidity measures and TA indicator. First,
models of type (3.9) for yearly subsamples assess whether effects remain stable over
time. The regressions apply the same independent variables but employ standard errors
double clustered by stock and day (Thompson, 2011). Additionally, I use an alternative
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approach to analyze liquidity measures. In a first step, I fit an auto-regressive model
of the variables of interest for each stock-day. The model includes five lags and a
second-order trend. The residuals of all stock-days are then pooled and regressed on
the TA indicators and control variables as before. Since residuals have zero-mean across
stocks and days, stock-day fixed effects are not included. The quadratic trend and the
inclusion of lags incorporate an alternative intraday variation structure that replaces
the minutely fixed effects of the original model. In sum, I estimate a model of type (3.9)
with double clustered standard errors and a simple intercept instead of fixed effects.
The main purpose of this approach is to account for potential stock- and time-varying
auto-regressive characteristics in the analyzed liquidity measures.
Columns ’2008’ - ’2013’ of Table 3.19 report results for the measures turnover, quoted
spread, effective spreads, Depth5 Ask, and Depth5 Bid for each year. For the sake of
brevity the table solely contains the TA indicator estimates. Column ’All’ shows results for
the respective model of AR(5) residuals. The latter confirms the findings regarding SRL,
i. e., significantly positive SRL indicator estimates for quoted and effective spreads as
well as for depth on the side of the respective SRL. The year-by-year consideration shows
that LOB depth on ask (bid) side at resistance (support) levels is significantly increased
throughout the samples. For quoted spreads, I find no significant SRL estimates in
2008 and relatively large estimates accompanied with high standard deviation in 2009.
Similar results occur for effective spreads. The generally stressed market situation
during the financial crisis might be a reason for the different results for the spread
measures in these years.
Panel B reports models including SMA indicators. As before, findings from the
main analyses can be confirmed. Turnover surges around long and short signals in all
years. The coefficients suggest that the effect on turnover is particularly strong at the
beginning of the sample. Analogues assertions hold for quoted spreads while in case of
effective spreads the evidence is relatively mixed throughout the years. Interestingly,
the approach based on AR(5) residuals also suggests a significantly positive effect on
effective spreads. I interpret this results as additional evidence against Hypothesis 1b,
(iii).
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TABLE 3.19: Robustness Checks for Liquidity Measures. The table presents robustness tests for several liquidity measures
used in main analyses. Columns ’2008’ - ’2013’ report regressions of type (3.9) which employ standard errors double-
clustered by stock and day. The model is estimated for each year separately. The regression specifications contain stock,
day, and minute dummies. Column ’All’ reports results from a two stage approach. First, an auto-regressive model
including five lags and a quadratic trend is fitted for each stock-day. Then the model residuals are regressed on TA indicator
variables and controls. Standard errors are double clustered by stock and day. Panel A and Panel B show results for
support and resistance levels and moving average trading signals, respectively. Values for control variables are omitted. *,
**, *** denote significance on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Support and Resistance 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 All
Turnover
At Support -56.9826* -9.2411* -12.9413*** -18.7801*** -6.0181*** -6.9385*** 0.2081
(12.5708) (6.2046) (4.4653) (5.1851) (1.9602) (2.9107) (1.9195)
At Resistance -51.0872*** -10.1663*** -19.3840*** -26.7549*** -7.9246*** -5.4381*** 3.0691*
(14.3908) (4.3608) (5.6256) (8.8505) (2.0786) (2.1081) (2.2053)
Quoted Spread
At Support 0.1595* 0.7406* 0.1227*** 0.1560*** 0.1946*** 0.1254*** 0.0531***
(0.1261) (0.5169) (0.0316) (0.0439) (0.0707) (0.0286) (0.0078)
At Resistance 0.1225 0.3573*** 0.1175*** 0.1735** 0.1675*** 0.1056*** 0.0503***
(0.1062) (0.1296) (0.0362) (0.0896) (0.0574) (0.0200) (0.0075)
Effective Spread
At Support 0.2469* 0.5912 0.0619*** 0.0591** 0.0601*** 0.0427*** 0.0425***
(0.1604) (0.4631) (0.0181) (0.0319) (0.0172) (0.0183) (0.0095)
At Resistance 0.2817** 0.2190* 0.0578*** 0.0587** 0.0663*** 0.0346*** 0.0360***
(0.1335) (0.1412) (0.0167) (0.0262) (0.0203) (0.0124) (0.0060)
Depth5 Ask
At Support 212.2236** 6.8103 75.3086* 91.6682** 12.5037 33.1957*** -0.5390
(104.6517) (8.6867) (53.4369) (44.2051) (11.0213) (11.6925) (0.5909)
At Resistance 240.2373*** 93.1328*** 158.5761** 193.4304*** 119.4657*** 138.0345*** 6.4670***
(94.1351) (36.1803) (80.0895) (62.6305) (28.6488) (32.7405) (0.5888)
Depth5 Bid
At Support 354.9068** 61.6024*** 130.6859** 155.1138*** 72.6739*** 90.2272*** 5.2602***
(175.9610) (23.6755) (67.9420) (58.6421) (12.9476) (18.6673) (0.6151)
At Resistance 200.7927** 13.5104 94.2721* 111.6243*** 32.2454** 51.4654*** -0.3093
(113.7585) (12.6604) (61.0151) (46.6665) (16.6709) (16.3957) (0.5733)
Continued on next page
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Panel B: Moving Averages 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 All
Turnover
SMA long 62.3965*** 24.8750*** 13.2210*** 12.0036** 18.1904*** 15.8653** 5.8742***
(17.2978) (6.4682) (5.4964) (5.7621) (6.8118) (6.9554) (1.9711)
SMA short 67.3643*** 24.5664*** 18.7749*** 17.6065*** 23.0853*** 16.1618*** 5.0113***
(17.1334) (6.5737) (6.7353) (7.4462) (6.2471) (5.742) (2.0543)
Quoted Spread
SMA long 0.8814*** 1.0505*** 0.3431*** 0.3329*** 0.3434* 0.1768*** 0.0854***
(0.2402) (0.4223) (0.0821) (0.1009) (0.2145) (0.0191) (0.0094)
SMA short 0.9824*** 1.1583*** 0.3638*** 0.3449*** 0.4157** 0.1809*** 0.1050***
(0.2908) (0.4559) (0.0722) (0.0982) (0.2509) (0.0263) (0.0106)
Effective Spread
SMA long -0.0411 0.2919** 0.1646*** 0.1661*** 0.0795** 0.1143*** 0.0546***
(0.1744) (0.1765) (0.0399) (0.0475) (0.0365) (0.0161) (0.0076)
SMA short 0.0062 0.3480** 0.1527*** 0.1803*** 0.1177*** 0.0921*** 0.0732***
(0.2048) (0.1634) (0.0329) (0.0467) (0.0297) (0.0244) (0.0080)
Depth5 Ask
SMA long -44.9903** 3.0351 -7.1237 -14.6240** -15.2979*** -31.6890*** 4.4170***
(20.7447) (6.7904) (7.6407) (6.52) (5.0345) (9.3374) (0.5360)
SMA short -51.4653** -42.2893*** -44.0597*** -39.3492*** -41.9796*** -64.7970*** -7.8998***
(27.0127) (13.739) (8.1225) (9.177) (7.8715) (12.2583) (0.6817)
Depth5 Bid
SMA long -66.2827*** -34.9878*** -38.3106*** -31.9072*** -34.4710*** -54.9490*** -7.6556***
(26.0252) (11.0987) (7.3471) (7.8703) (6.6846) (10.4196) (0.6391)
SMA short -44.0957** 7.3535* -6.7537 -13.0962** -12.3747*** -31.9159*** 3.1128***
(23.2831) (4.984) (7.1382) (6.7383) (4.9091) (10.2555) (0.4914)
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Volatility of Transitory and Permanent Price Components
In Section 3.6.5, I use the SSM defined by equations (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) to
decompose minutely prices and relate the components to TA signals. Since the SSM
is applied to minutely midquote prices the decomposition refers to a single point of
time. This might not fully reveal effects from TA signals on prices, because trading on
TA signals probably appears not instantaneously but is distributed over some period of
time. Furthermore, the approach of analyzing the size of (for instance) pricing errors
means considering the mean effect on the price components instead of the effect on
their volatility.
To complement the above analysis, I repeat the state state procedure for midquote
data with a 1-second observation frequency. The SSM definition and estimation
approach remains the same. From the smoothed pricing error si,τ, where τ refers
to a 1-second observation, I calculate the transitory volatility
σs,i,t = σ(si,τ, ..., si,τ+59), (3.16)
where τ= 60t and t = 0, 1, ..., denotes 1-minute intervals. The permanent volatility
ση,i,t = σ(ηi,τ, ...,ηi,τ+59), (3.17)
is analogously defined. From the pooled stock-minute volatilities and volatility ratios
100∗σs,i,t/(σs,i,t+ση,i,t), I estimate regression models including SRL and SMA indicators,
respectively, and a second specification adding VDAX (market volatility) and market
capitalization. All models include stock-day fixed effects and double clustered standard
errors.
Table 3.15 reports the results for specifications including SRL indicator variables
(Panel A), and SMA long and short signals (Panel B), respectively. The increase in pricing
error volatility around SRL is not significant, however the ratio of transitory volatility
to total volatility shows a strong relative increase. The corresponding estimates imply a
6.11% (6.4%) increase at support (resistance) levels which appears to be substantial
compared to typical levels20. Obviously, this is caused by the reduction in permanent
volatility. For SMA signals the transitory and permanent volatility derived from the
20The mean volatility ratio equals 10.65%, standard deviation 23.45%
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SSM increases significantly. The effect is more dominant for permanent volatility as the
decreasing share (about 4%) of transitory volatility indicates.
Overall, the SSM applied to 1-second midquote data confirms the results presented
in Section 3.6.5. The volatility of the transitory component around SRL provides a new
perspective. It seems that the (absolute) higher pricing errors estimated on a 1-minute
frequency do not vary excessively when considered on a higher frequency. Since the
respective SRL indicator variable is determined with respect to a specific 1-minute
quote observation, the effect could be just a single jump which does not translate into
excessive further variation. Furthermore, the actual SRL level is probably not at the best
bid or ask during some 1-minute period over which the transitory volatility is calculated.
I also test an alternative range over which standard deviations σs,i,t and σw,i,t are
determined. In this case, the 1-minute intervals from which standard deviations of the
SSM components are calculated begin between two full minutes. The estimation results
are qualitatively equal, so I omit to report the tables.
3.6.7 Conclusion
I demonstrate that two popular Technical Analysis techniques are related to significant
variations in market quality measures. In 1-minute intervals with an active SRL limit
order supply increases significantly and quoted as well as effective spreads are higher. In
case of SMA signals, turnover and quoted spreads rise significantly. Although coefficient
estimates of effective spreads are not significantly higher, I find no evidence that trading
on TA signals leads to lower implicit trading costs due to potentially reduced adverse
selection risk for liquidity suppliers. The analysis of realized spreads suggests that
subsequent to TA signals prices tend to evolve unfavorably for Technical Analysis traders
implying that trading on TA signals is not beneficial from a short-run perspective. In
sum, the empirical evidence confirms part (i) and (ii) of Hypothesis 2a whereas part (iii)
is rejected. In this regard, the results for Xetra contradict findings from other studies.
The analysis of SSM price components shows that Technical Analysis trading signals
are related to differences in permanent and transitory price components (Hypothesis
2c). Pricing errors tend to be larger in the direction of an active support or resistance
level, i. e., pricing errors are significantly positive at resistance levels and negative at
139
Chapter 3 Technical Analysis
TABLE 3.20: Regression Model of SSM Price Component Volatility. This table presents
estimation results from regressing SSM price component volatilities on TA indicators.
The independent variables permanent and transitory volatility defined in (3.16) and
(3.17) denote the 1-minute standard deviation of the respective price components of
SSM (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) applied to 1-second midquote prices. Vola ratio is
defined as transitory volatility divided by the sum of permanent and transitory volatility.
Panel A and Panel B show results for SRL and MA indicators, respectively. Models
(i), (iii), and (v) contain TA indicator variables and stock-day fixed effects only, while
models (iv) and (vi) additionally control for market volatility (VDAX) and market
capitalization (calculated as average of the previous day). All models contain standard
errors double-clustered on stock and day. *, **, *** denote significance on a 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are reported in
parentheses.
Panel A: Transitory Vola Permanent Vola Vola Ratio
Support & Resistance (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
At Support 0.0090 0.0088 -0.0722*** -0.0753*** 6.1107*** 6.0993***
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0073) (0.0072) (1.3232) (1.3247)
At Resistance 0.0056 0.0057 -0.0868*** -0.0833*** 6.4049*** 6.3664***
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0084) (0.0082) (1.1967) (1.1978)
VDAX 0.0020*** 0.0524 -0.3086***
(0.0005) (0.0031 (0.0343
Market cap 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0147*
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0075)
Panel B: Moving Averages
SMA long 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 0.2627*** 0.2630*** -3.8650*** -3.8692***
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.4299) (0.4303)
SMA short 0.0168*** 0.0167*** 0.2939*** 0.2926*** -3.9555*** -3.9490***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.4377) (0.4373)
VDAX 0.0020*** 0.0525*** -0.3178***
(0.0005) (0.0031 (0.0356
Market cap 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0151*
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0076)
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support levels. For SMA signals I find overpricing after a long signal and underpricing
at short signals, i. e., pricing errors are in line with the recommended trade direction.
However, permanent price changes rise disproportionately compared to pricing errors
implying that price moves are relatively persistent after SMA signals. The latter is an
indication for persistent liquidity demand in direction of the signal which might be
an explanation for rising or unchanged spreads around signals. Despite the higher
probability to trade against uninformed Technical Analysis traders, liquidity suppliers
would be faced with noise traders herding on one side of the market, making liquidity
provision or arbitrage trading less attractive.
Assuming that the TA signals contain no fundamental information about some stock
and are not systemically related to external idiosyncratic information events, my results
show that price discovery is influenced by TA signals. Thus, investment heuristics as a
form of behaviorally motivated trading seem to be able to influence the microstructure
of stock trading in the short run. Naturally, the shown effects only explain a small
portion of variation in the analyzed variables. First, signals do appear quite rarely
and might be perceived differently by different traders. Second, only some fraction of
market participants actually use such strategies. Yet the impact of TA signals can be
observed which highlights the relevance of such believes for stock markets.
Since I have no information on the identities or even the intentions behind each
trade, the study is limited by the assumption that the considered TA signals are actually
traded by a relevant number of market participants who thereby cause the shown effects.
If this assumption does not hold, TA signals are nevertheless able to detect variations in
liquidity and price discovery. On the other hand, the analysis of fully transparent order
flows from traders using Technical Analysis or other trading heuristics could reveal
further insights on the impact of trading heuristics in financial markets. In particular, a
specific analysis of the question of how long-lasting price deviations of such order flows
are and how they reverse, if at all. In this regard, the presented empirical evidence
provides an indication of the ongoing competition between Technical Analysis noise
traders and other market participants.
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3.7 Summary
Technical Analysis (still) is a relevant factor for securities trading. In this chapter, I
empirically show that signals from popular Technical Analysis trading strategies are
related to both retail investor trading in speculative structured products as well as stock
trading on Xetra.
In the case of speculative structured products traded at Stuttgart Stock Exchange, I
find a 35% increase in trading activity on days of chart pattern trading signals and an
11% increase for moving average signals. Furthermore, I identify trading characteristics
of round-trip trades. First, raw returns of TA-related trades are significantly higher
while leverage levels at purchase are lower and the holding duration tends to be shorter.
Second, the shape of the realized return distribution is significantly less left-skewed
(more right-skewed). In this regard, retail investors using Technical Analysis methods
might be less prone to the disposition effect due to the system-based trading approach.
If we assume that a fundamental motivation of retail investors who trade speculative
products is gambling and entertainment as existing literature suggests, then TA-related
trades tend to reach this goal more effectively.
To analyze the immediate impact of Technical Analysis trading signals on the German
stock market, I extend existing methodologies in order to account for characteristics of
intraday price observations. Analyzing a 6-year sample of DAX30 stocks traded on Xetra,
I find excess liquidity demand around moving average signals and high limit order supply
on support and resistance levels. Depending on the type of signal, spreads increase
or remain unaffected which contradicts the mitigating effect of uninformed TA-based
trading on adverse selection risks. While global measures of price efficiency change little
on signal days, the analysis of transitory and permanent price components demonstrates
increasing pricing errors (noise) around signals. However, around moving average
signals permanent price changes tend to increase of a larger magnitude. This suggests
that liquidity demand in direction of the signal leads to relatively long-lasting price
deviations which might be an explanation for the shown surge in spread measures.
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4.1 Introduction
In an idealized market the fair value of an asset at a fixed point in time is a unique
and precise number. In this idealized scenario, we would expect this value to assume
any number. However, this number – and thus the value of the asset – depends on
the market design and trading mechanism in several ways. In stock markets, and in
other markets alike, the value depends on the supply and the demand in the traded
asset. Limit order book markets bring together the supply and demand side. Market
participants place limit orders to make an offer to trade a quantity up to a designated
limit price. If the order cannot be matched with existing orders in the orderbook, the
trader is considered as a liquidity supplier who offers other market participants an
opportunity to trade. Liquidity demander may accept the offer by submitting a market
(marketable) order. This mechanism reveals the current price of the traded asset. As a
result, asset prices are affected by human perception of the prices offered by liquidity
suppliers and by the usage of numbers when offering liquidity, i. e., when the investors
specifies the the limit price of the limit order she wants to submit.
In practice, aspects of market design influence the possible numbers values can
assume. Exchange operators of limit order book markets specify a set of permitted price
values which is typically defined by the minimum price increment, that is, the so-called
tick-size. Furthermore, the stock company itself influences the typical price range of
their stock by specifying the number of shares into which the equity of the company is
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divided. Stock splits (and reverse splits) are often used to have a share price in some
convenient price (number) range, e. g., between EUR 10 and EUR 100.
While the price that is realized as a result of the price determination function of
financial markets could basically be any number, the human perception and usage of
numbers is biased in various ways. Rosch (1975) finds that experiment participants
use multiples of ten as cognitive reference points. The frequently occurring pricing of
consumer goods exactly below integers has been studied extensively in the marketing
literature, see Thomas and Morwitz (2005) and citations therein. Brenner and Brenner
(1982) put forward that humans give greater significance on the first digits of a number
which is commonly exploited by vendors. clustering, buy-sell imbalances, or other
number effects.
In the context of financial markets, Harris (1991) points out the need of traders to
simplify their negotiations and, thus, they concentrate on a smaller set of prices. Mitchell
(2001) states that using round numbers is more convenient and simplifies calculations
and memory. I refer to the latter paper for a detailed discussion of psychological effects
regarding number preferences and the human usage of numbers.
A typical characteristic of limit order markets is clustering of limit orders and
transaction prices around certain price levels. Price clustering in financial markets
has been studied over many decades. For instance, Osborne (1962) and Niederhoffer
(1965) obverse that trade prices are more often round numbers than one would expect.
Other empirical studies have investigated the occurrence of price clustering in different
markets, assets, and countries. In general, there are several forms of biases and
anomalies related to numbers, e. g., price clustering, buy-sell imbalances, and threshold
effects. Throughout the text, I use the term round number effects denote any form of
market or price anomaly related to numbers.
Hasbrouck (1999) introduces a structural model of bid and ask dynamics. The
model accounts for price discreteness and clustering by adding a rounding mechanism
which rounds to the minimum tick size or to multiples of five. However the model
does not allow for buy-sell probabilities that depend on the roundness of bid and
ask prices. Bhattacharya, Holden, and Jacobsen (2012) – henceforth referred to as
BHJ – extend the analysis of all transaction prices by differentiating between buy and
sell orders of liquidity demanders which allows to calculate buy-sell imbalances with
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respect to transaction prices. BHJ study buy-sell imbalances in 100 stocks traded on
the NYSE during the time period from 2001 to 2006. They find that investors have a
preferred hierarchy of roundness which is whole dollars, half-dollars, quarter, dimes,
and nickels which is inferred from the increased number of buys (sells) below (above)
these thresholds. Further, they test three different explanations for the occurrence
of buy-sell imbalances, namely undercutting, left-digit effects, and threshold trigger
effects. They find evidence for all three effects, but undercutting appears to be the
most dominant while the others are relatively weak. In their conclusion, BHJ highlight
the question whether round number effects can be found in other markets and other
countries.
On the other hand, the electronic evolution of financial market and the huge success
of trading algorithms could challenge whether the scenario by BHJ, i. e., value traders,
who are influenced by their perception of round numbers and, thus, alter their buying
and selling behavior, still holds. This motivates the main research question for this
chapter.
Research Question 3. How do round number effects influence trading on the
German stock market?
To answer this question, I consider five years of high-frequency data from Xetra
and find strong evidence that round number effects are also present in Germany. My
overall results for DAX30 stocks traded on Xetra show about 21% more buys below an
integer price level and 17% more sells above an integer price level, for example. This
holds true for other round number thresholds like 50, 20, and 10 cent with decreasing
imbalance values. However, investors in German markets have different cognitive
reference points than Americans, which seems to be related to characteristics of the
local currency. German investors do not focus on prices which are uneven multiples of
a quarter. Instead multiples of 20 seem to be (more) preferred. Overall, the order of
preference fits with the available Euro coins in an analogues manner to the NYSE and
the US Dollar coins.
Furthermore, trends and determinants of round number effects are identified such
as a decreasing effect strength over time, a positive relation to market capitalization,
and the role of tick size rules. The analysis of retail investor trading at Stuttgart
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Stock Exchange reveals that the magnitude of human round number biases is larger
and remains stable over time. The main reason for number biases in trades of retail
investors seems to be the usage limit order prices.
The research presented in this chapter provides empirical evidence on the existence
and the characteristics of round number effects in the German stock market and thereby
complements existing literature on round number effects in financial markets. By
identifying trends and determinants of round number effects, I contribute to the deeper
understanding of this anomaly. Furthermore, the analysis of retail investor trading data
allows for new insights regarding the mechanism in which (human) number biases
convey to trading and asset prices.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The following section outlines
the research approach and discusses related literature. The sample selection used to
conduct the empirical analyses is described in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 analyzes buy-sell
imbalances on Xetra using two methodologies. Section 4.5 assesses potential determi-
nants of round number effects. A specific study of retail investor trades at Stuttgart
Stock Exchange is performed in Section 4.6. Eventually, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Research Questions
Limit order clustering has been studied in many studies over several decades and is
considered as a basic characteristic of limit order book markets. I refer to the literature
overviews by Aitken et al. (1996), p.299-303, and Bhattacharya et al. (2012), p.415-416,
for an extensive discussion of existing empirical literature. BHJ consider the relation of
round number effects to the buying and selling propensity. They classify three round
number effects. First, the left-digit effect, which states that a change of the left-most
digit is perceived as a larger or more important price change than a price change of
the same size but without a change in the left-most digit. Second, the threshold trigger
effect accounts for the preference of investors to act when round numbers occur, for
example placing a market order or using stop-loss orders with a round stop-price. Third,
the so-called (cluster) undercutting effect denotes the behavior of market participants
to increase the execution probability of their limit order by entering a limit price which
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is one tick better than the current best bid or ask. If limit orders are clustered at some
level of the orderbook, then undercutting these clusters would be even more attractive
to increase the execution probability. Logically, cluster undercutting should occur more
often when there is more orderbook depth which reduces the chance that a quoted
price level gets breached.
To structure the research agenda within this chapter, the overarching Research
Question 3 is divided into three parts. The first part assesses whether the results of
BHJ apply to the German market and which of the three above mentioned effects drive
buy-sell imbalances around round numbers.
Research Question 3a. How is the propensity of buying and selling related to the
roundness of trade prices?
Besides the general existence of buy-sell imbalances, the question arises how the
effects are related to other factors such as tick size and market capitalization.
Research Question 3b. What are the determinants of round number effects?
In the course of this question, I also consider potential time trends of this anomaly.
Given the different time periods analyzed in the paper of BHJ and this thesis, potential
changes in the general market environment must be considered. First of all, the
technological enhancements of the market infrastructure as well as of information
processing system have led to an increase in speed and liquidity in all major markets e. g.,
(e. g., Hendershott and Riordan, 2013; Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2012). Algorithmic
trading is responsible for a great share of the overall turnover on Xetra. Since round
number effects like price clustering and buy-sell imbalances are anomalies resulting
from cognitive biases of humans, an alteration in these effects seems probable within a
market environment that is becoming more computer-driven.
Currently, in many important stock markets algorithmic traders account for the
majority of turnover in blue chip stocks. For trading in DAX30 stocks on Xetra during
January 2008, the shares of algorithmic traders in marketable and non-marketable
transaction volume are 52% and 50%, respectively, as reported by Hendershott and
Riordan (2013). Given the assumption that algorithms are not biased by certain
numbers, round number effects should decrease when there is more algorithmic trading.
Second, the argument by Harris (1991) of simplified negotiation and easier calculation
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of round numbers should weaken in a fully electronic market. Thus, I hypothesize
that round number effects on Xetra decrease over the observation period. At the same
time I do not expect human (retail) investors to get rid of their number biases since
psychological shortcomings, as those reported by Rosch (1975) for example, usually
are not just recognized and simply diminish afterwards.
To study round number biases of human investors, data from Stuttgart Stock Ex-
change where algorithmic trading is not permitted provides a promising basis. The
analysis of retail investor orders and trades could allow to infer insights regarding the
origin of round number effects in limit order book markets which is addressed by the
following research question.
Research Question 3c. How are round number effects related to stock trading of
retail investors at Stuttgart Stock Exchange and are there differences compared to
Xetra?
In relation to this question, Kuo et al. (2015) finds that retail (individual) investors
submit limit orders with round limit prices more often than institutional investors. As a
consequence, I hypothesize that buy-sell imbalances should be larger at Stuttgart Stock
Exchange. Due to the market structure of stock trading at Stuttgart Stock Exchange,
which basically detaches market and limit orders by employing market makers, it is
possible to analyze both order types independently. In particular, the undercutting
should play no role for market orders while left-digit and threshold trigger effect could
be more important in this case. On the other hand, the specification of the limit order
price constitutes a direct interaction with the market involving the usage of numbers.
4.3 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
For the empirical analyses three samples of the data sets introduced in Section 2.2 are
used. To clarify the presence of round number effects in the German stock market, the
30 DAX and 50 MDAX constituents based on the index compositions on December 31,
2012 are considered. At the beginning of 2010, Deutsche Börse introduced a new tick
size rule on Xetra, which is valid for the remaining observation period. Before 2010 the
tick size was EUR 0.01 for all stocks. Afterwards, tick size steps have been EUR 0.001
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for stocks traded below EUR 10, EUR 0.005 for stock prices between EUR 10 and EUR
50, EUR 0.01 for stock prices EUR 50 and EUR 100, and EUR 0.05 for stock prices above
EUR 100. Therefore, trades above EUR 100 are disregarded. Possible implications of
different tick sizes are discussed within Section 4.5. Trades below EUR 2 are dismissed
because the realized price range during a year is too narrow to deduce implications
regarding the cent amount of trade prices. In other words, for stocks having low prices,
it is not adequate to assume equally distributed cent amounts of trade prices during a
period of one year. A minimum price of EUR 5 is also tested, which does not affect the
results in any form. The final data sets contain 146,856,827 trades in DAX30 stocks
and 51,252,513 trades in MDAX50 stocks.
All buys and sells are classified by the cent amount of the trade price. Due to the new
tick size rule introduced by the Deutsche Börse, which allows a minimum price change
of EUR 0.001 for stocks traded below EUR 10, there are 1000 possible cent amounts. To
maintain comparability with BHJ and to have enough observations in each group, I use
100 groups, i. e., zero to 99, and classify the non-integer trade prices as follows. Groups
which are multiples of five, i. e., N = {0,5,10, ..., 95}, only contain trades having the
exact cent amounts since these ’round’ trade prices are of main interest. N + 1 (N − 1)
contains all cent amounts up to one cent larger (smaller) than N . Note that one cent
smaller than 0 cent means 99 cent and vice versa. The groups N + 2 and N + 3 include
all cent amounts in the intervals (N + 1, N + 2.5] and (N + 2.5, N + 4), respectively.
This classifications avoids asymmetric biases in groups below and above round numbers
compared to simple rounding to the next integer.
To analyze round number effects for transactions in which retail investors are
involved, I use the orderflow data from the Stuttgart Stock Exchange. The data ranges
from 04/01/2009 to 12/31/2013 and contains order submissions and executions in
DAX stocks. To study round number effects, I apply the same methodology as introduced
above to the data from Stuttgart Stock Exchange.
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for each data set and each year of the sample
period. The increasing average trade price in DAX and MDAX stocks might have an
impact on the results since round number effects are expected to be larger when prices
are high. Section 4.5 discusses possible implications in detail. The overall turnover and
the number of transactions are much smaller at Stuttgart Stock Exchange which is a
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TABLE 4.1: Descriptive Statistics. This table describes the data samples used within the
chapter. Panel A and B show Times & Sales data of DAX30 and MDAX50 stocks traded on
Xetra range from 2009/01/01 to 2013/12/31. Panel C describes trade data for DAX30
stocks traded on Stuttgart Stock Exchange ranging from 2009/04/01 to 2013/12/31. All
spread measures are trade-based averages and reported as equal-weighted half-spreads.
Units are given in brackets.
Panel A: DAX30 on Xetra Overall 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of Trades [mio] 175.22 32.75 34.85 44.95 34.31 28.36
Total turnover [bnEUR] 3,635.70 705.50 808.96 857.25 667.16 596.83
Average Trade Price [EUR] 43.72 37.51 43.73 43.96 46.17 47.50
Average Trade Size [EUR] 20,749 21,543 23,212 19,070 19,447 21,041
Average eff. Spread [bps] 27.41 35.48 26.03 30.23 22.28 21.53
Average spread costs per trade [EUR] 12.31 16.85 13.28 11.14 9.96 10.58
Panel B: MDAX50 on Xetra
Number of Trades [mio] 63.61 9.53 11.03 16.37 14.32 12.36
Total turnover [bnEUR] 510.55 90.02 108.50 126.79 95.41 89.84
Average Trade Price [EUR] 36.53 30.98 37.03 37.09 36.51 39.62
Average Trade Size [EUR] 8,026 9,443 9,841 7,744 6,661 7,267
Average eff. Spread [bps] 58.66 81.17 56.02 64.48 49.03 47.08
Average spread costs per trade [EUR] 6.55 9.86 7.41 6.22 4.78 5.74
Panel C: DAX30 on Stuttgart Stock Exchange
Number of Trades [mio] 1.62 0.2581 0.2834 0.4090 0.3204 0.3491
Total turnover [bn EUR] 21.31 3.1341 3.4966 4.9618 4.3518 5.3655
Average Trade Price [EUR] 42.51 32.33 40.60 41.94 42.68 52.08
Average Trade Size [EUR] 13,155 12,143 12,339 12,133 13,585 15,368
limitation of the data set. Average trade size of retail investors is typically smaller, but
the average share price is very close to Xetra.
4.4 Buy-Sell Imbalances of Liquidity Demanders
To study the general presence of round number effects in the German market, I use the
approaches applied by BHJ for the NYSE. First, the ’unconditional analysis’ considers
buy-sell imbalances on a firm-year basis grouped by the cent amount of trade prices.
Then the ’conditional analysis’ examines all trades conditioned on the past development
of quotes and transaction prices to explain the origin of buy-sell imbalances around
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round numbers.
4.4.1 Unconditional Buy-Sell Imbalances
For each firm contained in the DAX and MDAX, respectively, and each year, I calculate
three imbalance measures from a liquidity demander perspective. The measures are
based on the number of orders, the number of traded shares, and trade turnover, i. e.,
OrderImba(c) = log

#buys(c)
#sells(c)

, (4.1)
ShareImba(c) = log

#shares bought(c)
#shares sold(c)

, (4.2)
TurnoverImba(c) = log

turnover buys(c)
turnover sells(c)

, (4.3)
where c ∈ {0, 1, ...99} denotes the cent classification groups defined in Section 4.3. This
results in 100 imbalances for each stock and year. If a stock has less than 52 (liquidity
demanding) buys or sells in the above defined price range during a year, the particular
observation is dropped out. Thereby large imbalances due to only few observed trades
in a particular group are avoided. This might occur when stocks were only traded for a
short period within the specified price range during a year. Taking logarithms of the
buy-sell imbalance ratios ensures a symmetric relation of buys to sells around zero.
Each measure controls for different aspects that could affect the validity of results
drawn from a single measure. More precisely, the imbalance based on the number of
orders might be affected by traders splitting large orders into smaller pieces, which is
not the case for volume and turnover imbalances. On the other hand, volume could be
influenced by the price level of a stock, which plays no role for turnover imbalances.
The latter however could put too much weight on large trades and therefore does not
represent the majority of market participants.
Figure 4.1 shows the mean of buy-sell order imbalances based on all DAX firms and
years for each cent amount group. If there is no preference on specific price points
such as integer prices, one would expect more or less the same ratio for all cent values.
Obviously Figure 4.1 shows a clear pattern which is confirmed by both other measures
depicted in Figure 4.2. Turnover imbalance and shares traded imbalance tend to be
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FIGURE 4.1: DAX30 Buy-sell Order-Imbalance of Liquidity Demanding Orders on
Xetra. Average buy-sell order imbalance of DAX30 stocks from 2009 to 2013. The
dashed line represents the overall buy-sell imbalance of 0.0153.
noisier since these ratios inherit much larger variance than the trade direction indicators
which can only take the values 1 or -1. All imbalances show that buys greatly outnumber
sells below round numbers whereas sells outnumber buys above round numbers. The
differences in imbalances are of (economically) significant size. For example, if we
compare the order imbalances around integers, there are about 21.41 percent more
buys than sells for prices within the 99 cent group and 16.75 percent more sells than
buys for 1 cent prices. Note that the imbalances do not state how many trades occur for
a given cent amount. Actually there are much more trades exactly on round numbers
than above or below, but in this case buys and sells are equally balanced and imbalances
are near zero.
Considering Figures 4.1 & 4.2, the preferred order of roundness is integers, half-euros,
ten-cent, and five-cent, which is deduced from the deviation from the particular mean.
This is different to the NYSE results of BHJ where the order of roundness is found to
be integers, half-dollars, quarters, dimes, and nickels. To manifest this difference in a
statistical model, I run three regression models following BHJ’s Table 1 who use the
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FIGURE 4.2: DAX30 Imbalance Measures of Liquidity Demanding Orders on Xetra.
Average buy-sell imbalance measures of liquidity demanders of DAX30 stocks from
2009 to 2013. The shown measures are based on trade direction, turnover, and traded
shares (from top to bottom).
regression equation
Imbalance = α+
10∑
i=1
βi ∗ centdummy i . (4.4)
where the ten dummy variables centdummyi indicate cent amounts above and below
round numbers, e. g., the below 20 cent dummy variable represents the 19, 39, 59, and
79 cent groups, and so on. Table 4.2 shows the results of regressions having dummies
for below and above integers, half-Euro, ’quarter’, 10 cent, and 5 cent, analogously
to BHJ. For NYSE stocks they find that the absolute coefficients of these dummies are
monotonically decreasing and thereby determine the order of roundness. Obviously, the
order is not correct for the German market. The coefficient estimate of above (below)
quarters in Table 4.2 is of the same size as the above (below) 5-cent estimate and
significantly smaller (larger) than the 10-cent estimate. Wald tests and Likelihood-ratio
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tests are used to determine the statistical significance of the difference between two
regression parameters.
The missing quarter effect in the German market could be a consequence of the fact
that no 25 cent Euro coin exists, which causes German market participants to focus less
on this reference point than Americans do. Additionally, the prior currency Deutsche
Mark1 did not contain quarters. German exchanges historically never relied on eight or
sixteenth tick size regimes with quarters as even multiples of the minimum tick.
TABLE 4.2: Buy-sell Ratios Regressed on Cent Dummies. The buy-sell imbalances of
liquidity demanders stock are regressed on dummies for cent amount groups (see column
1). The general regression equation is Imba = α+
∑
βi ∗ centdummyi, i = 1,2, ..., 10.
Estimated coefficient standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *,**, and ***
denote significance on the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level. The sample contains DAX30 stocks
traded on Xetra from January 2009 to December 2013.
Imbalance
Buy/Sell Buy/Sell Shares
Orders Turnover Bought/Sold
Intercept 0.0115*** 0.0344*** 0.0332***
(0.0010) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Below Integers (.99) 0.2003*** 0.2868*** 0.2846***
(0.0150) (0.0274) (0.0272)
Above Integers (.01) -0.2059*** -0.2747*** -0.2745***
(0.0150) (0.0279) (0.0278)
Below Half-Euro (.49) 0.1559*** 0.2011*** 0.2031***
(0.0125) (0.0244) (0.0241)
Above Half-Euro (.51) -0.1667*** -0.1674*** -0.1612***
(0.0128) (0.0273) (0.0277)
Below Quarters (.24, .74) 0.0627*** 0.0508** 0.0501**
(0.0059) (0.0175) (0.0176)
Above Quarters (.26, .76) -0.0649*** -0.0720*** -0.0733***
(0.0057) (0.0163) (0.0162)
Below 10-Cents 0.1192*** 0.1301*** 0.1307***
(.09,.19,.29,.39,.59,.69,.79,.89) (0.0031) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Above 10-Cents -0.1127*** -0.1408*** -0.1402***
(.11,.21,.31,.41,.61,.71,.81,.91) (0.0031) (0.01) (0.0099)
Below 5-Cents 0.0606*** 0.0584*** 0.0592***
(.04,.14,.34,.44,.54,.64,.85,.94) (0.0026) (0.009) (0.0089)
Above 5-Cents -0.0580*** -0.0806*** -0.0788***
(.06,.16,.36,.46,.56,.66,.86,.96) (0.0025) (0.0093) (0.0092)
1Deutsche Mark was replaced by the Euro in 2002. Pfennig denoted the cent coins of Deutsche Mark.
There were one, five, ten, and fifty Pfennig coins.
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Rearranging the dummy variables to represent the existing Euro cent coins, i. e.,
dummies for above and below integer, half-euros, 20 cent, 10 cent, and 5 cent, shows that
the order of roundness is indeed in accordance with the Euro cent coins. Consistently,
the absolute value of the regression coefficients shown in Table 4.3 are monotonically
decreasing. The difference between 10-cent and 20-cent coefficients is of the correct
sign, although it is not statistically significant. A possible explanation might be the
general importance of multiples of ten in the perception and use of numbers (cf. Rosch,
1975).
TABLE 4.3: Buy-sell Ratios Regressed on Alternative Cent Dummies. The buy-sell
imbalances of liquidity demanders stock are regressed on dummies for cent amount
groups (see column 1) which are defined according to the available Euro coins. The
general regression equation is Imba = α+
∑
βi ∗ centdummyi, i = 1, 2, ..., 10. Standard
errors of the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote
significance on the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level. The sample contains DAX30 stocks traded
on Xetra from January 2009 to December 2013.
Imbalance
Buy/Sell Buy/Sell Shares
Orders Turnover Bought/Sold
Intercept 0.01148*** 0.03442*** 0.03324***
(0.001) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Below Integers (.99) 0.20027*** 0.28677*** 0.28462***
(0.015) (0.0274) (0.0272)
Above Integers (.01) -0.20593*** -0.27467*** -0.27454***
(0.015) (0.0279) (0.0278)
Below Half-Euro (.49) 0.15587*** 0.20113*** 0.20306***
(0.0125) (0.0244) (0.0241)
Above Half-Euro (.51) -0.16668*** -0.16738*** -0.16116***
(0.0128) (0.0273) (0.0277)
Below 20-cents (.19, .39, .59, .79) 0.12343*** 0.13541*** 0.13684***
(0.0045) (0.0129) (0.013)
Above 20-cents (.21, .41, .61, .81) -0.11553*** -0.14453*** -0.14426***
(0.0044) (0.0142) (0.0141)
Below 10-cents (.09, .29, .69, .89) 0.11494*** 0.12471*** 0.12447***
(0.0039) (0.0121) (0.012)
Above 10-cents (.11, .31, .71, .91) -0.10992*** -0.13707*** -0.13617***
(0.0043) (0.0134) (0.0133)
Below 5-cents(.04, .14, .24, .34, .44, 0.06101*** 0.05685*** 0.05741***
.54, .64, .74, .85, .94) (0.0024) (0.0082) (0.0081)
Above 5-cents(.06, .16, .26, .36, .46, -0.05934*** -0.07889*** -0.07769***
.56, .66, .76, .86, .96) (0.0024) (0.0083) (0.0082)
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Extending the BHJ specification, I estimate models with both sets of cent dummies
and further control variables (e. g., average spread measures) as well as stock and
day fixed effects. The cent dummy coefficient estimates and standard deviations are
virtually unchanged. Thus, the corresponding tables are omitted.
Summarizing on Research Question 3a, the relation between cent endings of trade
prices and buying and selling intensity of liquidity demanders exists in the German
market but has different characteristics. In both the U.S. and the German stock market
the order of magnitude of buy-sell imbalances is in accordance to the coins of the local
currency, which means that round number effects are influenced by local characteristics
of market participants. The fact that market participants are familiar with their currency
seems to have a direct impact on their trading behavior, i. e., they use these often
perceived values as cognitive reference points.
4.4.2 Conditional Buy-Sell Imbalances
In order to determine whether unconditional round number effects are due to cluster
undercutting, left-digit, or threshold trigger effects, the analysis of trade price clustering
is performed conditional on the price path of bid and ask quotes. Therefore, I apply the
methodology of BHJ to trades in DAX30 stocks.
All trades in the sample are classified into the following groups. ’Ask falls below
integer’ denotes all trades after the ask price drops from [.0, .10] to below the integer
until the ask leaves [.90, .99]. The corresponding benchmark group ’ask falls below
5-cent’ contains all trades after the ask falls from [N , N + .10] below N until it leaves
[N − .10, N], where N ∈ {.15, .25, .35, .45, .55, .65, .75, .85}. Omitting .05 and .95
ensures that the groups remain disjoint. Both threshold trigger and left-digit effect
predict excess buying for the ’ask falls below integer’ group.
’Ask falls to integer’ corresponds to all trades after the ask falls from [.01, .10] exactly
to the integer, i. e., [.00], until the ask leaves the integer price and equivalently ’ask falls
to 5-cent’. Here, only the threshold trigger effect causes positive buy-sell imbalances
since the left-digit of the ask price does not change. ’Ask rises while staying below integer’
means all trades after the ask rises from [.80, .89] to [.90, .99] until the ask leaves the
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latter interval. The corresponding 5-cent group ’ask rises while staying below 5-cent’
aggregates all trades after the ask soars from [M − .20, M − .11] to [M − .10, M − .01],
where M ∈ {.25, .35, .45, .55, .65, .75}, until the ask leaves [M − .10, M − .01]. Again,
the thresholds for M are chosen to ensure disjoint integer and 5-cent groups.
BHJ use the latter groups as a way to control for the meaningfulness of the other
two groups. Moreover, this group could represent the situation when traders start
to sell below resistance levels, i. e., price barriers which they believe will not be
penetrated. Note that this kind of situation does not fit within BHJ’s framework of
value investors using market orders according to their valuation of a stock which only
predicts positive (negative) imbalances when prices fall (rise). I avoid this scenario
since value traders who submit market orders seem to be neither the only nor the
main cause for the observed phenomenon. BHJ as well as this study conclude that
round number effects are primarily driven by traders submitting limit orders and maybe
other traders reacting to the fact that existing orders in the limit order book are not
’equally distributed’ on all price points. Thus, assuming this scenario ex ante seems
undesirable for the interpretation of the results. Consequently, I do not assume any
strategic order submission behavior but emphasize that the behavioral biases causing
order submissions to depend on the number preferences are not an attribute of a specific
investment (trading) style.
The bid groups ’bid rises to integer (5 cent)’, ’bid rises above integer (5 cent)’, and
’bid falls while staying above integer (5 cent)’ are constructed in the same manner. Note
that within the overall classification not every trade must belong to one group.
After trades have been flagged by the introduced classification, regression models
employing different dependent variables are estimated to test the difference between
integer and 5 cent groups. Trade direction coded as 1 for a buy and 0 for a sell is used
in a logistic regression. Signed turnover (negative for sell turnover) and signed number
of shares traded are applied in two multivariate regressions which are estimated by
maximum-likelihood. In all three cases the general regression equation is defined as
DepVar = α+
6∑
i=1
 
βi ∗ int i + γi ∗ f iveCi

+
∑
cont rols, (4.5)
where int i and f iveCi denote the six integer groups and the six five cent groups,
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respectively. The regression includes control variables for price level, trade size, stock,
year, and penny-endings. Controls for penny-endings, i. e., whether a trade price ends
on 1,2,...,9, are used to rule out the effect that in case of ’ask falls’ groups, for instance,
9 cent endings are generally more preferred than 4 cent endings and therefore would
dilute implications regarding the three types of groups (’falls to’, ’falls below’, ’rises
while staying below’).
Additionally to BHJ’s regression, I use controls for the direction of the previous three
trades. These control variables are used to extract the auto-correlation in orderflows,
and particularly in the trade direction, which is usually observed in empirical studies (cf.
Hasbrouck, 1988; Chung et al., 2005, among others). Assuming there is an independent
order flow of, say, human investors who tend to have round number biases, then
differences should become larger because of other traders relying on information about
the orderflow or because of traders who split large orders. Auto-correlated orderflow
of marketable orders basically increases absolute values of imbalances given that the
available order book depth is large enough and of similar size on the bid and ask side.
Controlling for previous trades does not alter the significance of any difference and
therefore does not change the conclusion from the regression results.
Table 4.4 shows the difference of the regression estimates between the integer and 5
cent groups, whereby the significance is verified through Wald tests. The results are in
line with the NYSE results of BHJ. Large differences in buy-sell imbalance measures
mainly occur for the ’ask falls to integer’ and ’bid rises to integer’ groups. The other ask
(bid) groups also predict excess buying (selling), but are only a fraction of the size of
the ’falls (rises) to integer’ group. So more buys (sells) are triggered after the ask (bid)
falls (rises) to an integer. These trades must not necessarily take place on the exact
round number. For example if the ’ask falls to integer’ trigger is activated and the size of
the next marketable buy order exceeds the quoted size, a buy below the round number
takes place. Because the threshold trigger effect would additionally require large
differences in the ’ask falls below’ and ’bid rises above’ groups, it can be concluded that
unconditional buy-sell imbalances are mainly driven by cluster undercutting behavior.
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TABLE 4.4: Regression Models with Quote Path Indicators. This tables shows results from regression models of trade
direction, signed turnover, and shares traded. Quote path indicators are defined by the preceded quote development
of trades on integer and 5 cent price levels. The regression equation is DepVar = α+
∑6
i=1
 
βi ∗ int i + γi ∗ f iveCi

+∑
cont rols. The first column shows a logistic regression using a buy-sell indicator (1 for buy and 0 for a sell) as dependent
variable. The second and third column report the results from (signed) turnover, and (signed) shares, respectively, as
dependent variables. Controls include fixed effects for stock and year as well as dummies for penny-endings (0 to 9) and
the trade direction of the previous trade. The model of trade direction applies turnover and shares traded as additional
control variables. All regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood techniques. The table reports differences in
coefficients between the integer and 5-cent groups for each dependent variable. P-values for coefficient differences are
obtained from Wald tests. The sample contains trades on Xetra in DAX30 stocks from January 2009 to December 2013.
Trade Direction Signed Turnover Shares traded (signed)
Estimate diff. p-value Estimate diff. p-value Estimate diff. p-value
Ask falls below integer-
0.0279 <0.0001 597.03 0.0070 14.5414 0.0796
Ask falls below nickel
Ask rises while staying below integer-
0.0389 <0.0001 581.55 <0.0001 21.8824 0.0007
Ask rises while staying below nickel
Ask falls to integer-
0.2326 <0.0001 4366.15 <0.0001 124.0131 0.0033
Ask falls to nickel
Bid rises to integer- −0.2316 <0.0001 −2214.47 <0.0001 −11.5586 0.0146
Bid rises to nickel
Bid rises above integer- −0.0199 <0.0001 −1030.00 0.0020 −30.0041 0.0090
Bid rises above nickel
Bid falls while staying above integer- −0.0390 <0.0001 −1144.58 <0.0001 −23.1492 0.0072
Bid falls while staying above nickel
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4.5 Determinants of Round Number Effects
The last section has shown that buy-sell imbalances around round numbers are present
in the German market as well, but exhibit different local characteristics in comparison
to the U.S. This section assesses Research Question 3b. Therefore, I extend the analyses
and the methodology of BHJ to give a more precise understanding of the observed
effects.
4.5.1 Price Level and Tick Size
For the main analysis in the previous section, trades within a price range from EUR 2 to
EUR 100 are used and as such the results represent an average of round number effects
within this range. Since cluster undercutting is the main driver of buy-sell imbalances
around round numbers, the size of clusters (i. e., the relative available depth) should
be directly related to the (absolute) size of the buy-sell imbalances.
Harris (1991) argues that price clustering is induced by relatively smaller negotiation
costs and finds that clustering increases with price level. The relative error of the
potentially imprecise estimation of prices becomes smaller for higher prices given the
minimum price change (tick size) remains the same. Ohta (2006) and Chiao and Wang
(2009) confirm this relation for other markets and time periods.
An application of the methodology of the previous section to a subsample including
trades between EUR 50 and EUR 100 confirms the assumption of larger buy-sell
imbalances for higher stock prices. The regression is similar to (4.4), but includes
dummies for year and stock. The regression equation becomes
Imbalance =
10∑
i=1
βi ∗ centdummy i +
∑
cont rols, (4.6)
where the ten cent dummy groups are according to the German order of preference
(compare Table 4.3). The inclusion of stock-year dummies allows the means of buy-sell
imbalances to vary among stocks and years, which addresses the fact that stocks can
have varying money in- and outflows from a liquidity demander perspective. In this
sense, the model is more meaningful as it does not produce significant coefficients due
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to imbalances of stocks which deviate strongly from the market imbalance in some
cent group, i. e., the unweighted average of buy-sell imbalance of all stock, but do not
significantly deviate from their own average. Using these controls in the regressions
of Section 4.4.1 does not change the drawn conclusions and for this reason additional
tables are omitted.
TABLE 4.5: Buy-sell Ratios Regressed on Alternative Cent Dummies. The buy-sell
imbalances of liquidity demanders stock are regressed on dummies for cent amount
groups (see column 1) which are defined according to the available Euro coins. The
general regression equation is Imba = α +
∑
βi ∗ centdummyi + F ixedE f f ec ts, i =
1, 2, ..., 10. The model is estimated on a subsample which contains trades between EUR
50 and EUR 100 exclusively. Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are reported
in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance on the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level.
Imbalance
Buy/Sell Buy/Sell Shares
Orders Turnover Bought/Sold
Intercept 0.026 0.0141*** 0.1171***
(0.0141) (0.0236) (0.0233)
Below Integers (.99) 0.2575*** 0.0187*** 0.379***
(0.0187) (0.0509) (0.052)
Above Integers (.01) -0.2612*** 0.0208*** -0.3416***
(0.0208) (0.0414) (0.0412)
Below Half-Euro (.49) 0.1915*** 0.0171*** 0.2247***
(0.0171) (0.0414) (0.0414)
Above Half-Euro (.51) -0.2011*** 0.0181*** -0.1798***
(0.0181) (0.0398) (0.0398)
Below 20-cents (.19, .39, .59, .79) 0.1226*** 0.0062*** 0.1526***
(0.0062) (0.0218) (0.0218)
Above 20-cents (.21, .41, .61, .81) -0.122*** 0.0062*** -0.1641***
(0.0062) (0.0258) (0.0257)
Below 10-cents (.09, .29, .69, .89) 0.1165*** 0.0057*** 0.1173***
(0.0057) (0.022) (0.0221)
Above 10-cents (.11, .31, .71, .91) -0.1228*** 0.0061*** -0.1476***
(0.0061) (0.0229) (0.023)
Below 5-cents(.04, .14, .24, .34, .44, 0.0626*** 0.0035** 0.0435**
.54, .64, .74, .85, .94) (0.0035) (0.0149) (0.0149)
Above 5-cents(.06, .16, .26, .36, .46, -0.0674*** 0.0034*** -0.09***
.56, .66, .76, .86, .96) (0.0034) (0.015) (0.015)
Controls Stock, Year Stock, Year Stock, Year
Results for the subsample are reported in Table 4.5. Coefficients are statistically
significant and confirm the main results. However, they are absolutely larger than
for the complete sample confirming the assumption that the focus on round numbers
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increases in price level. The smaller relative error from an imprecise estimation of a fair
price seems to move the attention to rounder numbers, since the effects in the integer
and half-Euro groups increase most.
When discussing differences in price levels, the question arises whether the tick size
rule has an impact on the results. For the subsample of trades between EUR 50 and
EUR 100 a minimum tick size of 1 cent applies during the whole sample period. The
new rule defines a step-wise tick size schedule and was introduced at the beginning of
2010. For stocks traded between EUR 10 and EUR 50 the minimum tick size reduces to
0.5 cent, and to 0.1 cent for stocks below EUR 10, respectively.
Chiao and Wang (2009) find that price clustering in the Taiwanese stock market
increases with absolutely smaller tick sizes. For human investors small tick sizes might
be irrelevant because their ability to estimate the fair value is not precise enough
to distinguish between very small price differences. Furthermore, it might be more
complicated for human investors to use sub-cent values for limit order submission which
is also in line with the negotiation argument by Harris (1991). Thus, it seems probable
that orders of human investors still tend to cluster on round numbers, whereas orders
of sophisticated market participants such as algorithmic traders could be distributed
on more price points. This would increase the relative clustering, i. e., differences in
transaction volume as well as in offered depth between adjacent price points might
increase, in particular if one price level was a cluster under the old rule.
To detect changes in trades of stocks which are affected by the new tick size rule, I
use an extended conditional analysis. Since implications are the same for all dependent
variables used in regressions (4.5), I focus on trade direction. For the following
regression only the years 2009 and 2010 are used, i. e., one year before and after the
introduction. I adopt the model to represent an event study approach. The regression
equation becomes
BuySel l =
6∑
i=1
(β (1)i ∗ int i + β (2)i ∗ int i ∗ dummy2010+ β (3)i ∗ int i ∗ t ick
+ β (4)i ∗ int i ∗ t ick ∗ dummy2010) +
6∑
j=1
(γ(1)j f iveC j ∗ [...]) +
∑
cont rols,
where dummy2010 indicates the year 2010, int i and f iveCi denote dummies for the
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six integer and 5-cent groups, and t ick is a dummy variable which equals one for
price levels having a change in tick size and zero else. The term
∑6
j=1 γ
(1)
j f iveC j ∗ [...]
abbreviates the sum of the five-cent groups which is defined analogously to the integer
terms.
Table 4.6 shows the difference between the coefficients of the integer and 5-cent
groups based on the above logistic regression. To check the significance of these
differences, I apply Wald tests from which the reported p-values result. First of all, the
interpretation of the regression results remain unchanged compared to the complete
sample and the original regression specification. Consequently, it is convenient to
interpret the falls (rises) to integer and 5-cent differences to detect a possible impact of
the new tick size rule.
Confirming the last subsection, the positive influence of the price level on the effects
is found as well. The baseline effect β (1)i − γ(1)i refers to trades in 2009 between EUR
50 and EUR 100. The differences β (3)i − γ(3)i which distinguish the two tick classes
are consistently opposite to the baseline effect β (1)i − γ(1)i . This means, stocks which
are affected by the new tick size in 2010 generally exhibit smaller imbalances as their
price level is lower. The negative estimates are not surprising since stocks which are
affected by the new tick size are low-priced and therefore tend to exhibit smaller round
number effects as shown above. The differences β (2)i − γ(2)i reported in column ’Dummy
2010’ are opposed to the baseline effect indicating that round number effects weakened
considerably from 2009 to 2010. The yearly development of the size of the effects is
elaborated in Section 4.5.3.
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TABLE 4.6: The Impact of Tick Size Regimes on Conditional Buy-Sell Imbalances. The regression models reported
in this table are specified as BuySel l =
∑6
i=1(β
(1)
i ∗ int i +β (2)i ∗ int i ∗ dummy2010+β (3)i ∗ int i ∗ t ick +β (4)i ∗ int i ∗ t ick ∗
dummy2010) +
∑6
j=1(γ
(1)
j f iveC j ∗ [...]) +
∑
cont rols, where controls include fixed effects for stock and year as well as
dummies for penny-endings (0 to 9), turnover, volume, and the trade direction of the previous trade. The table shows
differences in coefficient estimates between the integer and 5-cent group with respect to the tick size dummy and the
dummy for trades in 2010, as well as their intersection. Column ’No Dummy’ shows the baseline effect, i.e. stocks traded
between EUR 50 and EUR 100 in 2009. Columns ’Dummy 2010’ and ’Tick Size Dummy’ measure overall changes in 2010
and the difference of effects in the group of trades between EUR 2 and EUR 50. The column ’Tick Size & 2010’ shows
the differences in the interaction term which measure the impact of the new tick size regime. P-values for coefficient
differences are obtained from Wald tests.
No Dummy Dummy 2010 Tick Size Dummy Tick Size & 2010
β
(1)
i − γ(1)i β (2)i − γ(2)i β (3)i − γ(3)i β (4)i − γ(4)i
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Ask falls below integer-
0.0392 <0.0001 −0.0213 <0.0001 −0.0157 0.0004 0.0098 0.0991
Ask falls below nickel
Ask rises while staying below integer-
0.0919 <0.0001 −0.0590 <0.0001 −0.0327 <0.0001 0.0436 <0.0001
Ask rises while staying below nickel
Ask falls to integer-
0.4368 <0.0001 −0.2100 <0.0001 −0.1432 <0.0001 0.1251 <0.0001
Ask falls to nickel
Bid rises to integer- −0.4399 <0.0001 0.2659 <0.0001 0.1593 <0.0001 −0.2441 <0.0001
Bid rises to nickel
Bid rises above integer- −0.0362 <0.0001 0.0101 0.0459 0.0221 <0.0001 0.0066 0.2716
Bid rises above nickel
Bid falls while staying above integer- −0.0803 <0.0001 0.0270 <0.0001 0.0360 <0.0001 −0.0300 <0.0001
Bid falls while staying above nickel
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The last column of Table 4.6 lists the differences in coefficients estimates which
include an interaction term between tick size and year 2010 dummies. This difference
measures changes from 2009 to 2010 within the group of trades that actually are
effected by the new tick size rule. The differences are significant and imply stronger
round number effects. The overall effect for the EUR 2 to EUR 50 class in 2010 is still
weaker than in 2009, but it did not decrease as much as the benchmark group (EUR
50 to EUR 100). However, given a general trend of weakening round number effects
over time, the overall effect, i. e., the sum of coefficients, is still decreasing. Hence, to
argue the new tick size rule is worrying with respect to limit order clustering and round
number effects seems questionable, although the presented model shows an positive
effect when it is analyzed isolated.
Running the same regression with Q4/2009 and Q1/2010 in order to reduce the
impact of a time trend, the ’Ask falls to’ difference β (4)i −γ(4)i is not statistically significant
but the corresponding bid group. The latter might partially be a results of the reduced
statistical power given the smaller sample size. Explicit results are shown in Appendix
A.5. Isolating the effect from the altered tick size on a reduction of round number
effects is hard to disentangle from the overall (negative) trend based on this analysis.
However, both regression point in the direction that smaller tick sizes increase round
number effects, which is in line with Chiao and Wang (2009).
In general, the smaller minimum tick size has led to reduced spreads for stocks below
EUR 50. For example, the average time-weighted quoted (half) spreads of the whole
sample declined from 6.50bps in 2009 to 3.40bps in 2010 (see Table 4.1). The average
effective (half) spread of all trades between EUR 2 and EUR 10 decreased from 5.95bp
in 2009 to 3.33bps in 2010 and from 3.42bps to 2.58bps for trades between EUR 10 and
EUR 50. This means the reduction in (effective) spreads would not have been possible
without a reduction of the minimum tick size (e. g., 2 ∗ 3.33bps ∗ EUR10< EUR0.01).
However, round number effects within this group of stocks remained the same. So
positive effects from the reduced tick size on spreads should outweigh increasing round
number effects.
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4.5.2 Mid-cap Stocks
This section assesses the relation of market capitalization and round number effects.
The fifty MDAX constituents are used to show that round number effects are not an
artifact of the thirty German blue chips but of the whole German market. By applying
the unconditional analysis on a second set of stocks, the robustness of the main results
is confirmed. Figure 4.3 shows the average buy-sell order imbalance for MDAX (solid)
and DAX (dashed) stocks. Buy-sell imbalances of MDAX stocks are qualitatively equal,
i. e., the same pattern evolves but the imbalances seem to be generally larger. To test
for a possible difference, I pool DAX30 and MDAX50 firm-year imbalances and adapt
regression (4.6), which results in
Imbalance =
10∑
i=1
 
βi ∗ centdummy i + γi ∗M DAX ∗ centdummy i

+
∑
F ixedE f f ,
(4.7)
where F ixedE f f include dummy variables for year and stock.
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FIGURE 4.3: DAX30 and MDAX50 Imbalance Measures of Liquidity Demanding
Orders on Xetra. Average buy-sell order imbalance of MDAX50 stocks (solid line)
and DAX30 stocks (dashed line) from 2009 to 2013.
The results are reported in Table 4.7. Round number effects are qualitatively the
same for MDAX50 stocks as for DAX30 stocks, i. e., the order of roundness reappears
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equivalently as expected from Figure 4.3. The estimated sign of each coefficient γi
indicates greater buy-sell imbalances for MDAX50 stocks. In case of buy-sell order
imbalances as dependent variable, coefficients are consistently significant on a 0.1%
level. The absolute size of coefficient indicate that buy-sell-imbalances are more than
50% larger for MDAX than DAX on almost all levels.
In case of imbalances based on turnover and traded shares, only some round number
thresholds are significantly different between MDAX and DAX. This is primarily due
to the much higher noise in these variables which increases the coefficients’ standard
deviation. In order to avoid examining every single threshold, I aggregate the regressions
coefficients by summing up all coefficients of ’below’ round number dummies and
coefficients of ’above’ round number dummies multiplied by −1 to be consistent with
the hypothesized round number effects. That is, the sums
∑10
i=1(−1)i+1βi for the DAX
and
∑10
i=1(−1)i+1(βi + γi) for the MDAX constitutes a proxy for the overall magnitude
of buy-sell imbalance in the respective sample of stocks.
Calculated from the estimates of the respective regressions, the differences between
both groups are 0.8390, 0.6011, and 0.6092 for order, turnover, and traded-shares
imbalances, respectively. Wald tests confirm the significance on the 0.1% level for
all differences. Thus, round number effects are stronger in the mid-cap index MDAX
compared to the large cap stocks in the DAX. During the sample period the average price
of trades in DAX stocks is 42.98 and 30.98 for MDAX stocks, respectively (see Table
4.1). According to Section 4.5.1 DAX stocks are expected to exhibit greater imbalances
due to the higher price level. Since the differences between MDAX and DAX show the
opposite, the results of this sub-section can be considered as conservative.
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TABLE 4.7: Buy-sell Imbalances in DAX30 and MDAX50 Stocks. This table show results from regression buy-sell
imbalance measures of liquidity demanders on cent group dummies which fit to the available Euro coins. To detect
differences of round number effects in DAX and MDAX stocks, data from both indices are pooled and the model includes
the intersection of the MDAX dummy variable with all cent group dummies. The regression equation becomes Imba =∑ 
βi ∗ centdummy i + γi ∗M DAX ∗ centdummy i

+
∑
F ixedE f f ec ts, i = 1,2, ..., 10. The model uses fixed effects for
stock and year. *, **, and *** denotes significance on the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level. The sample period spans from January
2009 to December 2013.
Imbalance
Buy/Sell Orders Buy/Sell Turnover Shares Bought/Sold
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Below Integers (.99) 0.2014*** 0.0148 0.2874*** 0.0275 0.2853*** 0.0273
MDAX * Below Integer 0.1186*** 0.0222 0.0539 0.0356 0.0539 0.0356
Above Integers (.01) -0.2102*** 0.0150 -0.2807*** 0.0275 -0.2805*** 0.0274
MDAX * Above Integer -0.1344*** 0.0212 -0.0703* 0.0338 -0.0656 0.0337
Below Half-Euro (.49) 0.1607*** 0.0129 0.2040*** 0.0243 0.2059*** 0.0239
MDAX * Below Half-Euro 0.1144*** 0.0185 0.0979** 0.0306 0.0992** 0.0302
Above Half-Euro (.51) -0.1689*** 0.0125 -0.1718*** 0.0268 -0.1657*** 0.0272
MDAX * Above Half-Euro -0.1200*** 0.0187 -0.1389*** 0.0331 -0.1431*** 0.0334
Below 20-Cents (.19, .39, .59, .79) 0.1254*** 0.0045 0.1430*** 0.0137 0.1443*** 0.0137
MDAX * Below 20-Cents 0.0648*** 0.0071 0.0480** 0.0172 0.0480** 0.0172
Above 20-Cents (.21, .41, .61, .81) -0.1156*** 0.0043 -0.1462*** 0.014 -0.1459*** 0.0139
MDAX * Above 20-Cents -0.0766*** 0.0066 -0.0682*** 0.0171 -0.0677*** 0.0168
Below 10-Cents (.09, .29, .69, .89) 0.1163*** 0.0040 0.1260*** 0.0121 0.1258*** 0.0120
MDAX * Below 10-Cents 0.0606*** 0.0066 0.0521*** 0.0157 0.0558*** 0.0155
Above 10-Cents (.11, .31, .71, .91) -0.1114*** 0.0042 -0.1386*** 0.0132 -0.1377*** 0.0131
MDAX * Above 10-Cents -0.0797*** 0.0066 -0.0466** 0.0166 -0.0447** 0.0165
Below 5-Cents (.04, .14, ?) 0.0616*** 0.0024 0.0548*** 0.0083 0.0554*** 0.0082
MDAX * Below 5-Cents 0.0217*** 0.0039 0.0215* 0.0104 0.0246* 0.0103
Above 5-Cents (.06, .16, ?) -0.0588*** 0.0023 -0.0807*** 0.0083 -0.0795*** 0.0082
MDAX * Above 5-Cents -0.0521*** 0.0039 -0.0349*** 0.0104 -0.0338** 0.0103
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As an additional robustness check, I apply a Tobit regression to model absolute
imbalances. The model specification is basically equivalent to (4.7) but it includes
the yearly average price for each stock as an independent variable, which should be
positively related to the absolute imbalance measures. The regression results confirm
the hypothesized relationship between round number effects and price level, but the
differences between DAX and MDAX stocks remain highly significant. Estimation results
of the Tobit regression are reported in Table A.4 of Appendix A.2.
Several reasons for the larger effects in the index of mid-cap stocks seem probable.
First, because there is less volume in MDAX stocks and spreads are higher, a relation
between round number effects and liquidity could be imaginable. With respect to order
clustering it seems not sufficient to just increase overall depth, for instance, as long as
the additional limit orders have basically the same characteristics. That is, to reduce
limit order clustering and undercutting the additional liquidity would have to balance
the existing liquidity assuming the characteristics of prevailing liquidity remain stable
over time. Second, the proportion of algorithmic trading in the mid-cap index is smaller
which could also be linked to lesser liquidity. Assuming that algorithmic traders have
generally no tendency to focus on any round number and no additional costs from using
small price increments, the strength of round number effects should be correlated with
the ratio of human and algorithmic traders in a market segment.
4.5.3 Time Trends in Round Number Effects
Empirical market microstructure literature shows that financial markets have become
more efficient and more liquid over the last decades. More efficient market systems and
participants such as algorithmic traders are primary reasons for this development. As
hypothesized in Section 4.2, the increasing share of algorithmic traders, who I assume
to be unaffected by cognitive number biases, could possibly result in weakening round
number effects. Therefore the development of the effect over the sample period is
investigated.
In Section 4.5.1 the conditional analysis of trades already revealed smaller coefficients
for the ’ask (bid) falls (rises) to integer’ group in 2010 than in 2009. Another approach
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to detect time trends in buy-sell imbalances is to allow multilevel slopes and intercepts
in regression (4.6). Then the regression equation becomes
Imbalance =
4∑
j=1
10∑
i=1
βi j ∗ centdummyi ∗ year j +
4∑
j=1
∑
k
stockk ∗ year j. (4.8)
I estimate six regressions based on the DAX30 and MDAX50 samples (separately) and
the three imbalance measures as defined in Section 4.4.1. Table 4.8 presents the absolute
sums of coefficients for each year. Furthermore it shows p-values from Wald tests which
verify the significance of differences between the sums of coefficients of consecutive
years. Formally the specified Wald test assesses the hypotheses
∑10
i=1
 
βi, j+1 − βi, j

=
0, j = 1, 2, 3, where βi, j are maximum-likelihood estimates of the model parameters.
In case of the DAX30 sample, the sum of absolute coefficients estimated by the
order imbalance regression is 0.6539 smaller in 2010 than in 2009 and this difference
is statistically significant (p-value < 0.0001). The declining trend holds during the
following three years as well, which means round number effects have become gradually
weaker over the sample period, although prices of DAX (MDAX) stocks rise from a
yearly average price of 36.06 (26.28) in 2009 to 47.50 (39.62) in 2013. Since Section
4.5.1 shows that round number effects increase in price level, the declining trend
can be regarded as conservative. The results from the turnover and traded shares
imbalance measures of DAX30 stocks are similar, except for the fact that there is no
significant difference between 2011 and 2012 anymore. A reason might be the much
higher variability inherent in (signed) turnover and traded shares compared to the mere
number of buys and sells.
Interestingly, in case of the MDAX50 data, there is no significant drop in the absolute
sum of coefficients from 2009 to 2010, but during the following years. To some
extent, this should be related to an increasing price level in these years. All stocks
have been traded on the same system (i. e., Xetra), thus technological differences
affecting trading can be excluded. A reason might be that algorithmic traders or other
efficiency-improving market participants first focused on large-cap stocks and turned
their attention on mid-cap stocks in the following years.
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TABLE 4.8: Analysis of Time Trends in Buy-sell Imbalances on Xetra. The table shows the sum of absolute coefficients
of all cent dummies per year estimated from the regression model Imbalance =
∑10
i=1
∑5
j=1βi, j ∗ centdummy i ∗ year j +∑
k
∑5
j=1 stockk ∗ year j. The three introduced imbalance measures are employed as dependent variables for DAX30 data
(Panel A) and MDAX50 data (Panel B). The significance of the year-to-year difference of the coefficient sums is tested via
a Wald test regarding the hypothesis
∑10
i=1βi, j+1 − βi, j = 0, j = 1, ..., 4. P-values refer to the year-to-year Wald test.
Panel A: DAX Order Imbalance Turnover Imbalance Shares Imbalance
Year Sum of Coeff. ∆ yr/yr p-value Sum of Coeff. ∆ yr/yr p-value Sum of Coeff. ∆ yr/yr p-value
2009 2.1468 - - 2.3881 - 2.3537 - -
2010 1.4929 −0.6539 <0.0001 1.8087 −0.5794 0.0008 1.8074 −0.5462 0.0110
2011 1.2128 −0.2801 <0.0001 1.3806 −0.4281 0.0128 1.3681 −0.4393 0.0086
2012 0.9724 −0.2404 <0.0001 1.5071 0.1265 0.4701 1.5184 0.1503 0.3847
2013 0.6948 −0.2776 <0.0001 0.9801 −0.5270 0.0032 0.9814 −0.5370 0.0027
Panel B: MDAX
2009 2.7275 - - 2.7502 - - 2.7505 - -
2010 2.6986 −0.0289 0.6921 2.7772 0.0269 0.8433 2.7842 0.0337 0.8027
2011 2.2421 −0.4565 <0.0001 2.1919 −0.5853 <0.0001 2.1832 −0.6010 <0.0001
2012 1.5952 −0.6468 <0.0001 1.8437 −0.3482 0.0081 1.8375 −0.3457 0.0080
2013 1.6405 0.0453 0.5266 1.7993 −0.0444 0.7391 1.7930 −0.0445 0.7366
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A similar extension of the conditional analysis of Section 4.4.2 leads to the same
conclusion of decreasing round number effects over the years. For example, the logistic
regression modeling the occurrence of a buy after the ask price has fallen to an integer
or to a 5 cent level, respectively, shows constantly decreasing differences in these groups
over the years.
Overall, the identified decrease of buy-sell imbalances can be interpreted as a higher
level of market efficiency. There are several causes which might play a role in this
development. First of all, improvements in information systems of Xetra and its market
participants were accompanied by improved market liquidity, such as smaller spreads,
increased depth. Second, sophisticated market participants could actively exploit round
number anomalies and thereby weaken the effects. If market participants who run
market making strategies identify large clusters and imbalances in liquidity supply and
demand on some price levels, they could adjust their liquidity supplying strategy by
increasing liquidity provision on the side of the book with less depth and thereby round
number effects could consequently weaken. On the other hand, human investors might
have become aware of their round number biases and, thus, they try to avoid placing
orders on or around round numbers.
4.6 The Case of Retail Investors at the Stuttgart Stock
Exchange
The latter section has shown that round number effects have gradually weakened over
the observation period. Several possible reasons have been put forward to explain these
results. However, the insights from the Xetra Times & Sales data is limited. There is no
information on who is trading and, more particular, whether an order is submitted by
an algorithmic trading system or by a human investor.
The important feature of the data provided by Stuttgart Stock Exchange is the cer-
tainty that orders and transactions are on behalf of human investors because algorithmic
trading interfaces or co-locations are not permitted. A disadvantage of the data is the
relatively small trading volume, which is about 1 percent compared to Xetra (see Table
4.1).
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Furthermore, the mechanism of stock trading at Stuttgart Stock Exchange is distinct
from Xetra. The hybrid trading system combines a standard limit order book with market
makers (so-called quality liquidity provider) who actively improve market quality. They
spend liquidity when client orders could be executed given Xetra bid or ask quotes
although there is no matching order in the limit order book at the Stuttgart Stock
Exchange. This so-called reference market principle ensures that (retail) clients obtain
prices which are as least as good as on Xetra up to a given trade size. Consequently,
market orders processed by this mechanism become independent from standing limit
orders in the book, i. e., imbalances in supply and demand of traders are automatically
resolved by market makers. The described process usually runs automatically without
any active interventions by human market makers as long as incoming orders are within
predefined parameters.
The market structure of stock trading at the Stuttgart Stock Exchange has some
implications for the presented analysis of round number effects. First of all, results
are not directly comparable to results from Xetra due to the mentioned differences.
The reference market principle and the low volume makes the contribution to price
discovery of stock trading in Stuttgart become negligible. Theoretically, market makers
who balance their inventories could have an impact on Xetra prices, but the potential
effect should be minimal because of the small volume.
The interesting aspect regarding the analysis of round number effects is that liquidity
demand and supply are detached by market makers who buy and sell according to
predetermined conditions, i. e., bid and ask quotes of the reference market Xetra. Thus,
different patterns in executed limit orders and marketable orders are possible, in contrast
to a pure limit order book market where these orders will always match. For the present
analysis of round number effects it is possible to separately assess which patterns occur
in each order type and how these pattern differ.
There are considerable differences in the patterns of buy-sell imbalances between
limit and marketable orders by retail investors. Figure 4.4 contrasts the averages of buys-
sell order imbalance measure based liquidity demanding orders, liquidity demanding
orders without stop-orders and other exotic order-types and, analogously Figure 4.5
depicts liquidity supplying orders. In all three cases investors place more buy than sell
orders over the observation period as the positive overall buy-sell imbalances (dashed
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DAX30 Order-Imbalance of Liquidity Demanders without Stop-orders
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FIGURE 4.4: Imbalances of Liquidity Demanding Orders at the Stuttgart Stock
Exchange. The upper plot shows average buy-sell order imbalances of liquidity
demanding orders in DAX30 stocks at Stuttgart Stock Exchange from April 2009 to
December 2013. For the bottom plot stop-orders and other exotic order types are
excluded. The dashed horizontal line depicts the respective average buy-sell imbalance.
lines) show. On the first plot, a large surplus of sells exactly on round numbers is
apparent. This is mainly due to stop-loss orders which are extremely popular among
retail investors. Because of their functionality stop-loss orders have to be treated as
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DAX30 Order-Imbalance of Liquidity Suppliers
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FIGURE 4.5: Imbalances of Liquidity Demanding Orders at the Stuttgart Stock
Exchange. The plot shows average buy-sell order imbalances of executed liquidity
demanding orders in DAX30 stocks at Stuttgart Stock Exchange from April 2009 to
December 2013. The dashed horizontal line depicts the average buy-sell imbalance.
liquidity demanding orders. The necessity to enter a stop price makes this order type
susceptible for round number biases of the order submitter. Since stop-loss orders are
much more common than stop-buy2 orders, the sell side turns out to be very dominant
for all round price levels where stop orders are typically placed.
Excluding stop-orders (bottom plot of Figure 4.4) removes the spikes on round
numbers, but still there is a less clear pattern as expected from Xetra data (see Figure
4.2 & 4.3). Order imbalances show a much noisier behavior and relatively small
deviations from the mean suggesting that retail investors who submit marketable orders
have a weaker propensity to base their market order submission on cent endings or
other number references.
On the other hand, buy-sell imbalances of marketable order can only lack an explicit
pattern if the demand is not restricted by the supply side, which is the case at Stuttgart
Stock Exchange except the applied reference market principle. Assuming a sufficiently
large number of randomly incoming orders which are equally distributed over time, the
2Also referred to as start-buy orders.
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resulting patterns of buy-sell imbalances at the Stuttgart Stock Exchange should become
similar to Xetra since market makers set their prices in accordance to Xetra. Due to the
small number of trades a considerable amount of noise should bias the actual pattern.
Yet despite the mentioned relation between the exchanges the observed pattern is much
weaker than on Xetra, so it is conservative to argue there is no particularly pronounced
round number bias in market orders executed at Stuttgart Stock Exchange.
Figure 4.5 shows buy-sell imbalances based on limit prices of all executed, non-
marketable limit orders. Due to diluting effects on the actual transaction price stemming
from the reference market principle of Stuttgart Stock Exchange, the corresponding
limit price is considered. Similar to the liquidity demander plot, the line is noisier than
for Xetra, which is presumably related to the much smaller number of observations.
The typical pattern – in this case more buys above round numbers and more sells below
– is apparent for the limit order data and the relatively large fluctuations suggest that
limit orders are considerably biased. In contrast to investors on Xetra, retail investors at
Stuttgart Stock Exchange place more buy orders on multiples of five and ten (compared
to the overall average) except on the integer price level which tends to be more preferred
for sells.
For both, liquidity demanding and supplying order, the 99 cent prices seem to be
special for human investors at the Stuttgart Stock Exchange. Buying at prices having 99
cent endings is quite intense in both cases. In case of demanding orders the imbalance
has the expected tendency but is much stronger than the other price levels. For liquidity
supplying orders a surplus of sells is expected but the opposite appears, i. e., more buys
than sells. This is evidence for the left-digit effect, i. e., retail investors perceive the
smaller left-digit number associated with the 99 cent price level as a signal to buy.
The visual conjecture is formalized by regression models of type (4.6). The model
is estimated for the limit order sample and the sample of marketable orders without
stop-loss, respectively. The results of the order imbalance measures are printed in
Table 4.9. For liquidity demanding orders coefficient estimates are relatively small and
only four out of ten levels are significant on a 1% level. The below integer exhibits
the absolutely largest value in this model, which is indication for the left-digit effect
for marketable orders. The other significant levels are above integer, half-Euro, and
20-cents which exhibit increased selling behavior. However, the lack of a consistent
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pattern for all (most of) the considered levels as on Xetra seem to support the result
of previous sections, i. e., round number effects tend to be induced by undercutting
behavior of limit order submitter and not by investors using market orders. This fits the
intuition from a theoretical perspective in the sense that marketable orders are preferred
when immediacy is the main objective of the investor. Then considerations about the
current or realized price of the stock is of subordinate importance. Since about 80
percent of marketable orders are market orders, no limit price must be specified for the
order. Thus, the most obvious way to convey round number biases of investors into
trade prices is removed.
TABLE 4.9: Regression Model of Buy-sell Imbalance Ratios at Stuttgart Stock
Exchange. The table shows regression results from the sample of executed limit orders
and the sample of marketable orders in DAX30 stocks at the Stuttgart Stock Exchange.
The sample period spans from April 2009 to December 2013. The regression equation
is defined as Imba =
∑
βi ∗ centdummy i +∑ F ixedE f f ec ts, where i = 1,2, ..., 10,
and F ixedE f f ec ts denote stock and year dummies. *, **, and *** denote significance
on the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level.
Liquidity Suppliers Liquidity Demanders
Buy/Sell Orders Buy/Sell Orders
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Below Integers (.99) 0.0577 0.0608 0.1822*** 0.0446
Above Integers (.01) 0.2939*** 0.0633 -0.1411** 0.0439
Below Half-Euro (.49) -0.3469*** 0.0633 0.0703 0.0439
Above Half-Euro (.51) 0.2273*** 0.0662 -0.1456** 0.0443
Below 20-Cents (.19, .39, .59, .79) -0.1633*** 0.0326 0.0379 0.0227
Above 20-Cents (.21, .41, .61, .81) -0.0145 0.0335 -0.0942*** 0.0227
Below 10-Cents (.09, .29, .69, .89) -0.1129*** 0.0337 0.0519* 0.0225
Above 10-Cents (.11, .31, .71, .91) 0.0456 0.0338 -0.0425 0.0227
Below 5-Cents(.04, .14, .24, .34, .44, -0.1868*** 0.022 0.0198 0.0149
.54, .64, .74, .85, .94)
Above 5-Cents(.06, .16, .26, .36, .46, 0.0084 0.0218 -0.0056 0.0149
Regression results from liquidity supplying orders show more pronounced round
number effects in buy-sell imbalances, but not all levels exhibit significant estimate as
in case of the Xetra data. Interestingly, the ’below integers’ estimate, which is expected
to be the largest among the below round number variables, is not significant and close
to zero. This means that for retail investors 99 cent prices are comparably attractive
for buy and sell orders alike. On the other hand, the left-digit effect seems to play a
role for the ’below integers’ level as it is the only dummy which means a change in
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the left digit. Thus, setting a limit price for a (non-marketable) limit buy order exactly
below the integer might be perceived as cheaper, which is not the case for limit sell
orders for which the integer price point (.00) implies a changing left digit. The average
buy-sell imbalance of integer price levels is slightly positive, but it is about 0.15 below
the overall buy-sell imbalance of 0.19 (see Figure 4.5. So the integer price level also
emphasizes a left-digit effect.
TABLE 4.10: Analysis of Time Trends in Buy-sell Imbalances at Stuttgart Stock
Exchange. The table shows results from regression models analyzing changes in
buy-sell imbalances over time. The model is estimated for the sample of limit orders
(Panel A) and marketable orders (Panel B) in DAX30 stocks executed at the Stuttgart
Stock Exchange. The sample period spans from April 2009 to December 2013. Due
to the limited sample size and data restrictions, a shift between first and second half
of the sample period is considered. Within these two periods trades are aggregated
to obtain a meaningful number of observations for each cent amount per stock. The
regression equation is defined as Imbalance =
∑2
j=1
∑10
i=1βi ∗ centdummyi ∗ period j +∑
k
∑2
j=1 stockk ∗ period j. *, **, and *** denotes significance on the 5%, 1%, and
0.1% level of the period effect
∑10
i=1−1iβi, j, j = 1, 2, based on a Wald test. To test the
differences between periods, the hypothesis
∑10
i=1βi, j+1 − βi, j = 0, j = 1, 2 is tested by
means of a Wald test. P-values from this test are shown in the last column.
Panel A: Liquidity Supplier
Period Sum of coefficients ∆yr/yr p-value
2009/04 - 2011/06 1.2496*** - -
2011/07 - 2013/12 1.7051*** 0.4555 0.5368
Panel B: Liquidity Demander
2009/04 - 2011/06 0.8631*** - -
2011/07 - 2013/12 0.7190*** −0.1441 0.3862
As shown in Section 4.5.3, unconditional buy-sell imbalances decrease over the
sample period and several possible explanations for the finding were discussed. Based
on the trade data from Stuttgart Stock Exchange, a potential relation to human investors
who diminish their round number biases can be tested. Therefore, an extended
regression similar to (4.8) is applied. Due to the much smaller sample size and the
missing data for Q1/2009, there are not enough orders to obtain a reliable yearly
buy-sell imbalance of each cent amount of every stock. Because of these limitations, I
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run the regression model with pooled data for the first and second half of the sample
period. Regression results are shown in Table 4.10.
Both regressions indicate that human investors at Stuttgart Stock Exchange keep
their round number biases over the years. For liquidity demanders the overall effect is
decreasing, but not on a statistically significant level. In contrast, coefficient estimates
for liquidity suppliers slightly increase, which is not significant, though. So in both cases
round number effects remain stable over time, i. e., effects development differently
on Stuttgart Stock Exchange and Xetra where a decrease in round number effects is
observed3. This result contradicts the hypothesized explanation of decreasing buy-sell
imbalances due to retail investors becoming aware of their round number biases. Hence,
it supports the explanation that improved market efficiency and an increased share of
sophisticated traders on Xetra is responsible for the decrease.
4.7 Summary and Conclusion
Round number effects influence trading in the German stock market (Research Question
3). In this chapter, I have analyzed trading data from Xetra and find excessive buy-
sell-imbalances around round numbers to be apparent in Germany, but the order of
roundness deviates from the American market (NYSE) as found by Bhattacharya et al.
(2012). In particular, there is no quarter effect in Germany. Instead, 20-cent price
levels tend to exhibit larger imbalances (Research Question 3a). Although the reason
for differences in the particular cognitive reference points cannot be identified with
certainty, an habituation effect of market participants regarding the local currency and
historic trading conditions (e. g., eighth and sixteenth tick sizes in the U.S.) seems
natural.
Further, I analyze what drives buy-sell-imbalances and how they develop over time
(Research Question 3b). As expected, higher prices levels are associated with larger
buy-sell imbalances around round numbers. Likewise, smaller tick size lead to stronger
round number effects as limit orders can be distributed over more price steps. However,
3Using an regression specification that applies Xetra data that is pooled over two years, results in the
same conclusion as on a yearly basis.
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the latter is superimposed by the overall negative trend in round number effects which
is stable over the sample period.
Analyzing stock trading data from Stuttgart Stock Exchange shows that retail in-
vestors (i. e., human investors) tend to have strong round number biases (Research
Question 3c). Comparing market and limit orders reveals that the usage of limit order
(prices) is the main driver of excessive buy-sell imbalances of retail investors, while
market orders are almost unbiased. Furthermore, the effects on the retail investor
market remain stable over time.
In sum, it is remarkable that highly sophisticated and internationalized financial
markets still show imperfections induced by the behavior of market participants that
are locally distinct. While the negotiation argument by Harris (1991) is sound for
markets where investors directly interact or submit orders by telephone to their broker,
potential impacts thereof should be less important for fully electronic markets. Another
argument proposing easier calculations and better recognition is naturally still valid for
today’s markets and investors, but the functionality of most brokerage accounts should
diminish these mental shortcomings. Many trading accounts simplify order submission
to a large extend, e. g., the order value is automatically calculated for the specified price
and quantity. The application of round numbers when entering limit prices needs the
same effort for each limit or stop price (disregarding sub-cent price ticks). Thus, the
cognitive influence of numbers and strategic considerations when making investment
decisions seem to be dominant drivers.
A reason for the negative trend in round number effects might be an increasing share
of algorithmic trading and higher investor sophistication. While this study presents
no quantifiable arguments, the increasing share of algorithmic traders, who should be
unbiased with respect to numbers, could lead to the shown decrease in round number
effects. An explanation based on (human) retail investors becoming aware of their
round number biases is ruled out by the results from Stuttgart Stock Exchange.
The causality between algorithmic trading and round number effects is of course
limited, since the explicit strategies employed are not known. Empirical studies suggest
that many algorithmic and high-frequency trader run market-making strategies and as
such could strongly depend on recent order flow information (e. g., Hendershott et al.,
2011). From a strategic trading perspective, market makers who identify order flow
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on some price level being less informed on average could considerably decrease their
adverse selection risks when trading against such orders. If excessive limit order volume
on round numbers signals a greater share of potentially uninformed retail investors,
trading against these orders is less risky and providing liquidity on the other side of the
book becomes more attractive.
The recent study by Kuo et al. (2015) confirms that clustered orders by retail
investors in the Taiwanese stock market suffer considerable losses. Put differently,
other market participants are able to trade successfully against these orders. This rules
out the interpretation that round limit prices are an effective mechanism to signal
uninformed trading intentions to the market to incentive others to trade. On the other
hand, the intensity of round number effects could be used as a measure of algorithmic
(institutional) trading intensity and investor sophistication.
This chapter has direct implications for the trading efforts of retail investors. As
shown by BHJ, buying below and selling above round numbers results in negative
(excess) returns compared to other price levels, for example. By becoming aware of their
cognitive bias towards round numbers, human investors could improve the perception of
current prices and also the precision of their price estimates. For example, Linnainmaa
(2010) shows that the under-performance of retail investors can be explained (to some
extent) by the use of limit orders. Specifically, when submitting limit orders, investors
should take into account that an imprecise limit price might not serve best for their
trading purpose. First, in a fast trading environment their limit orders face a large
adverse selection risk which additionally increases in the presence of low-latency market
participants (cf. Linnainmaa, 2010). Second, setting limit orders preferentially on or
around round numbers could convey information into the market that the order is
more likely to be uninformed. At the same time the execution probability decreases
because of the high clustering. In both cases, retail investors presumably underestimate
the amount of information and the option to trade, which they both provide to the
market.
Interestingly, the New York Stock Exchange abolished stop-orders in February 2016
(New York Stock Exchange, 2015), because the exchange expects it "will help raise
awareness around the potential risks during volatile trading" (Reuters, 2015). Further-
more, the NYSE states that "many retail investor use stop orders as a [...] protection"
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(Pisani, 2015). In particular, the results from retail investors on Stuttgart Stock Exchange
presented in this chapter indicate that the intense use of stop-orders on round numbers
could be problematic. The large amounts of stop-orders on round numbers can be
anticipated by other traders and identified as potentially less informed. In addition,
traders might push prices to reach or penetrate round number levels in order to earn low-
risk revenues for providing liquidity to the triggered stop-orders causing a short-lived
directional liquidity shock that reverts afterwards.
The relation between market efficiency and round number effects remains ambiguous.
In particular, it is unclear whether an (theoretical) anomaly like round number effects
generally should be associated with an inefficient trading mechanism. Either way, the
regulatory discussion in Europe4 about the necessity for a slowdown of market operation
and a limitation of high-frequency trading has brought up the question which tick size
rule is appropriate. A suggestion has been to increase tick sizes again, since very small
ticks do (presumably) not exhibit an economical benefit and have no practicable use
for human investors. In relation to price clustering and buy-sell imbalances, my study
can support this view in terms of round number effects as they do not considerably
decrease due to smaller tick size providing evidence that smaller price increments are
not adopted by human investors.
A limitation of the presented study is the unavailability of individual trading infor-
mation which would allow to investigate round number biases on a subject level. Thus,
an interesting extension could be to analyze brokerage account data to measure the
actual impact of round number biases on the individual performance. A distinction
between human and algorithmic trades (in the same market) could be promising to
detect different patterns in the use of numbers for these groups. Furthermore, such
data could be used to verify the impact of algorithmic trading on round number effects
and test whether the degree of price clustering and buy-sell imbalances constitutes
an effective indicator for trading activity of algorithmic traders and retail investors,
respectively.
4Compare with European Securities and Markets Authority Consultation paper ESMA/2011/224,
among others (https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2011_224.pdf ac-
cessed on June 27, 2016).
182
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Outlook
Achieving investment and trading goals in financial markets effectively and efficiently
is an arduous task for investors. Behavioral finance research identifies the impact of
biased human behavior and decision making on the outcome of their investment and
trading efforts. Behavioral biases are caused by the application of cognitive heuristics
used to simplify the decision complexity. To overcome the complexity of the investment
problem outlined in Section 1.1, investors typically use investment heuristics to find
solutions to meet their goals, while cognitive and knowledge limitations are clearly
driving factors for the usage.
In this thesis, I analyze the role of Technical Analysis and round number effects
for retail investors trading as well as for the microstructure of stock markets. This
chapter summarizes the main contributions of the presented research and discusses its
implications. Furthermore, future research topics deduced from the results of the thesis
are outlined.
5.1 Contributions
This thesis shows how the imperfect trading intentions influence the trading behavior of
retail investors and the microstructure of stock trading on Xetra. Chapter 3 assesses the
relation of Technical Analysis and retail investor trading as well as trading of large-cap
stocks along two overarching research questions.
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Research Question 1. Do investment heuristics that are summarized as Technical
Analysis influence retail investor trading in speculative structured products?
Research Question 2. What is the relation between Technical Analysis trading
signals and the market quality on Xetra?
The foundation for both research questions is the selection, calibration, and imple-
mentation of Technical Analysis techniques from which the resulted trading signals are
analyzed. Therefore, I review related academic literature as well as textbooks on Tech-
nical Analysis to select ’typical’ techniques and strategy calibrations. Specifically, chart
patterns, moving averages, as well as support and resistance levels are considered.
The empirical analysis of Research Question 1 focuses on two types of structured
products namely plain vanilla warrants and knock-out warrants on DAX and DAX30
stocks traded on Stuttgart Stock Exchange. Thus, Technical Analysis trading signals
in the respective underlyings are considered. Overall, retail investor trading activity
is substantially increased on days of such trading signals. A trading signal from the
considered chart patterns1 is associated with a 35 percent increase in excess turnover,
on average. Moving average signals are associated with an increase of 11 percent.
Furthermore, round-trip trades in accordance to Technical Analysis buy or sell signals
show different characteristics than comparable trades on non-signal days. These trades
exhibit a better performance, less leverage, and shorter holding duration. Using
Technical Analysis signals to cluster round-trip trades into groups, those trades in
accordance with Technical Analysis trading signals realize a significantly more right-
skewed return distribution.
The findings on Research Question 1 contribute to the literature in several ways. First,
they provide evidence that Technical Analysis is a relevant factor for retail investors
trading structured products, which has been conjectured as a potential motivation
to trade such products (cf. Meyer, 2014). Further, the results on realized returns of
round-trip trades provide empirical support for the theoretical (simulation) results of
Ebert and Hilpert (2014) arguing that payoffs from Technical Analysis strategies lead
to right-skewed return distributions, which should be preferred by investors having
prospect theory preferences.
1Specifically, Head-and-shoulder and inverse Head-and-shoulder patterns, Double Tops and Bottoms,
as well as Rectangle Tops and Bottoms.
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Since I also find that performance of Technical Analysis related round-trip trades
is better although leverage is lower, retail investors using Technical Analysis might be
more sophisticated than other retail investors trading structured products. In this sense,
Technical Analysis might be a tool for retail investors to pursue strategies which help
them to overcome behavioral biases such as the disposition effect.
Interpreting the relevance of Technical Analysis for retail investors as a demand for
Technical Analysis tools or, more general, as a demand for a guiding system, has practical
implications for the retail financial service industry. In this sense, efforts of Börse
Stuttgart and other (online) information providers to make data, data visualization,
and automated analysis tool available on their websites and trading accounts can be
considered as a valuable service for retail investors.
On the other hand, such tools and services could misguide retail investors as the
conveyed trading recommendation make people to be overconfident about what and
when to trade without considering the broader view on the individual investment prob-
lem (e. g., investment goals and horizon, risk preferences, portfolio composition, and
cost awareness). Obviously, there exists a conflict of interest as brokers and exchanges
are interested in high turnover rates of their clients’ portfolios, while academic findings
identify trading costs and product costs as important drivers of the underperformance
of retail investor portfolios.
The second main research question assesses the relation of Technical Analysis and
the microstructure of stock trading on Xetra. Since from an academic perspective
Technical Analysts are a prime example of noise traders (as they trade on past price
information), the resulting effects on the trading process are of interest as classical
market microstructure models (e. g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) predict declining
implicit trading costs as a consequence of the reduced adverse selection risk of liquidity
suppliers (market makers).
The study of Research Question 2 runs along three dimensions: liquidity, informa-
tional efficiency, and price discovery. These dimensions are analyzed with respect to
the popular Technical Analysis techniques (simple) moving averages as well as support
and resistance level. The large-scale analysis of Xetra trading of DAX30 stocks shows
that limit order supply increases significantly on support and resistance levels, while
after moving average signals particularly drive liquidity demand. Both results are in
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accordance to the findings by Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) on the NYSE in the late
1990s. In contradiction to the latter and other related studies, Technical Analysis signals
are not associated with lower implicit trading costs due to potentially reduced adverse
selection risk for liquidity suppliers. However, informational efficiency measured by
variance ratios, return auto-correlation, and delay is not (support and resistance levels)
or only weakly (moving averages) related to Technical Analysis signals, i. e., long-term
price efficiency is not harmed
Analyzing high-frequency price behavior by means of a price decomposition obtained
from state space models of midquote prices, Technical Analysis trading signals turn out
to have an impact on permanent and transitory price changes. Pricing errors tend to be
larger in the direction of an active support or resistance level, i. e., pricing errors are
significantly positive at resistance levels and negative at support levels. Moving average
signals induce overpricing after a long signal and underpricing at short signals, i. e.,
pricing errors are in line with the recommended trade direction. However, permanent
price changes rise disproportionately compared to pricing errors implying that price
moves are relatively persistent after such signals. The latter is an indication for persistent
liquidity demand in direction of the signal, which might be an explanation for rising
or unchanged spreads around signals. Despite the higher probability to trade against
uninformed Technical Analysis traders, liquidity suppliers would be faced with noise
traders herding on one side of the market, making liquidity provision or arbitrage
trading less attractive.
Assuming that TA signals contain no fundamental information about some stock and
are not systemically related to external idiosyncratic information events, the results
show that price discovery is influenced by Technical Analysis signals. The findings
contribute to empirical market microstructure research by highlighting the relevance
of investment heuristics such as Technical Analysis for the microstructure of stock
trading. In particular, liquidity and price discovery can be significantly influenced by
trading signals and thereby provides one answer to Subrahmanyam (2007) question
on "whose biases affect prices" (see Section 1.1). Additionally, the empirical analysis
complements theoretical evidence from models considering noise trading under limited
arbitrage such as De Long et al. (1990a) and De Long et al. (1990b). In particular
moving average strategies seem to be able to cause permanent price deviations as they
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encourage short-term (positive) feedback trading.
On the other hand, the presented research adds to the literature on Technical Analysis
supporting the view of other empirical studies that moving averages plays a role for
the German stock market and adds novel evidence that support and resistance levels
are related to liquidity supply (i. e., limit order book volume). Since a great share of
trading on Xetra is due to algorithmic traders, it seems likely that Technical Analysis
related strategies play a role for some of them, i. e., Technical Analysis is not only an
issue for retail investors.
The analyses of implicit trading costs imply for both techniques that pursuing such
strategies does not reduce costs for demanding liquidity as a result of potentially reduced
adverse selection risks for liquidity supplier, but implicit trading costs can even increase.
For liquidity demander who want to trade large volume, support and resistance level
could be helpful to locate high volumes of limit order supply in the book.
The third research question, which is discussed in Chapter 4, considers a long-
standing stylized fact of stock trading, namely round number effects and limit order
clustering.
Research Question 3. How do round number biases influence trading on the
German stock market?
First of all, this thesis provides empirical evidence that round nubmer effects are
present in the German stock market. Trading data from Xetra shows excessive buy-
sell-imbalances adjacent to round numbers, but in contrast to results by Bhattacharya
et al. (2012) on the NYSE the effects appear to have local characteristics. In particular,
there is no quarter effect in Germany. Instead, 20-cent price levels tend to exhibit larger
imbalances, which seem to be in relation to the local currency (Euro vs. Dollar coins)
and historic trading conditions (eighth and sixteenth tick sizes in the U.S. market) that
serve as cognitive reference points for market participants.
The study contributes to the literature by identifying drivers of buy-sell-imbalances
and how they develop over time. Higher price levels are associated with larger buy-sell
imbalances around round numbers. Likewise, smaller tick size lead to stronger round
number effects as limit orders can be distributed over more price steps. However, the
187
Chapter 5 Conclusion and Outlook
latter is superimposed by the overall negative trend in round number effects, which is
stable over the sample period. This apparent trend could be related to an increasing
share of algorithmic traders who are hardly effected by number biases.
The novel finding regarding this research questions is provided by the analysis of
stock trading data from Stuttgart Stock Exchange as an assessment of human (retail
investor) behavior. Comparing market and limit orders reveals that the usage of limit
orders (prices) is the main driver of excessive buy-sell imbalances of retail investors,
while market orders are almost unbiased. Furthermore, the effects on the retail investor
exchange remain stable over time. This suggests that the main cause for round number
biases is the implementation of limit order, i. e., the specification of limit price, and the
undercutting effect is most dominant factor for buy-sell imbalances of those suggested
by Bhattacharya et al. (2012).
The implications for retail investor are twofold. As Kuo et al. (2015) confirm for
the Taiwanese stock market, clustered retail investor orders suffer considerable losses.
Put differently, other market participants are able to trade successfully against these
orders. By becoming aware of their cognitive bias regarding round numbers, human
investors could improve their perception of current prices, the precision of their price
estimates, and their trade implementation strategy. With respect to limit orders, they
must become aware of the risk being adverse selected (cf. Linnainmaa, 2010). Second,
retail investors need to realize that setting limit orders preferentially on or close to
round numbers can convey information into the market signaling that the order is more
likely to be uninformed, while no other positive effects are obtained in return (Kuo
et al., 2015).
The results on Research Question 3 should motivate the retail financial service
industry to enhance the support for their clients implementing trades, e. g., to increase
the awareness of associated risk of each order type or decision support for the selection
of the right order type given the purpose of a trade. Along the same line, the NYSE
recently abolished stop-orders (New York Stock Exchange, 2015), because the exchange
operator expects it "will help raise awareness around the potential risks during volatile
trading" (Reuters, 2015). The change of trading rules indicates the NYSE suspects that
retail investor do not fully understand stop-orders, which require the specification of a
stop price comparable to the limit price of limit orders.
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5.2 Outlook
Empirical research highly depends on the available data and information used to
address the research questions of interest. This thesis has explored the meaning of
Technical Analysis and round number biases on the basis of public exchange data. An
analysis of other data sources that describe investor behavior on financial markets could
provide further insights helping to understand investor behavior and to support them in
achieving their investment goals. Similar, more detailed (stock) trading data providing
further information on the identities of market participants could help to improve the
understanding of the microstructure of trading. In the following, I discuss several
research topics as well as potential practical implementations that could advance or
build on the results and implications of the research presented in this thesis.
Market Microstructure and Noise Trading
Besides the considered Technical Analysis techniques and round number biases, there
are a lot more trading styles which might cause a significant amount of noise in
securities markets. With respect to Technical Analysis, a selection of specific strategies
were analyzed in this thesis. Hence, there is room to explore which strategies are
adopted most by market participants in order to isolate situations when noise trading is
most intense. Although I have argued against the approach to ’reverse engineer’ the
calibration of Technical Analysis strategies by finding those parameters maximizing
some objective function (e. g., turnover), this approach could provide interesting insights
when combined with more precise trading information such as (anonymized) trader
IDs or identifiers for specific types of market participants (e. g., algorithmic trader).
By identifying eminent signals in relation to some group of traders, we could analyze
their role in specific trading environments (e. g., volatile trading). This role could be
of significant importance given (automated) trading on Technical Analysis impounds
additional liquidity demand in the direction of large price moves, e. g., when moving
average signals are triggered in course of a price shock. Thereby we could gain additional
insights regarding the role of noise trading in different market situations.
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Analysis of Retail Investor Brokerage Accounts
The results presented in this thesis refer to the population of retail investors. Data on
individual trading efforts from brokerage accounts could add interesting insights on the
particular usage of specific trading heuristics (similar to the studies by Hoffmann and
Shefrin (2014), Etheber et al. (2014), and Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos, and
Meyer (2012)). However, the mere observation of account activities is not sufficient to
show whether retail investors meet their investment goals, for instance, when their main
intention is to gamble for entertainment reasons. Thus, complementary surveys and
socio-demographic information are needed to obtain a complete view on the investor.
Such complete data sets could be a promising foundations to identify aspects of the
implementation of trading heuristics and provide insights where retail investors could
benefit most from additional support or, in other words, where they make the most
severe mistakes.
While brokerage data has been extensively studied in several dimensions, actual
methods to support brokerage clients have rarely been tested from a scientific perspective
and therefore have a lot of potential for future research. First interesting approaches
consider unbiased investment advise (Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos, and
Meyer, 2012) and personalized reports for retail investors (Meyer et al., 2015).
Empirical Assessment of Information Channels and Types on Financial Websites
Financial websites are important information sources for many investors. Typical
financial websites2 provide numerous different types of information and analyses, such
as news, economic indicators, corporate fundamentals, price histories, and tools like
data visualizations (charts), Technical Analysis, and order flow analysis. While there is
evidence on aggregate behavior around news (Barber and Odean, 2008), stock message
boards (Antweiler and Frank, 2004), TV shows (Engelberg et al., 2011), Google search
volume (Da et al., 2011), and other attentions effects, the actual usage of financial
websites by (retail) investors is mainly unexplored. Since modern website are able to
track a lot of information on their visitors (e. g., click paths, cookie information, client
2See among many others, http://www.marketwatch.com/, http://www.finanzen.net/, and
https://www.boerse-stuttgart.de/.
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information) and many of these websites have contents for registered users only (e. g.,
watchlists), there is a lot of individual information available.
The information on individuals as well as on the usage of the website could provide
interesting insights on the role of different information sources for retail investors’
information processing and decision making. Furthermore, the identification of infor-
mation demand with respect to individual characteristics of the user could be utilized
to improve information supply for retail investors, for instance, to reduce information
overload by improved information selection and preprocessing.
Experimental Analysis of Investor Behavior and Data Visualizations
Empirical studies lack the possibility to isolate single effects and biases in decision
making for several reasons. Foremost, the unavailability of personal information on the
individuals and the impact of superimposing effects as a consequence of an uncontrolled
environment and setting limit the explanatory power. Laboratory experiments can be
used to partly overcome such problems and allow the assessment of very specific
effects.
In the context of this thesis, an interesting question is how trading heuristics influ-
ence the decision making process on an individual level. More specifically, Technical
Analysis tools and data visualization could be considered. Existing experimental studies
analyze how price charts and visualizations alter the belief in trends and their strength
with respect to forecasts and the confidence about future price developments (e. g.,
Mussweiler and Schneller, 2003; Glaser et al., 2007; Rötheli, 2011). Mostly unexplored
in these studies is how the actual trading behavior is influenced, i. e., do participants
trade more frequently and is their risk taking behavior and risk perception influenced by
trading heuristics such as Technical Analysis. Experimental evidence by Kaufmann et al.
(2013) shows that risk perception can be positively supported by graphical displays and
experience sampling of risk. While the latter implies a positive effect of visualizations
(information presentation), the fact that the behavior is influenced at all suggests that
a manipulation of behavior in a manner which is not beneficial for the investors is
possible, too.
In sum, experimental research as described above could serve as a foundation for
future initiatives to build systems and tools that support (retail) investors in making
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financial decisions. Furthermore, it could provide insights on the effects of the increased
application of data visualizations and chart tools in brokerage accounts. If it turns
out that these tools encourage users to act in contrast to their actual intentions and
preferences, this line of research could provide arguments whether such offerings are
appropriate for certain investors, e. g., financially illiterate investors.
Decision Support for Retail Investors and Financial Education
Section 1.1 motivated the presented research on the basis of a stylized investment
process. As discussed, there is evidence that households’ investment performance is
suboptimal, but the reasons therefore are manifold. The question arises how retail
investors can be supported to meet their investment goals, e. g., a solid retirement
provision.
In recent years, the start-up industry in the financial service sector is rapidly growing.
Several so-called Fintechs have developed automated online asset management accounts,
which intend to compete with classical (online) brokerage and banking services. Their
key selling point is simple and automated investment advise coming at relatively low
costs compared to classical bank advisers or wealth managers. The automated advisory
(so-called robo-advisory) typically seeks to capture the clients’ financial situation and
goals from which default solutions are derived and offered to the client. In that respect,
the scope and complexity of robo-advisors is fairly limited and current features are far
from fully digitalizing real investment advisers. For instance, it seems questionable
whether the average retail investor is able to formulate a suiting investment goal given
her financial situation because the relevance of different dimensions can be fairly
complex (e. g., forecasts of income and consumption rates).
Hence, there is much room to enhance the support of (retail) investors with regard to
the stylized investment process. First of all, since the average level of financial literacy in
Germany (and other countries alike) is considered as low, additional financial education
offers are required, e. g., in schools or on online (learning) platforms. However, it is
unclear how to support self-directed financial decision making in an effective way, i. e.,
which parts of the investment problem should be supported and which can be automated.
The meta-analysis by Fernandes et al. (2014) suggests that financial education decays
over time and, thus, ad-hoc decision support might be more valuable than single
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education programs. How ad-hoc decision support in a retail investment context can be
realized in an effective way is an open question for future research that would provide
an extensive social benefit.
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A.1 Supplementary Materials for Chapter 2
FIGURE A.1: Xetra Trading Schedule. This figure shows the official continuous
trading and auction schedule of Xetra for different types of securities. Source:
Deutsche Börse, http://www.xetra.com/xetra-en/trading/trading-information/
auction-schedule (accessed on August 9, 2016).
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TABLE A.1: Thomson Reuters Tick History – Times & Sales Data Example. This table shows a few seconds of Xetra
trading in the stock of RWE AG. Quote observations only show changes in the prevailing quote. Trade observation report
trade price and volume of an executed trade. Qualifiers denote message flags which provide coded message details.
GMT Bid Bid Ask Ask
RIC Date[G] Time[G] Offset Type Price Volume Price Size Price Size Qualifiers
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:02.308 1 Quote 26.385 295 345 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:02.791 1 Trade 26.4 345 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:02.809 1 Quote 26.395 125 26.415 77 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:02.880 1 Trade 26.405 125 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:03.312 1 Quote 995 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:03.811 1 Quote 1606 26.42 378 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:04.326 1 Quote 26.405 295 26.425 714 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:04.817 1 Quote 602 26.415 340 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:05.305 1 Quote 1141 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:05.526 1 Trade 26.41 17 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:05.573 1 Trade 26.41 295 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:05.837 1 Quote 602 26.41 119 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
RWEG.DE 24.Jan12 08:29:07.934 1 Quote 307 TRADE [GV1_TEXT];
[PRC_QL2]
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TABLE A.2: Sample of DAX30 Stocks. The table lists the 30 DAX stocks analyzed in
this thesis. Stock names are obtained from Deutsche Börse Cash Market Statistics
(http://goo.gl/N5pagN accessed on August 9, 2016.). Stock names are stated with the
following German abbreviations (English translation in parentheses). "NA" Namensaktie
(registered share); "VNA" vinkulierte Namensaktie (registered share with restricted
transferability); "O.N." Ohne Nennwert (no-par-value); "VZO" Vorzugsaktie ohne
Stimmrecht (non-voting bearer preferred share).
Stock Name RIC ISIN
ADIDAS AG NA O.N. ADSGn.DE DE000A1EWWW0
ALLIANZ SE VNA O.N. ALVG.DE DE0008404005
BASF SE NA O.N. BASFn.DE DE000BASF111
BAYER AG NA BAYGn.DE DE000BAY0017
BEIERSDORF AG O.N. BEIG.DE DE0005200000
BAYRISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AG ST BMWG.DE DE0005190003
COMMERZBANK AG CBKG.DE DE000CBK1001
CONTINENTAL AG O.N. CONG.DE DE0005439004
DAIMLER AG NA O.N. DAIGn.DE DE0007100000
DEUTSCHE BANK AG NA O.N. DB1Gn.DE DE0005140008
DEUTSCHE BOERSE NA O.N. DBKGn.DE DE0005810055
DEUTSCHE POST AG NA O.N. DPWGn.DE DE0005552004
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG NA DTEGn.DE DE0005557508
E.ON SE NA EONGn.DE DE000ENAG999
FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE KGAA O.N. FMEG.DE DE0005785802
FRESENIUS SE+CO.KGAA O.N. FREG.DE DE0005785604
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG O.N. HEIG.DE DE0006047004
HENKEL AG+CO.KGAA VZO HNKG_p.DE DE0006048432
INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG NA O.N. IFXGn.DE DE0006231004
K+S AG NA O.N. LHAG.DE DE000KSAG888
LANXESS AG LING.DE DE0005470405
LINDE AG O.N. LXSG.DE DE0006483001
LUFTHANSA AG VNA O.N. MRCG.DE DE0008232125
MERCK KGAA O.N. MUVGn.DE DE0006599905
MUENCHER RUECKVERSICHERUNG VNA O.N. RWEG.DE DE0008430026
RWE AG ST O.N. SAPG.DE DE0007037129
SAP AG O.N. SDFGn.DE DE0007164600
SIEMENS AG NA SIEGn.DE DE0007236101
THYSSENKRUPP AG O.N. TKAG.DE DE0007500001
VOLKSWAGEN AG VZO O.N. VOWG_p.DE DE0007664039
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TABLE A.3: Sample of MDAX50 Stocks. The table lists the 50 MDAX stocks analyzed
in this thesis. Stock names are obtained from Deutsche Börse Cash Market Statistics
(http://goo.gl/N5pagN accessed on August 9, 2016.). Stock names are stated with the
following German abbreviations (English translation in parentheses). "NA" Namensaktie
(registered share); "VNA" vinkulierte Namensaktie (registered share with restricted
transferability); "O.N." Ohne Nennwert (no-par-value); "VZO" Vorzugsaktie ohne
Stimmrecht (non-voting bearer preferred share).
Stock Name RIC ISIN
A.SPRINGER SE VNA SPRGn.DE DE0005501357
AAREAL BANK AG ARLG.DE DE0005408116
AIRBUS GRP (LEGALLY EADS) EADS.DE NL0000235190
BAYWA AG BYWGnx.DE DE0005194062
BILFINGER SE O.N. GBFG.DE DE0005909006
BRENNTAG AG BNRGn.DE DE000A1DAHH0
CELESIO AG NAM. O.N. CLSGn.DE DE000CLS1001
DEUTSCHE EUROSHOP AG O.N. DEQGn.DE DE0007480204
DEUTSCHE WOHNEN AG INH DWNG.DE DE000A0HN5C6
DMG MORI SEIKI AG O.N. GILG.DE DE0005878003
DOUGLAS AG DOHG.DE DE0006099005
DUERR AG O.N. DUEG.DE DE0005565204
ELRINGKLINGER AG NA O.N. ZILGn.DE DE0007856023
FIELMANN AG O.N. FIEG.DE DE0005772206
FRAPORT AG FFM.AIRPORT FRAG.DE DE0005773303
FUCHS PETROL.SE VZO O.N. FPEG_p.DE DE0005790430
GAGFAH S.A. NOM. EO 1,25 GFJG.DE LU0269583422
GEA GROUP AG G1AG.DE DE0006602006
GERRESHEIMER AG GXIG.DE DE000A0LD6E6
GERRY WEBER INTERNATIONAL O.N. GWIG.DE DE0003304101
GSW IMMOBILIEN AG GIBG.DE DE000GSW1111
HAMBURGER HAFEN UND LOGISTIK AG HHFGn.DE DE000A0S8488
HANN.RUECK SE NA O.N. HNRGn.DE DE0008402215
HOCHTIEF AG HOTG.DE DE0006070006
HUGO BOSS AG NA O.N. BOSSn.DE DE000A1PHFF7
KABEL DT. HOLDING AG O.N. KD8Gn.DE DE000KD88880
KLOECKNER + CO SE NA KCOGn.DE DE000KC01000
KRONES AG O.N. KRNG.DE DE0006335003
KUKA AG KU2G.DE DE0006204407
LEONI AG NA O.N. LEOGn.DE DE0005408884
MAN SE ST O.N. MANG.DE DE0005937007
METRO AG ST O.N. MEOG.DE DE0007257503
MTU AERO ENGINES NA O.N. MTXGn.DE DE000A0D9PT0
NORMA GROUP SE NA O.N. NAFG.DE DE000A1H8BV3
Continued on next page
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Continued from last page
PROSIEBENSAT.1 NA O.N. PSMG_p.DE DE000PSM7770
PUMA SE PUMG.DE DE0006969603
RATIONAL AG RAAG.DE DE0007010803
RHEINMETALL AG RHMG.DE DE0007030009
RHOEN-KLINIKUM O.N. RHKG.DE DE0007042301
SALZGITTER AG O.N. SZGG.DE DE0006202005
SGL CARBON SE O.N. SGCG.DE DE0007235301
SKY DTLD AG NA SKYDn.DE DE000SKYD000
STADA ARZNEIMITTEL VNA O.N. STAGn.DE DE0007251803
SUEDZUCKER MA. O.N. SZUG.DE DE0007297004
SYMRISE AG INH. O.N. SY1G.DE DE000SYM9999
TAG IMMOBILIEN AG TEGG.DE DE0008303504
TUI AG NA TUIGn.DE DE000TUAG000
VOSSLOH AG VOSG.DE DE0007667107
WACKER CHEMIE O.N. WCHG.DE DE000WCH8881
WINCOR NIXDORF O.N. WING.DE DE000A0CAYB2
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A.2 Supplementary Materials for Chapter 4
TABLE A.4: Tobit Regression Model of Buy-sell Imbalances in DAX and MDAX. The
table shows regression results estimated from the pooled data of DAX and MDAX
stocks. The dependent variable is the absolute order imbalance. The sample period
spans from January 2009 to December 2013. The regression equation is defined as
|Imba| = ∑5i=1βi ∗ centdummy i +∑5i=1 γi ∗ centdummy i ∗ M DAX + δ ∗ AvgPrice +∑
F ixedE f f ec ts, where F ixedE f f ec ts denote stock and year dummies. *, **, and
*** denote significance on the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Order Imbalance
Estimate Std. Dev.
Integer (.99, .01) 0.1693*** 0.0068
Integer * MDAX 0.0718*** 0.0087
Half-Euro (.49, .51) 0.1243*** 0.0068
Half-Euro * MDAX 0.0638*** 0.0087
20-Cents (.19, .39, .59, .79, 0.0715*** 0.0036
.19, .39, .59, .79)
20-Cents * MDAX 0.0213*** 0.0046
10-Cents (.09, .29, .69, .89 0.0625*** 0.0036
.11, .31, .71, .91)
10-Cents * MDAX 0.0235*** 0.0046
5-Cents (.04, .14, .24, .34, .44, 0.0152*** 0.0025
.54, .64, .74, .85, .94, .06, .16, .26,
.36, .46, .56, .66, .76, .86, .96)
5-Cents * MDAX -0.0026 0.0031
Average Price 0.0638** 0.0087
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TABLE A.5: The Impact of Tick Size Regimes on Conditional Buy-Sell Imbalances – Subsample Analysis. The logistic
regression model shown in this model is equivalent to the model reported in Tabel 4.6 but estimated on a subsample of the
original analysis including Q4/2009 and Q1/2010 only. The regression model is specified as Order Imba = α+
∑6
i=1(β
(1)
i ∗
int i +β
(2)
i ∗ int i ∗ dummy2010+β (3)i ∗ int i ∗ t ick+β (4)i ∗ int i ∗ t ick ∗ dummy2010+
∑4
j=1 γ
( j)
i f iveCi ∗ [...])+
∑
cont rols.
Controls include fixed effects for stock and year as well as dummies for penny-endings (0 to 9), turnover, volume, and the
trade direction of the previous trade. The table shows differences in coefficient estimates between the integer and 5-cent
group with respect to the tick size dummy and the dummy for trades in 2010, as well as their intersection. Column ’No
Dummy’ shows the baseline effect, i.e. stocks traded between EUR 50 and EUR 100 in 2009. Columns ’Dummy 2010’ and
’Tick Size Dummy’ measure overall changes in 2010 and the difference of effects in the group of trades between EUR 2
and EUR 50. The column ’Tick Size & 2010’ shows the differences in the interaction term which measure the impact of
the new tick size regime. P-values for coefficient differences are obtained from Wald tests.
No Dummy Dummy 2010 Tick Size Dummy Tick Size & 2010
β
(1)
i − γ(1)i β (2)i − γ(2)i β (3)i − γ(3)i β (4)i − γ(4)i
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Ask falls below integer-
0.0502 <0.0001 -0.0219 0.0248 -0.0283 0.0004 0.0242 0.0012
Ask falls below nickel
Ask rises while staying below integer-
0.0801 <0.0001 -0.0209 0.0261 -0.0468 0.0011 0.0368 0.0437
Ask rises while staying below nickel
Ask falls to integer-
0.3702 <0.0001 -0.0508 0.0525 -0.0549 0.0266 0.0645 0.0655
Ask falls to nickel
Bid rises to integer-
-0.4114 <0.0001 0.0863 0.0012 0.1392 <0.0001 -0.1225 0.0006
Bid rises to nickel
Bid rises above integer-
-0.0275 <0.0001 0.0012 0.9103 0.0237 0.0072 0.0248 0.0415
Bid rises above nickel
Bid falls while staying above integer-
-0.046 <0.0001 -0.0282 0.0025 0.0120 0.1515 0.0251 0.0299
Bid falls while staying above nickel
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